Abstract
This article investigates the promotion of the Republika Srpska chapter of the Night Wolves Motorcycle Club (NWMC) on Facebook during the first two years of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It analyses how Russia and its strategies for social mobilization were portrayed on the platform, identifying recurring patterns that emphasized Slavic and Orthodox kinship through a narrative of Serbo–Russian brotherhood. These patterns included the glorification of shared historical events and the promotion of the NWMC’s charitable activities. Central to the group’s mobilization strategy was a dichotomous worldview contrasting a sacred, righteous Russia with a corrupt, anti-Christian West. The article argues that the NWMC was deliberately presented as both appealing and ordinary; by downplaying its extremist nature, the group was able to attract widespread support. Facebook functioned as a key medium for mainstreaming Night Wolves ideology and fostering destabilization in the Western Balkans, including explicit calls for armed mobilization to retake Kosovo.
Introduction
Russia is back. No first sentence can beat this one from a book by Dimitar Bechev. 1 His words capture the reassertion of Russian influence in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, particularly in regions marked by frozen conflicts and unresolved ethno-national tensions. In this context, the Russian Federation has increasingly relied on a diverse array of instruments, ranging from conventional diplomacy and energy leverage to digital propaganda and engagement with non-state actors (NSAs) to project power and counter Western influence. 2
Among these NSAs, the Night Wolves Motorcycle Club (NWMC) has emerged as one of the most visible proxies of Russian strategic ambitions in the Western Balkans. This article investigates how the Republika Srpska (RS) chapter of the NWMC contributes to Russia’s hybrid strategy by engaging in ideological dissemination, patriotic mobilization, and pro-Russian narrative construction through online platforms. Specifically, the article examines the NWMC’s use of Facebook during the first two years following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (24 February 2022 to 24 February 2024), a period that has accelerated global polarization and sharpened the visibility of Russian-aligned actors in contested regions.
The central research question guiding this study is: How does the NWMC chapter in RS use Facebook to frame Russia’s geopolitical role and mobilize local support in alignment with Russian strategic objectives? In addressing this question, the article argues that the NWMC has functioned as a vehicle for mainstreaming Kremlin-aligned ideology in RS by constructing emotionally resonant narratives of Orthodox brotherhood, anti-Western resistance, and Slavic unity. Through curated online content, the group mobilizes symbolic capital and patriotic sentiment, diffusing Russian soft power in the guise of cultural and humanitarian engagement. By promoting traditional values, glorifying shared historical memory, and reinforcing religious and ethnic kinship, the NWMC appears as a benign subcultural actor while concealing its alignment with authoritarian geopolitics.
This article contributes to debates on hybrid warfare, proxy actors, and the ideational dimensions of Russia’s foreign policy. It builds on the work of scholars such as Mark Galeotti, Marlène Laruelle, or Vladimir Rauta, who argue that Russia’s hybrid strategy entails not only the outsourcing of tactical operations to NSAs but also the deployment of affective and cultural narratives through patriotic symbolism, religious mobilization, and ideological framing. 3 In the Balkans, such narratives resonate with a historical legacy of Orthodox Christian solidarity, anti-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sentiment, and ethnonationalist myths that provide fertile ground for Russia’s soft and sharp power projection. 4 As a sharp power, the Russian government seeks to penetrate the political and information environments of targeted countries, and its strategy is to distract and manipulate. It is not principally about persuasion or attraction as with soft power; its aim is rather to degrade the credibility of democratic regimes. 5
The Night Wolves exemplify the “militant infrastructure” of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir), an expansive and ideologically charged vision that fuses cultural identity, religious faith, and imperial memory into a tool of geopolitical mobilization. 6 As part of this broader constellation, the NWMC’s RS chapter presents itself as a patriotic and charitable organization, while in fact functioning as a channel for spreading a worldview of a sacred, embattled Russia confronting a decadent, anti-Christian West. 7 These themes mirror the foundational tropes of Occidentalism, a politically and emotionally charged rejection of the “collective West” seen as morally corrupt and spiritually empty. 8 In the Western Balkans, Occidentalist discourse intertwined with local ethnonationalist narratives, which further amplifies the resonance of Russian-aligned actors like the NWMC. 9
Empirically, this article offers a case study based on a longitudinal qualitative content analysis of Facebook posts by the NWMC chapter in RS. Facebook was chosen due to its prominence as a publicly accessible, mainstream platform preferred by the group for disseminating its messages. The posts are analyzed through the lens of framing theory, particularly the concepts of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing as developed by Snow and Benford and expanded by James Jasper to incorporate the emotional and cultural dimensions of mobilization. 10
