This paper examines a recent debate in the literature on power indices in which
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been criticized on the grounds that they do not take into account player
preferences. It has been argued that an index that is blind to preferences misses a
vital component of power, namely strategic interaction. In this vein, there has been
an attempt to develop so-called strategic power indices on the basis of
non-cooperative game theory. We argue that the criticism is unfounded and that a
preference-based power index is incompatible with the definition of power as a
generic ability: ‘the ability to affect outcomes’. We claim that
power resides in, and only in, a game form and not in a game itself.
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