This article compares convergence of political parties when voters are voting strategically and when they are voting sincerely under low-information conditions. In order to examine this problem, I create a computational model of a party system, where parties are uncertain about the distribution of the electorate. In one condition of the model, voters vote sincerely; in another, voters vote strategically. It is found that when voters vote strategically parties are less likely to converge than when voters vote sincerely.
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