Abstract
This paper provides a new explanation for autocracies’ political stability by focusing on the role of changes in asymmetric public perceptions of different policy dimensions. We show that the probability of policies enabling the provision of public goods on one dimension alone increases with the opacity of public perception. In turn, this implies that the probability of coups and revolts has a non-monotonic behavior in asymmetric opacity. Thus, transitional periods with changes in public perception might lead to an increase in the probability of coup and revolt attempts, reducing autocratic stability, and thereby altering some established ideas in the literature.
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