Reviews

Abrahamson, E. , & Park, C. (1994). Concealment of negative organizational outcomes: An agency theory perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 37,1141-1166.

Astley, W. G. , & Zammuto, R. F. (1992). Organization science, managers, and language games. Organization Science, 3,443-460.

Ben-Ner, A. (1994). Who benefits from the nonprofit sector? Reforming law and public policy towards nonprofit organizations. Yale Law Journal, 104, 731-762.

Binmore, K. (1992). Fun and games: An introductory text to game theory. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.

Binmore, K (1994). Game theory and the social contract, Vol. 1: Playing fair. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Clotfelter, C. T. (Ed.). (1992). Who benefits from the nonprofit sector? Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Coleman, J. (1993). The rational reconstruction of society. American Sociological Review, 58,1-15.

Davis, D. D. , Holt, C. A. (1993). Experimental economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Douglas, E. J. (1989). The simple analytics of the principal-agent incentive contract. Journal of Economic Education, 20,39-51.

Dyer, G. , & Wilkins, A. (1991). Better stories, not better constructs, to generate better theory. Academy of Management Review, 16,613-619.

Eisenhardt, K. (1991). Better stories and better constructs: The case for rigor and comparative logic. Academy of Management Review, 16,620-627.

Gioia, D. A. , Thomas, J. B. , Clark, S. M. , & Chittipeddi, K. (1994). Symbolism and strategic change in academia: The dynamics of sense making and influence. Organization Science, 5,363-383.

Hall, P. D. (1993). Of books and the scholarly infrastructure. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 22, 5-11.

Hall, P. D. (1995, November 14-16, 20). Filer Commission Papers 1-5, ARNOVA-L electronic discussion list, November 14,15,15,16, and 20, respectively.

Hansmann, H. (1987). Economic theories of nonprofit organizations. In W. W Powell (Ed.). The nonprofit sector: A research handbook (pp. 27-42). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Hart, O. (1995). Corporate governance: Some theory and implications. Economic Journal, 105, 678-689.

Hoffman, E. , McCabe, K. , Shachat, K. , & Smith, V. (1994). Preferences, property rights and anonymity in bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior, 7,346-380.

Holmstroem, B. R. , & Tirole, J. (1989). The theory of the firm. In R. Schmalensee & R. D. Willing (Eds.), Handbook of industrial organization (pp. 61-133). New York: Elsevier Science.

Jeavons, T. H. (1994). Ethics in nonprofit management: Creating a culture of integrity. In R. Hermann & associates (Eds.), The Jossey-Bass handbook of nonprofit leadership and management (pp. 184-207). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Kreps, D. M. (1990a). Corporate culture and economic theory. In J. Alt & K. Shepsle (Eds.), Perspectives on positive political economy (pp. 90-143). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kreps, D. M. (1990b). Game theory and economic modelling. New York: Oxford University Press.

McKinsey Global Institute . (1992). Service sector productivity. Washington, DC: McKinsey & Company.

Milofsky, C. , & Messer, J. (1993). New directions. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 22, 14.

Ortmann, A. (1995, November). Modern economic theory and the study of nonprofit organizations: Why the twain shall meet. Paper presented at the meeting of Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action, Cleveland, OH.

Ortmann, A. , & Colander, D. (in press). A simple principal-agent experiment for the classroom. Economic Inquiry.

Oster, S. M. (1995). Strategic management for nonprofit organizations. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Powell, W. W. (1987). The nonprofit sector: A research handbook. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Rose-Ackerman, S. (Ed.). (1986). The economics of nonprofit institutions: Studies in structure and policy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, V. (1991). Rational choice: The contrast between economics and psychology. Journal of Political Economy, 99, 877-897.

Smith, V. , & Walker, J. (1993). Monetary rewards and decision costs in experimental economics. Economic Inquiry, 31, 245-261.

Stiglitz, J. E. (1993). Principles of economics. New York: Norton.

Tirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Tirole, J. (1994). The internal organization of government. Oxford Economic Papers, 46,1-29.

Young, D. R. , & Steinberg, R. (1995). Economics for nonprofit managers. New York: Foundation Center.

Zamagni, S. (Ed.). (1995). The economics of altruism. Brookfield: Edward Elgar.