Most research on interest groups has focused on theoretical perspectives concerning why members join these groups. Missing from this work is any connection between theories of organizational maintenance (i.e., how an organization forms) and research on influence activity (i.e., what an organization does).This article argues that a connection exists between organizational maintenance and the participation of their members in the organization's influence activities. Relying on a two-stage study of educational interest groups and the U.S. Congress, this article maintains that rational choice theories of interest group maintenance cannot account for the presence and perseverance of Washington-based education interest groups. A theory acknowledging levels of ideological commitment may be a more appropriate model for understanding educational interest groups at the national level.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Anderson, G. M.
, & Tollison, R. D. (1988). Legislative monopoly and the size of government. Southern Economic Journal, 54, 592-645.
2.
Barro, R.
(1973). The control of politicians: An economic model. Public Choice, 14, 19-42.
3.
Baumgartner, F. R.
, & Walker, J. L. (April, 1989). Educational policy making and the interest group structure in France and the United States. Comparative Politics, pp. 273-287.
4.
Becker, G.
(1985). Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs. Journal of Public Economics, 28, 330-347.
5.
Berry, J. M.
(1984). The interest group explosion. Boston: Little, Brown.
6.
Cigler, A.
, & Loomis, B. A. (1995). Interest group politics. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
7.
Close, A. C.
(1979-1999). Washington representatives (lst-23rd eds.). New York: Columbia Books.
8.
Downs, A.
(1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
9.
Goldstein, K. M.
(1999). Interest groups, lobbying, and participation in America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
10.
Hildreth, A.
(1994). The importance of purposes in purposive groups: Incentives and participation in the sanctuary movement. American Journal of Political Science, 38, 447-463.
11.
Knoke, D.
(1988). Incentives in collective action organizations. American Sociological Review, 53, 311-329.
12.
Knoke, D.
(1986). Associations and interest groups. Annual Review of Sociology, 12, 15.
13.
Leighley, J.
(1996). Group membership and the mobilization of political participation. The Journal of Politics, 58, 447-463.
14.
Marsh, D.
(1976). On joining interest groups: An empirical consideration of the works on Mancur Olson, Jr.British Journal of Political Science, 6, 257-272.
15.
Marsh, D.
(1978). More on interest groups. British Journal of Political Science, 8, 380-384.
16.
Mitchell, R. C.
(1979). National environmental lobbies and the apparent illogic of collective action. In C. Russell (Ed.), Collective decision making (pp. 187-221). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
17.
Mitchell, W. C.
, & Munger, M. C. (1991). Economic models of interest groups: An introductory survey. American Journal of Political Science, 35(2), 512-546.
18.
Moe, T. M.
(1980). The organization of interests. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
19.
National Education Association
. (2000). Legislative action center [Online]. Available from the World Wide Web: http://www.nea.org/lac/
20.
Olson, M., Jr.
(1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
21.
O'Neill, M. J.Y
(1993). The roar of the crowd. New York: Times Books.
22.
Penning, N. J.
(2000a). Slam dunk! The AASA legislative corps. Nick's notes [Online]. Retrieved March 17 from the World Wide Web: http://www.aasa.org/NicksNotes/marl7.htm
23.
Penning, N. J.
(2000b). You are cordially invited. Nick's notes [Online]. Retrieved April 25 from the World Wide Web: http://www.aasa.orglNicksNotes/marl7.htm
24.
People For the American Way. (2000). Activist Network [Online]. Available from the World Wide Web: http://www.pfaw.org/activist/
25.
Peterson, M. A.
, & Walker, J. L. (1986). Interest group responses to partisan change: The impact of the Reagan administration upon the national interest group system. In A. J. Cigler & A. L. Burdett (Eds.), Interest group politics (2nd ed., pp. 237-252). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
26.
Piguo, A. C.
(1928). A study of public finance. London: Macmillan.
27.
Sabatier, P. A.
(1992). Interest group membership and organization: Multiple theories. In M. P. Petracca (Ed.), The politics of interests: Interest groups transformed (pp. 99-129). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
28.
Sabatier, P.
, & McLaughlin, S. (1990). Belief congruence between interest group leaders and members: An empirical analysis of three theories and a suggested synthesis. Journal of Politics, 52, 914-935.
29.
Schlozman, K. L.
, & Tiemey, J. T. (1983). More of the same: Washington pressure group activity in a decade of change. Journal of Politics, 45, 353-373.
30.
Schlozman, K. L.
, & Tierney, J. T. (1986). Organized interests and American democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
31.
Skocpol, T.
(1985). Bringing the state back in: Strategies of analysis in current research. In P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol (Eds.), Bringing the state back in. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
32.
Tierney, J. T.
(1992). Organized interest groups in the nation's capitol. In M. Petracca (Ed.), The politics of interests: Interest group politics transformed (pp. 201-220). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
33.
Tillock, H.
, & Morrison, D. E. (1979). Group size and contributions to collective action: An examination from zero population growth. Research in Social Movements, 2, 131-149.
34.
Truman, D. B.
(1951). The governmental process. New York: Knopf.
35.
Verba, S.
, & Nie, N. H. (1972). Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality. New York: Harper & Row.
36.
Walker, J. L.
(1983). The origins and maintenance of interest groups in America. American Political Science Review, 77, 390-406.
37.
Wilson, G.
(1990). Interest groups. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
