Prior research has analyzed R&D spending in family and founder firms. Yet little is known about the economic and technological importance of innovations in these types of firms. Using patent citation data, we show that founder-managed firms, which we argue favor an entrepreneurial orientation, receive more patent citations when compared with other firms, even controlling for R&D spending. By contrast, family-managed firms, many of which, we argue, pursue socioemotional wealth for the family, receive fewer patent citations compared with other firms, again, controlling for R&D spending. Patent citations have been shown in the literature to reflect the economic and technological importance of innovations.
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