Nonprofit organizations, their consultants, and researchers have well-developed ideas about how to evaluate service provision. Yet researchers seem to know much less about how to evaluate their policy campaigning. Perhaps this is not surprising. Because typical campaigning situations are complex, and because "consumer" constituencies are hard to identify and may typically be in mutual conflict, the relationship between activity and impact in campaign management is uncertain. This article develops an approach to the problem by concentrating on the evaluation of strategy rather than of impact directly. It combines policy analysis, norm and convention analysis, and economic analysis of efficiency. The central innovation, however, is to apply game theory to appraise the effectiveness of campaign strategies. A worked example of the approach is given.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Ball, M.
(1988). Evaluation in the voluntary sector. London: Forbes Trust.
2.
Bebbington, A. C.
, & Davies, B. (1986). Equity and efficiency in the allocation of the personal social services. Journal of Social Policy, 12, 309-330.
3.
Becker, G. S.
(1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98,372-400.
4.
Becker, G. S.
(1985). Public policies, pressure groups and deadweight costs. Journal of Public Economics, 28,329-347.
5.
Bell, J.
(1991). Discussion of evaluation issues. London: Voluntary Services Unit, Home Office and Community Development Foundation.
6.
Bianco, W T.
(1994). Trust: Representatives and constituents. Ann Arbor. Michigan University Press.
7.
Booth, W. J.
, James, P., & Meadwell, H. (Eds.). (1993). Politics and rationality. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
8.
Drummond, M. F.
(1980). Principles of economic appraisal in health care. Oxford, England: Oxford Medical Publications, Oxford University Press.
9.
Drummond, M. F.
(1989). Output measurement for resource allocation decisions in health care. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 5, 59-74.
10.
Elster, J.
(1989). The cement of society: A study of social order. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
11.
Hardaker, M.
, & Ward, B. K. (1987). Getting things done: Making a team work. Harvard Business Review, 65(6), 112-117.
12.
Harsanyi, J. C.
(1977). Advances in understanding rational behaviour. In R E. Butts & J. Hintikka (Eds.), Foundational problems in the social sciences. Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel. (Reprinted in 1986 in J. Elster [Ed.], Rational choice [pp. 82-107], Oxford, England: Blackwell)
13.
Hogwood, B. W
, & Gunn, L. A. (1984). Policy analysis for the real world. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
14.
Jenkins, J. C.
(1987). Nonprofit organizations and policy advocacy. In W. W. Powell (Ed.), The nonprofit sector: A research handbook (pp. 296-320). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
15.
Kanter, R M.
, & Summers, D. V (1987). Doing well while doing good: Dilemmas of performance measurement in nonprofit organizations and the need for a multiple constituency approach. In W. W Powell (Ed.), The nonprofit sector: A research handbook (pp. 296-320). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
16.
Knapp, M.R.J.
(1984). The economics of social care. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan.
17.
Kreps, D. M.
(1990). A course in micro-economic theory. Hemel Hempstead, England: Harvester Wheat sheaf.
18.
Law Centres Federation
. (1988). Questions of value: Framework for the evaluation of law centres, Part 3: Evaluation bibliography. London: Author.
19.
MacKeith, J.
(1992, March). Meeting needs or meeting targets? Paper presented at the Third International Conference on Nonprofits, Indianapolis, IN.
20.
March, J. G.
, & Olsen, J. P. (1984). The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life. American Political Science Review, 78, 734-747.
21.
(Reprinted in 1991 in W. W Powell & P. J. DiMaggio [Eds.], The new institutionalism in organizational analysis [pp. 41-62], Chicago: University of Chicago Press)
22.
National Council for Voluntary Organizations
. (1990). Cause and effect. London: Author.
23.
Olson, M.
(1982). The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation, and rigidities. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
24.
Ordeshook, P.
(1986). Game theory and political theory: An introduction. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
25.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
. (1991). The evaluation of labor market and social programs. Paris: Author.
26.
Pietro, D. S.
(Ed.). (1983). Evaluation sourcebook for private and voluntary organizations. New York: American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service.
27.
Rhodes, R.A.W.
, & Marsh, D. (1992). New directions in the study of policy networks. European Journal of Political Research, 21,181-205.
28.
Selten, R.
(1975). Re-examination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory, 4,25-55.
29.
6, P.
(1993, May). The co-ordination problem and institutions in non-profit studies: A research agenda. Paper presented at the "Well-Being in Europe by Strengthening the Third Sector" conference, Barcelona.
30.
6, P.
(1995). Designing the market place of ideas. London: Demos.
31.
6, P.
, & Randon, A. (1995). Liberty, charity, and politics: Non-profit law and freedom of speech. Aldershot, England: Dartmouth.
32.
Stern, E.
(1991). Evaluating innovatory programs: An external evaluator's view. In J. Batsleer, C. Comforth, & R Paton (Eds.), Issues in voluntary and non-profit management (pp. 107-120). Wokingham, England: Addison-Wesley.
33.
Wilson, D.
(1984). Pressure: The A to Z of campaigning. London: Heinemann.
34.
Wilson, J.
(1990). Interest groups. Oxford, England: Blackwell.
