Laruelle and Widgrén (1998) have raised the question of whether the allocation of voting power in the EU is fair. This paper extends some of their results insofar as (1) it deals with the consequences if the square root rule - which is the basis for calculating fair shares of voting power - is not fully applicable; (2) it calculates voting weights that lead to a fair allocation of voting power in the EU Council; and (3) it considers the effects of an EU enlargement on the fair allocation of voting power.
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