Abstract
In the workplace, the credibility of workers’ knowledge is constantly being assessed. Whether being hired for a role, making comments during a meeting, or sharing advice with a coworker, workers’ reliability as a “knower” of information is determined by bosses, coworkers, and clients. However, workers’ knowledge may be dismissed on the basis of their social identity—an experience known as epistemic injustice. While this concept originated in philosophy by Black feminist scholar Kristie Dotson (2014), it holds relevance to many other fields, including the world of work. Despite this relevance, the connection between epistemic injustice and vocational psychology has been largely unexplored in vocational psychology scholarship. The current paper describes the concept of epistemic injustice (including three subtypes: testimonial injustice, testimonial smothering, and hermeneutic injustice) and explores its applicability to vocational psychology and career counseling.
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