In their article in this issue, Singleton and Taylor ask why some groups of users of a commons are able to resolve their collective action problems on their own and others are not. They argue that when groups approximate a community of mutually vulnerable individuals, they are able to develop endogenous solutions. In this note, I discuss four questions: (1) Is community important for the solution of CPR problems? (2) Is community sufficient for the solution of CPR problems? (3) Is community necessary for the solution of CPR problems? and (4) Are solutions to CPR problems robust over the long-run without enforcers?
Alexander, Paul
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2.
Alexander, Paul
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3.
Blomquist, William
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4.
Glaser, Christina
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5.
Ostrom, Elinor
(1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
6.
Ostrom, Vincent
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7.
Ostrom, Vincent
(1992) The Constitution of Order in Human Societies: An Inquiry Concerning the Pragmatics of Language in the Political, Social, and Policy Sciences. Bloomington: Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (preliminary draft), forthcoming.
8.
Taylor, Michael
(1982) Community, Anarchy, and Liberty. New York: Cambridge University Press.
