Our study investigates the R&D investment behavior of founder-controlled Canadian listed firms. We use De Massis et al.’s model of the sufficiency conditions of ability and willingness and adapt it to predict investments in R&D. As founder-controlled firms are heterogeneous in nature, we distinguish four categories: lone founder firms and family founder firms with and without excess voting rights. In line with our predictions, we find that only lone founder firms without excess voting rights have both the ability and the willingness to invest in R&D and so they invest more in R&D than their counterparts.
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