Conceptual Framework: Russkiy Mir, Hybrid Warfare, and Non-State Proxies
The analysis builds on several interlocking concepts—Russkiy Mir, Occidentalism, religious nationalism, hybrid warfare, and proxy actors—to understand the NWMC’s role in RS as part of Russia’s influence strategy. At the ideological level, Russia’s outreach is framed by the idea of Russkiy Mir and a counter-hegemonic narrative about the degenerate West. Russkiy Mir is a concept popularized by scholars like Marlene Laruelle, who calls it “a geopolitical imagining—a fuzzy mental atlas on which different regions of the world and their links to Russia can be articulated in a fluid way.” 11 This nebulous concept serves as Russia’s soft-power umbrella: it combines language, culture, historical memory, and Orthodox religion into a civilizational identity that transcends Russia’s state borders. By advancing this idea, the Kremlin asserts a right to protect and guide not only ethnic Russians abroad but all communities bound by Orthodox Slavic heritage and a shared historical narrative. Russkiy Mir’s flexibility is its strength: its “blurriness is structural” and allows continual reinterpretation to legitimize Russian influence in various contexts. In parallel, Russian strategists have cultivated what Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk term a “counter-normative” soft-power strategy, which weaponizes conservative values and Orthodox solidarity as tools of influence. 12 Rather than embracing liberal international norms, Moscow’s soft-power narrative defines Russia as a unique great power civilization in conscious opposition to Western modernity. This approach intertwines ideology with policy: constructing a nationalist-imperial identity that distinguishes Russia from the West while forging channels of communication with like-minded illiberal and religious-conservative forces abroad.
This posture directly feeds into the notion of Occidentalism. Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit describe Occidentalism as a dehumanizing anti-Western ideology, a caricature of “the West” as soulless, decadent, and corrupt. 13 In the Russian context, Occidentalist tropes paint Western liberalism and secularism as existential threats to traditional Slavic–Orthodox culture. The Kremlin’s discourse increasingly invokes a civilizational clash: President Vladimir Putin’s speeches frame Russia as a bulwark of spiritual values standing against a profane, “idolatrous” West that seeks to undermine Russian sovereignty. 14 This worldview is not merely an abstract rhetoric but actively mobilizes emotions of resentment and righteousness in domestic and foreign audiences. It overlaps with religious nationalism, which links the Orthodox faith inextricably with ethnic-national identity and statehood. The Russian Orthodox Church is a key proponent of this fusion as Patriarch Kirill casts Moscow as the leader of a transnational “Holy Russia” encompassing all Eastern Slav lands and Orthodox believers. 15 Such sacralization of politics portrays Russia and “brotherly” Orthodox nations like Serbia as guardians of true Christianity in a struggle against Western materialism. The resulting ideological package comprises a blend of Orthodox Christian nationalism, pan-Slavic revivalism, and anti-Western resentment, providing the cognitive framework through which groups like the NWMC interpret their mission.
Hybrid warfare has become synonymous with Russia’s contemporary modus operandi, describing a blend of military and non-military means that blurs the line between war and peace. Mark Galeotti notes that the Russian strategy combines political, economic, social, and kinetic factors in conflicts where covert action, information operations, and deniable interventions (such as unmarked troops or local militias) are synergically orchestrated together. 16 This holistic warfare model thrives on ambiguity, leveraging proxy actors and information campaigns to achieve strategic goals without overt conventional invasion. Vladimir Rauta defines a proxy war as an armed confrontation in which an external power (the “beneficiary”) engages an adversary (the “target”) indirectly by using a third-party proxy to carry out sustained violence. Proxy agents are often characterized as clients or pawns of the sponsor state, but recent scholarship emphasizes their agency and the strategic “bargains” underpinning such relationships. 17 In Russia’s case, proxy actors, ranging from the church and NGOs to local insurgents to ostensibly private military groups (PMCs), allow the Kremlin to project power while maintaining plausible deniability. The NWMC can be seen as one such proxy instrument: a NSA closely aligned with Russian state interests, operating in the so-called gray zone of influence. The NWMC’s presence in the Balkans exemplifies how hybrid warfare uses proxies for both hard (using coercion) and soft power (persuasion and attraction through culture, public diplomacy, educational exchanges) aims: the group’s tours through RS (often against the wishes of BiH’s central authorities) were viewed as deliberate intimidation of non-Serbs and a boost to secessionist elements. 18 In short, Russia’s hybrid war approach provides the strategic template (integrating military, informational, and covert tools) within which proxy actors like the NWMC are deployed.
