Agency theory has long been studied in the corporate setting and used to explain performance in management and in boards of directors. However, little has been done to extend this research into the area of not-for-profits. Using data collected from member institutions of the Council of Independent Colleges, relationships between boards of trustees and presidential demography and institutional performance were examined. Data were analyzed using panel regression with a separate panel for each year’s data and for each of the responding schools. Using revenue and gift income as dependent variables, it was found that increases in the size, average tenure, and level of business executive background on a board led to subsequent increases in performance for the institution. Diversity of the board had mixed results, whereas presidential tenure improved performance. These findings partially support the hypotheses and extend the explanatory reach of agency theory into the not-for-profit sector.
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