China has announced ambitious dual-carbon targets to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. However, due to regional differences and lack of accurate emission monitoring data, local governments have been given greater autonomy to achieve these targets. Based on semi-structured interviews and document analysis on emission peak campaigns in inland regions, this article identifies one local game strategy – ‘Dauling Dragon’ (木翼双龙) whereby local governments prioritize high emission projects to be completed by 2030 in order to create a margin for future development, a phenomenon known as ‘carbon rush’ (碳冲锋). The article explores the consequences and antecedents of such a strategy through the lens of environmental authoritarianism. It also makes a theoretical contribution to the conceptualization of the Dauling Dragon strategy, by focusing on its effects on local environmental implementation. Findings from our case study show that China’s climate ambitions, especially its long-term carbon neutrality goal, faces local political obstacles.
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