The NWMC and the Political Opportunity Structures in the Western Balkans
The political opportunity structures present a relevant tool for understanding the sociopolitical environment in which the Night Wolves operate. 19 Political opportunity structures include specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements, and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate or constrain the development of social and political movements. 20 Key elements of political opportunity structure usually include the openness of the political system, the stability of political alignments, the presence of influential allies, and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. Keeping in mind the complexity and fragility of the Western Balkans, we must also consider the regional level before zooming in on the local one. On the regional level, political opportunity structures facilitating or constraining the mobilization of social movements comprise regional players and their interplay with external player in institutional settings. The next section focuses on the international actors and organizations involved in the region, with particular emphasis on Russia, the European Union (EU), and NATO and their struggle for influence.
All Western Balkan countries—except Serbia—have declared their will to join NATO. Albania and Croatia joined in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and North Macedonia in 2020 after resolving its naming dispute. The alliance has been committed to building a sustainable peace and stability with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) since the 1990s; the country joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 2006 and was invited to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2010 with the hope of joining NATO in due course. Kosovo also aspires to join NATO but, as BiH, must solve its internal and external challenges hindering membership, which is therefore unlikely within the foreseeable future. Relations with Serbia are heavily determined by the NATO intervention in 1999; thus, Serbian priorities do not include NATO membership. Nevertheless, NATO invited Serbia to join whenever ready to do so. In 2015, an Individual Partnership Action Plan was arranged with Serbia, so the country has regularly participated in NATO military maneuvers and hosted a joint civil protection exercise in 2018. A poll from 2022 found that 82 percent of Serbians opposed joining NATO, while only 10 percent supported accession. 21
The EU sees enlargement into the Western Balkans as a strategic investment in European peace, security, stability, and prosperity and, in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, contends that the accession process should be accelerated. Candidates recognized for EU membership are North Macedonia (in 2005), Montenegro (2010), Serbia (2012), Albania (2014), and BiH (2022). Kosovo is, for the moment, not included; its biggest achievement in integration so far has been allowing visa-free travel for Kosovar citizens from 1 January 2024. However, EU accession is hindered by grave structural problems in these countries, democratic backsliding, a decline in media freedom, and the so-called “integration fatigue.” Meanwhile, Russia welcomes the geo-strategic vacuum in the Balkans and strives to fill it.
Russia uses many different instruments to assert its interests: hard military power, manipulation of economic ties, interference in other countries’ domestic politics, and targeted information campaigns to influence public opinion. 22 Moscow has considerable influence over domestic politics in several Western Balkan countries and uses its local proxies, including the NWMC, to expand its sphere of influence. The country remains one of the key players in the Western Balkans, purposedly fueling instability on Europe’s periphery. 23 Historically, it has always supported the Serbs, and relations between politicians and the Orthodox Churches remain very close. The Western Balkan countries have emerged as a front line in Russia’s geopolitical confrontation with the West. Russia protects its economic interests; its objective is to slow down Euro-Atlantic integration, undermine EU and NATO influence, and preserve the status quo in the region (BiH and Kosovo). After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Kosovo joined EU sanctions against Russia; Serbia and BiH supported the UN resolutions condemning Russia’s actions but refused to join the program of sanctions. Fears of disintegration of BiH and escalation of the conflict in Kosovo have intensified since then.
