We provide a theory that derives conditions under which presidents' ability to increase the salience of an issue will generate legislative influence and correspondingly, conditions under which presidents will engage in this activity of public agenda setting. The theory shows that presidents can obtain influence from not only the act, but also the threat of public agenda setting. However, even when the action is costless, presidents can not always achieve policy goals from it. When a president does not want Congress to become more responsive to public opinion, or when the status quo is not extreme relative to his/her preferred outcome and voters' preferences, the president lacks a policy-based incentive to increase the salience of an issue. These predictions are illustrated with cases involving President Reagan's tax policy negotiations and President Clinton's budget negotiations.
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