We challenge the generally accepted ally principle in legislative politics that a preference outlier committee will distort information to the legislative floor. If interest groups (or other third parties) are rational, they will withhold the most precise information for fear of committee misrepresentation. As a result, even preference outlier committees could be disciplined by their own ignorance not to distort the lobbyist message, as they are uncertain whether lying pays for the current situation or not. Our result calls into question the theoretical foundation of the influential preference outlier debate in legislative politics.
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