Electoral Competition and Coalition Bargaining in Multiparty Systems

Abstract

This paper is about mass constraints on parties engaged in coalition bargaining. Models of coalition bargaining most commonly focus on policy distances between parties, and have often neglected the part electoral competition plays in the process. In the electoral arena, in order to gain votes, parties are advocates of conflict and offer the electorates clear and distinctive electoral platforms. In the parliamentary arena, however, in order to bargain their way into some coalition alternative, they are forced to water down the clarity of the party program and to give policy concessions to other parties. Thus, a dilemma occurs between seeking office and seeking votes. This dilemma is the topic of the current paper. Two questions are analysed: to what extent do the parties' electoral strategies constrain their coalition potentials? And what is the effect of elite strategy on voters' attitudes and preferences? Using the 1993 Norwegian parliamentary election as a case study, the findings suggest that policy alterations made in the electoral arena for the purpose of gaining votes in fact reduced the parties' bargaining potentials.