In the spatial model of politics voters choose the candidates closest to them in weighted Euclidean distance, and candidates seek to compete by positioning and repositioning themselves in and n-dimensional policy space. This model has recently come under attack from a number of scholars who assert its depiction of politics is unrealistic. Still these critiques retain the character of the original model. We offer a more radical alternative: an explicitly neo-Downsian spatial model of ideology specifying the linkage between ideological messages and policy positions. After indicating the importance of ideology as a theory, a formula depiction is offered and an illustrative empirical application is provided.
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