The war in Ukraine also attracted many foreign fighters, mostly Serbs fighting on the side of the Russian Federation, and Croatian nationals who supported the defense of Ukraine. Around 300 individuals from the region reportedly took part in the fighting in 2022, and Serbia provided 100–300 male combatants fighting alongside Russia. Some Serbian combatants have also contributed already to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. 24 Often, these foreign fighters engaged with far-right groups and pro-Russian organizations such as the Night Wolves. The return of fighters from abroad could boost the paramilitaries, heighten inter-ethnic tensions, and increase the activities of criminal groups. The president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, claimed that 99 percent of the Serbs fighting in Ukraine were mercenaries, but the civil sector argued that legal attempts to define foreign fighters as mercenaries were politically driven. 25 The prosecution of returning Serb combatants remains limited to three individuals, who received penalties ranging from six months of home detention to three years of probation. 26
Russia’s disinformation campaign is highly efficient and cost-effective since Western Balkans news outlets often promote pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives. 27 As many as 110 registered non-governmental entities are suspected of having connections to the Russian lobby in Serbia. 28 Russian entities enjoy influence, particularly in the Montenegrin real estate and tourism market. In 2012, the Russia daily Novaya Gazeta reported that Russian citizens own about 40 percent of real estate in Montenegro, particularly along the Adriatic coast. By 2016, roughly one-third of all foreign companies registered in Montenegro were Russian-owned, making it the Balkan country with the greatest Russian investment. Actual Russian investment could be even higher given the widespread use of offshore companies. 29
Russia has a great impact on local political elites. In 2018, it paid $41,000 to the Night Wolves for a Western Balkans tour to show Russia’s support for Milorad Dodik, one of the strongest supporters of Russia in the region, and to work in Russia’s interests by stalling accession into the EU and NATO. 30 The Russian government also used its business connections to disincentivize Northern Macedonia’s accession to the EU and NATO. For example, businessmen Sergei Samsonenko and Ivan Savidis provided financial support to mobilize people against North Macedonia’s name change. Ivan Savidis provided around $350,000 in funding to social media campaigns to decrease turnout for the name change referendum in 2018. Russia funded grassroots youth movements to change public opinion toward Russia. Russia has also sought to influence the foreign policies of Montenegro through the Serbian Orthodox Church (Srpska pravoslavna crkva, SOC), an activity very visible during the 2006 push for Montenegrin independence and during the run-up to the country’s accession to NATO. Montenegrin officials alleged that the Night Wolves were involved in the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Duško Marković in 2016. Russia also conducted cyber-attacks against Montenegrin government institutions during 2016–2017, led a robust anti-NATO propaganda campaign, planned a 2016 coup plot to overthrow President Djukanović, and placed a pro-Russian Democratic Front in power in order to reject NATO membership. After the country gained NATO membership, Russia’s role in it decreased. 31
By supporting secessionist actors in BiH, Russia hopes to establish a client state in Europe and damage NATO’s credibility. If destabilized, the whole region could be prevented from deeper integration with the West. An isolated and impoverished BiH would be a fertile recruitment ground for radical Islamist groups, which could threaten European security. 32 The Night Wolves have been banned from entering a couple of countries in Europe (e.g. Poland multiple times, Germany in 2015), and in 2018, BiH banned Alexander Zaldostanov and the Serbian leader Saša Savić from entering due to security concerns. Apart from these examples, the Night Wolves operate legally and face no constraints from the state authorities in the region.
The NWMC from Moscow to Banja Luka
The Night Wolves came into being in 1983 as a group of anti-establishment motorbike lovers, rock and heavy metal music fans, with their clothing and look derived from American biker gangs. The group, heavily influenced by perestroika, initially provided security at rock concerts. By the early 1990s, Alexander Zaldostanov, known as “The Surgeon,” became the leader. Under his leadership, the NWMC transformed from an anti-establishment group to an organization closely cooperating with the state. In 1991, the NWMC defended the Kremlin from an attempted coup and was presented with a medal by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. 33 In the early 1990s, the NWMC opened Russia’s first rock music nightclub, tattoo shop and motorcycle shop, Wolf Engineering, and launched a biker clothing line (Wolf Wear). The Surgeon centralized power in his own hands and, shortly after suffering a bike accident and subsequently embracing Orthodox Christianity, added a religious and spiritual dimension to the NWMC’s activities. During the mid-2000s, Alexei Weitz joined the club; he nurtured and significantly strengthened relations with the Russian Orthodox Church. Zaldostanov paid regular visits to Patriarch Kirill, and NWMC members physically defended the church against several protests. 34 Relations with Vladimir Putin also deepened, and Zaldostanov was awarded the Order of Honor medal for his work on youth patriotic education and for preserving the memory of the fallen in World War II. He also served as a torchbearer at the 2014 Sochi Olympics. Some sources claim that the Night Wolves have received millions of rubles from the Russian government. 35
The NWMC has established more than sixty-five chapters in more than ten countries. 36 Different sources give different estimates of its membership, ranging from around 5,000 to 50,000. 37 The organization is involved in patriotic education, security, and training and is affiliated with partners such as the International Union of Paratroopers and the Central Council of Special Forces. It owns various commercial enterprises, ranging from nightclubs to restaurants, that generate significant revenues: in 2007, the nightclubs alone returned approximately US$2.4 million. 38 The NWMC played an important role in the annexation of Crimea, supporting the Russian military and receiving at least eleven “For the Return of Crimea” campaign medals. It recruited fighters for the pro-Russian militias in Eastern Ukraine and served there as a special police squad. The NWMC organized motorcycle rallies, of which the best-known is the Victory Ride to Berlin, which, since 2015, commemorates the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. The Night Wolves are banned from entering several European countries, Poland being the first to deny entry in 2016. The organization’s biggest, most grandiose bike show takes place in Sevastopol, where narratives echoed by bikers and actors mention patriotic duty, a love for Russia, unconditional support for President Putin, and the moral decay of the West. 39 Glorification of Soviet history, reinforcement of positive memories, and minimization of injustices and hardship under Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin maintain a common historical narrative, collective memory, and group identity.
