We analyze a model of leader gender and crisis bargaining under asymmetric information. There are no essential differences between the sexes in their willingness to use force, but sexist leaders receive a subjective boost for defeating female leaders in war and pay a subjective cost for defeat. We show that this hostile sexism can lead to war for two reasons, first by offering sufficient private benefits to make peace impossible and second by influencing an uninformed leader’s willingness to risk war. We also show that (a) the effect of leader sex on disputes and war depends on the distribution of power, (b) sexist leaders may initiate disputes at less favorable distributions of power than non-sexist leaders, and (c) sexist leaders adopt bargaining strategies that make it difficult for women to cultivate and benefit from reputations for resolve, even in the absence of sex differences in the willingness to use force.
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