Recent attention to presidential action recognizes the legal and constitutional questions surrounding the controversial use of many of these powers. Yet, scholarly research on executive policymaking tends to ignore the role of the courts, instead focusing on presidential–congressional relations. I develop a formal theory of the president’s decision to issue a signing statement in the face of constraints from the Supreme Court. The model produces several novel predictions. First, I predict that the president is more likely to issue a signing statement when he is ideologically aligned with the Court. Second, contrary to previous literature, the president is more likely to issue a statement when his preferences are also aligned with Congress. Finally, when reviewing legislation that is constitutionally challenged, I predict that the Court is more likely to rule in favor of the president’s position when he has issued a signing statement.
AinsworthSHarwardBMMoffettKW (2012) Congressional response to presidential signing statements. American Politics Research40(6): 1067–1091.
2.
AlitoSAJr (1986) Using presidential signing statements to make fuller use of the president’s constitutionally assigned role in the process of enacting law. Memo. February5. Office of Legal Counsel, US Department of Justice.
3.
American Bar Association (2006) American Bar Association policy regarding presidential signing statements, August7–8.
4.
ArnoldD (1990) The Logic of Congresional Action. New Haven: Yale University Press.
5.
BaileyJRottinghausB (2014) Reexamining the use of unilateral orders: Source of authority and the power to act alone. American Politics Research20(10): 1–31.
6.
BaileyM (2007) Comparable preference estimates across time and institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency. AJPS51(3): 433–448.
7.
BeimD (2017) Learning in the judicial hierarchy. The Journal of Politics79(2): 591–604.
8.
BeimDHirshAVKatstellecJP (2014) Whistleblowing and compliance in the judicial hierarchy. American Journal of Political Science58(4): 904–918.
9.
BelcoMRottinghausB (2017) The Dual Executive. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
10.
BerryM (2009) Controversally executing the law. Congress & the Presidency36(3): 244–271.
11.
BlackRCOwensRJ (2009) Agenda setting in the Supreme Court: The collision of policy and jurisprudence. The Journal of Politics71(3): 1062–1075.
12.
BlackRCOwensRJ (2011) Solicitor General influence and agenda setting on the U.S. Supreme Court. Political Research Quarterly64(4): 765–778.
13.
BlackRCOwensRJ (2012) Solicitor General and the United States Supreme Court Executive Influence and Judicial Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14.
BoltonAThrowerS (2016) Legislative capacity and executive unilateralism. The American Journal of Political Science60(3): 649–663.
15.
BroomfieldE (2006) A failed attempt to circumvent the international law on torture. The George Washington Law Review75: 105
16.
BrownellREII (1998) The unnecessary demise of the Line Item Veto Act: The Clinton administration’s costly failure to seek acknowledgment of ‘national security rescission’. The American University Law Review47: 1273–1351.
17.
ButhmanG (2007) Signing statements and the president’s non-enforcement power. Oklahoma City University Law Review32: 103.
18.
CameronC (2000) Veto Bargaining. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19.
Canes-WroneB (2003) Bureaucratic decisions and the composition of the lower courts. American Journal of Political Science47(2): 205–214.
20.
Canes-WroneB (2006) Who Leads Whom?Chicago: Chicago University Press.
21.
CarrollK (1997) Whose statute is it anyway?The Catholic University Law Review46(2): 475–521.
22.
CarrubaCJZornC (2010) Executive discretion, judicial decision making, and separation of powers in the United States. The Journal of Politics72(3): 812–824.
23.
CarusonKBitzerJM (2004) At the crossroads of policymaking: Executive politics, administrative action, and judicial deference by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals (1985–1996). Law & Policy26(3–4): 347–369.
24.
CassRStraussP (2007) The constitutional implications of presidential signing statements. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 16(1): 11–26.
25.
ChiouF-YRothenbergL (2014) The elusive search for presidential power. American Journal of Political Science58(3): 653–668.
26.
ChiouF-YRothenbergL (2017) The Enigma of Presidential Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
27.
CohenLSpitzerM (1996) Judicial deference to agency action: A rational choice theory and an empirical test. Southern California Law Review68: 431–476.
28.
CooperP (2002) By Order of the President. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
29.
CooperP (2005) George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the use and abuse of presidential signing statements. Presidential Studies Quarterly35(3): 515–532.
30.
CooperP (2007) The last word? The constitutional implications of presidential signing statements as declaratory judgments: The president as judge. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal16: 253–282.
31.
CrabbM (2008) The Executive Branch Shall ConstrueKansas Law Review56: 711–743.
32.
CrombezCGrosecloseTKrehbielK (2006) Gatekeeping. The Journal of Politics68(2): 322–334.
33.
CrossFB (1988) the constitutional legitimacy and significance of presidential ‘signing statements.’Administrative Law Review40(2): 209–238.
34.
CrowleyDW (1987) Judicial review of administrative agencies: Does the type of agency matter?The Western Political Quarterly40(2): 265–283.
GarberMWimmerK (1987) Presidential signing statements as interpretations of legislative intent. Harvard Journal of Legislation24: 363.
45.
GenoveseM (1980) The Supreme Court, The Constitution, and Presidential Power. Washington DC: University Press of America, Inc.
46.
GeorgeTEpsteinL (1992) On the nature of Supreme Court decision making. The American Political Science Review86(2): 323–337.
47.
GrosecloseTMcCartyN (2001) The politics of blame: Bargaining before an audience. American Journal of Political Science45(1): 100–119.
48.
HarveyAFriedmanB (2009) Ducking trouble: Congressionally induced selection bias in the Supreme Court’s agenda. The Journal of Politics71(1): 574–592.
49.
