We draw on the socioemotional wealth perspective to examine the influence of family ownership on firms’ noncompliance with corporate governance codes. Our results yield an inverted U-shaped effect of family ownership on noncompliance. While the family influence and control dimension leads to high levels of noncompliance, socioworthiness stemming from image and reputation dimension lessens noncompliance. In the presence of potential agency conflict, the control dimension prevails over reputation, even in countries with strong governance institutions. Our findings have critical implications for family business theory, for governance policy making and also for better understanding corporate governance in family firms.
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