This article argues that classical (or rational) deterrence theory is logically inconsistent, empirically inaccurate and prescriptively deficient. In its stead it offers an alternative theoretical framework – perfect deterrence theory – that makes consistent use of the rationality postulate and is in accord with the empirical literature of deterrence. Perfect deterrence theory’s axiomatic base, its empirical expectations and its most significant policy prescriptions are highlighted and contrasted with those of classical deterrence theory. The theory’s implications for current policy debates about a national missile defense system, arms control, US policy toward China and Russia, and inter-state negotiations in general, are discussed.
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