Toward a Family Science Perspective on Executive Compensation in Family Firms: A Review and Research Agenda

Abstract

In family firms, the family often plays a central role in the strategic decisions of the business. However, until recently, research has primarily focused on exploring the role that business factors play in firm decision-making, with less attention given to the role of the family system. This article reviews the research on executive compensation in family firms to understand whether and how the family system has been considered within this work. Guided by the application of family science theories, we provide a framework to explain why it is important to incorporate the family system in the future study of executive compensation in family firms. We conclude by discussing a research agenda outlining how elements of the family system can be integrated into future executive compensation research to inspire scholars to think differently about this important research topic.

Keywords

executive compensation literature review family firms family science

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