HowardRHNixonDC (2002) Regional Court influence over bureaucratic policymaking: Courts, ideological preferences, and the internal revenue service. Political Research Quarterly55(4): 907–922.
50.
HowellW (2003) Power Without Persuasion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
51.
HuberJDShipanCR (2002) Deliberate Discretion?Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
52.
HumphriesMASongerDR (1999) Law and politics in judicial oversight of federal administrative agencies. Journal of Politics61(1): 207–220.
53.
JohnsonG (2014) Judicial deference and executive control over administrative agencies. State Politics and Policy Quarterly14(2): 142–164.
54.
JohnsonG (2015) Executive power and judicial deference: Judicial decision-making on executive power challenges in the American States. Political Research Quarterly68(1): 128–141.
55.
KelleyC (2006) Executing the Constitution. Albany: State University of New York.
56.
KelleyCMarshallB (2008) The last word: Presidential power and the role of signing statements. Presidential Studies Quarterly38(2): 248–267.
57.
KelleyCMarshallB (2009) Assessing presidential power: Signing statements and veto threats as coordinated strategies. American Politics Research37(3): 508–533.
58.
KelleyCMarshallB (2010) Going it alone: The politics of signing statements from Reagan to Bush II. Social Science Quarterly91(1): 168–187.
59.
KelleyCMarshallBWattsD (2013) Assessing the rhetorical side of presidential signing statements. Presidential Studies Quarterly43(2): 274–298.
KepplingerG (2007) Presidential Signing Statements Accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations Acts. Washington DC: US Government Accountability Office.
62.
KorziMJ (2011) ‘A legitimate function’: Reconsidering presidential signing statements. Congress & The Presidency38: 195–216.
63.
KrauseGCohenD (1997) Presidential use of executive orders, 1953–1994. American Politics Research25(4): 458–481.
64.
KrehbielK (1998) Pivotal Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
65.
LewisD (2008) The Politics of Presidential Appointments. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
66.
LowandeKS (2014) After the orders: Presidential memoranda and unilateral action. Presidential Studies Quarterly44(4): 724–741.
67.
MatthewsS (1989) Veto threats: Rhetoric in a bargaining game. Quarterly Journal of Economics104: 347–369.
68.
MayC (1998) Presidential Defiance of Unconstitutional Laws. Westport: Greenwood.
69.
MayerK (2001) With the Stoke of a Pen. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
70.
MayhewD (1974) Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.
71.
McCubbinsMDNollRGWeingastBR (1989) Structure and process, politics and policy: Administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies. Virginia Law Review75(2): 431–482.
72.
MoeT (1985) The politicized presidency. In ChubbJEPEPeterson (eds) Can the Government Govern?Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
73.
MoeTHowellW (1999) The presidential power of unilateral action. Journal of Law and Economics15(1): 132–179.
74.
MoraguezA (n.d.) Policy making in the shadow of executive action. Unpublished manuscript.
75.
OstranderISievertJ (2012) The logic of presidential signing statements. Political Research Quarterly20(10): 1–13.
76.
OstranderISievertJ (2013) What’s so sinister about presidential signing statements?Presidential Studies Quarterly43(1): 58–80.
77.
PfiffnerJ (2008) Power Play: The Bush Presidency and the Constitution. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
78.
RappaportM (2007) The constitutional implications of presidential signing statements. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal16: 113.
79.
RiceLL (2010) Statements of power: Presidential use of statements of administrative policy and signing statements in the legislative process. Presidential Studies Quarterly40(4): 686–707.
80.
RodriguezDBStiglitzEWeignastBR (n.d.) Executive discretion and the rule of law: A positive analysis of presidential signing statements. Unpublished manuscript.
81.
RomerTRosenthalH (1978) Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo. Public Choice33(4): 27–43.
82.
SavageC (2006) Bush challenges hundreds of laws. The Boston Globe, April30.
83.
SegalJSpaethH (2002) The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
84.
SheehanR (1990) Administrative agencies and the court: A reexamination of the impact of agency type on decisional outcomes. The Western Political Quarterly43(4): 875–885.
85.
SheehanR (1992) Federal agencies and the Supreme Court: An analysis of litigation outcomes, 1953–1988. American Politics Research20: 478–500.
86.
SievertJOstranderI (2017) Constraining presidential ambition: Controversy and the decline of signing statements. Presidential Studies Quarterly47(4): 752–776.
87.
SmithJ (2007) Presidents, justices, and deference to administrative action, The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization23(2): 346–364.
88.
SpillerPTTillerE (1996) Invitations to override: Congressional reversals of Supreme Court decisions. International Review of Law and Economics16(4): 503–521.
89.
ThrowerS (2017) The president, the court, and policy implementation. Presidential Studies Quarterly41(1): 122–145.
90.
WaltesB (1987) Let me tell you what you mean: An analysis of presidential signing statements. Ga. L. Rev. 21: 755.
91.
WillisonDH (1986) Judicial review of administrative decisions: Agency cases before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 1981–1984. American Politics Quarterly14(4): 317–327.
92.
WoodBDWatermanRW (1993) the dynamics of political-bureaucratic adaption. American Journal of Political Science37(2): 497–528.
93.
WrightJR (2010) Ambiguous statutes and judicial deference to federal agencies. Journal of Theoretical Politics22(2): 217–245.
94.
YatesJ (1999) Presidential bureaucratic power and Supreme Court justice voting. Political Behavior21(4): 349–366.
95.
YatesJWhitfordA (1998) Presidential Power and the United States Supreme Court. Political Research Quarterly51(2): 539–550.
96.
YatesJ2002. Popular Justice: Presidential Prestige and Executive Success in the Supreme Court. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
