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strategic behavior? This paper focuses on the influence of the judiciary on
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judicial predictability affect federal opportunism. Results of the model indicate
that governments in a federation challenge one another’s behavior in court
less frequently as the judiciary grows more predictable but the effect of
predictability on opportunism depends upon the cost of challenging an agent. When
costs are low, increasing the predictability of the court increases opportunism,
contrary to intuition. The model is extended to consider the effect of a biased court.
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