Among the few articles that jointly determine an individual's gifts of time and money, there exists disagreement as to whether these gifts are complements or substitutes. The authors try to shed some light on this debate by expanding the analysis of private contributions to take account of whether or not the individual is working in the paid labor market. The analysis indicates that gifts of time and money are largely complementary to each other, especially for employed individuals. The donations of employed males also appear to be crowded out by government expenditures. The fact that employment status as well as gender affect how individuals respond to fiscal stimulus may have important policy implications.
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