This is a reply to Dan Felsenthal's and Moshé Machover's verdict on the Holler-Widgrén contribution to the Symposium on `Power Indices and the European Union' in the July 1999 issue of this Journal. It questions the benefits of discussing the game-theoretical nature of power indices and argues that the public good index represents I-power, and not P-power. Moreover, it defends the application of the permutation model to represent preferences behind a veil of ignorance.
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Holler, Manfred J.
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Machover, Moshé
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Widgrén, Mika
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