Abstract
Amos Tversky died in 1996. Tversky's professional ideas and contributions revolutionized not only his own field of cognitive psychology, but that of economics as well. The purpose of this article is to systematically outline the meaning and potential significance of Tversky's insights for the study of political science. This discussion centers on three specific foci: judgment under uncertainty; decision-making under risk; and reason-based choice. Two noteworthy points emerge from this review and analysis. First, Tversky's work stresses the importance of reason-based choice, whereby individuals actively seek to generate, understand, and justify their decisions. Second, Tversky's work suggests that people do not act even `as if' they were the value-maximizers they are purported to be by more rationally based theories, such as expected utility. Rather, individuals function as problem-solvers who creatively construct their choices and resolve complex problems which require trade-offs between values and goals. In this way, preferences are created, rather than elicited, within the process and context of choice itself.
Keywords
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
