This paper affords an informal introduction to the work of economists on interest groups and their role in the political process. Among the major analysts considered are Olson, Stigler, Posner, Peltzman, Becker and the Virginia economists, notably Tullock and Tollison. Political scientists are encouraged to become familiar with this body of work because the study of `rent-seeking' is now a major enterprise within public choice.
Anderson, Gary M.
and Robert D. Tollison (1988) `Legislative Monopoly and the Size of Government', Southern Economic Journal54(1): 529-545.
2.
Becker, Gary S.
(1983) `A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence', The Quarterly Journal of Economicsxcviii(3): 371-399.
3.
Becker, Gary S.
(1985a) `Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs', Journal of Public Economics28(2): 330-347.
4.
Becker, Gary S. (1985b) `Special Interests and Public Policies', The Frank E. Seidman Distinguished Award in Political Economy, Acceptance Paper, Rhoads College. Memphis: P. K. Seidman Foundation.
5.
Benson, Bruce L.
and Eric M. Engen (1988) `The Market for Laws: An Economic Analysis of Legislation', Southern Economic Journal54(1): 732-745.
6.
Bentley, Arthur F.
(1908) The Process of Government. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
7.
Brennan, G.
and J. M. Buchanan (1980) The Power to Tax. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8.
Brough, Wayne T.
and Mwangi S. Kimenyi (1986) `On the Efficient Extraction of Rents by Dictators', Public Choice48(1): 37-48.
9.
Buchanan, J.M.
and G. Tullock (1962) Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
10.
Colander, David C.
, ed. (1984) Neoclassical Political Economy. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
11.
Crain, Mark
(1979) `Cost and Output in the Legislative Firm', Journal of Legal Studies8(3): 607-621.
12.
Crain, Mark
and Robert D. Tollison (1980) `The Sizes of Majorities'', Southern Economic Journal46(2): 726-734.
13.
Downs, Anthony
. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Brothers.
14.
Downs, Anthony
(1960) `Why the Government Budget in Democracies is Too Small', World Politics12(3): 541-563.
15.
Ekelund, Robert D., Jr
and Robert D. Tollison (1981) Mercantilism As a Rent-Seeking Society. College Station: Texas A & M Press.
16.
Friedman, D.
(1987) Price Theory. Cincinnati: Southwestern Publishing Co.
17.
Friedman, Milton
(1986) `Tax Reform Lets Politicians Look for New Donors', The Wall Street Journal7 July, p. 10-10.
18.
Galbraith, John K.
(1952) American Capitalism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
19.
Krueger, Anne O.
(1972) `The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', American Economic Review64(2): 291-303.
20.
Levi, Margaret
(1988) Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.
21.
Liebenstein, Harvey
(1987) Inside the Firm. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
22.
Lowi, Theodore
(1979) The End of Liberalism. New York: W.W. Norton.
23.
North, Douglass C.
(1981) Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W. W. Norton.
24.
Olson, Mancur, Jr
(1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
25.
Olson, Mancur, Jr
(1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
26.
Olson, Mancur
and Richard Zeckhauser (1966) `An Economic Theory of Alliances', Review of Economics and Statisticsxlviii(3): 266-279.
27.
Peltzman, Sam
(1976) `Toward a More General Theory of Regulation', Journal of Law and EconomicsXIX(3): 211-240.
28.
Posner, Richard A.
(1971) `Taxation by Regulation', The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science2(2): 22-50.
29.
Posner, Richard A.
(1974) `Theories of Economic Regulation', The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science5(3): 335-358.
30.
Rowley, Charles K.
, Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock, eds (1988) The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Boston: Kluwer.
31.
Samuelson, Paul A.
(1954) `The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure', Review of Economic Studies36(4): 387-389.
32.
Shughart, William F.
and Robert D. Tollison (1986) `On the Growth of Government and the Political Economy of Legislation', Law and Economics9(1): 111-127.
33.
Stigler, George
and C. Friedland (1962) `What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity', Journal of Law and Economics5(3): 1-16.
34.
Stigler, George
and C. Friedland (1971) `The Theory of Economic Regulation', The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science2(2): 3-21.
35.
Stigler, George
and C. Friedland (1974) `Free Riders and Collective Action', The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science5(4): 359-365.
36.
Tollison, Robert D.
and Robert E. McCormick (1981) Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy. Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff.
37.
Tollison, Robert D.
and Robert E. McCormick (1982) `Rent Seeking: A Survey', Kyklos35(1): 575-602.
38.
Truman, David
(1952) The Governmental Process, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
39.
Tullock, Gordon
(1967) `The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft', Western Economic Journal5(2): 224-232.
40.
Tullock, Gordon
(1971) `The Cost of Transfers', Kyklos24(3): 629-643.
41.
Tullock, Gordon
(1974) `More on the Cost of Transfers', Kyklos27(2): 378-381.
42.
Tullock, Gordon
(1974) `The Transitional Gains Trap', The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science6(3): 671-678.
43.
von Weiser, Friedrich
(1971) Natural Value. (A translation of Der Naturliche Werth, 1893, Book VI, `Value in the Economy of the State'.)New York: Augustus M. Kelley.
44.
von Weiser, Friedrich
(1967) Social Economics. (A translation of Theorie der Gesellschaftlichen Wirstschaft, 1914, Book III, `Theory of the State-Economy'.)New York: Augustus M. Kelley.