Despite the NWMC’s expansion, there is limited reporting on its involvement with organized crime or gang violence; the police in Western countries do not view the NWMC as a major threat to community safety as there is no evidence that it has been involved in violence outside Russia. The NWMC’s criminal activities (ranging from traffic offenses, fraud and identity theft, breach of contract and incitement, to assault, murder, and terrorism) are confined to Russia and the post-Soviet states. 40 As a result of the Night Wolves’ role in Ukraine, the United States sanctioned Zaldostanov in December 2014, and Canada did the same in 2015. 41 In the Balkans, the media largely report positively about the NWMC activities, but a journalist in Serbia was attacked and harassed by an NWMC group member. The journalist’s news portal was also targeted by hacker attacks. 42
The first Night Wolves chapter in the Western Balkans was established in Serbia; others followed in RS, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, and Night Wolves from Russia became frequent guests in the Balkans. 43 Balkan NWMC members often posted photos with Zaldostanov, local Orthodox clergy, and politicians. The deputy president of the chapter in RS, Goran Tadić, was the personal driver of Petar Djokić, the minister for energy and mining in the territory/the unrecognized republic. His company received concession for the construction of a small hydropower plant near Han-Pijeska worth three million Bosnian marks. The NWMC members are often seen accompanying members of Djokić’s Socialist Party, which includes Tadić and members of Dodik’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD). Relations between the NWMC and politicians extend to private and business interests, while the organization maintains important centers in Brčko and Šamac. 44 The NWMC is closely tied to representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which remains an influential force in public and political life today, a stable entity, and an institution that represents historical continuity, national identity, and destiny. The Church represents an instrument of soft power in politics and society in the region. 45 The close relations between the NWMC and SOC representatives bring them mutual visibility, credibility, and power, enhancing their status in society.
Russian ties to Serbia are strengthened by a shared history of opposition to NATO; this enhances pro-Russian sentiment, influences public opinion outside Russia, and promotes the “Russian World” narrative. The Night Wolves are symbols of pan-Slavism, the fight against the decadent West, and the preservation of Orthodox culture, tradition, and Serbo–Russian brotherhood. The Serbian NWMC chapters nurture ties with nationalists dreaming of a Greater Serbia. Religious nationalism takes a Manichean approach, in which the protection of Orthodox values allows nationalist groups to view anti-Russian sentiment through a moral and ethnic lens and to frame tensions with the West as a battle between good and evil. In this struggle, the NWMC is the protector of good and traditional values against the decadent and evil West. 46 There is an overlap between NWMC members in Serbia, RS, and Serbian Honor (a Russian-backed group that developed combat skills at the Russian–Serbian Humanitarian Centre in Niš to form a paramilitary unit). 47 Both Serbian Honor and the Night Wolves actively support the RS President Milorad Dodik, whom the United States sanctioned in 2017 for promoting separatism and undermining peace-building efforts in BiH. Both organizations take part in parades that promote the relationship with Russia, an activity that led to BiH banning several high-ranking NWMC members from entering the country. They both also have relations with two NGOs: Zavet (Oath), which is registered in BiH and has representatives in Russia, and the Union of Donbas Volunteers, which promotes the image of volunteer fighters in Ukraine. The middleman in the link to Zavet is the vice-president of the Bosnian Night Wolves, Goran Tadić. Tadić admitted that Zavet received a €1,000 grant from the RS government but that it was otherwise financed by a group of Russian souvenir sellers: “We built up a friendship, and this is how we are financed.” 48
The main goals of the NWMC are to promote Russian traditional values, fuel anti-Western sentiment, and promote pan-Slavism, using various activities such as restoring religious sites, constructing cultural centers, developing youth clubs, hosting patriotic activities, managing nightclubs and tattoo shops, selling merchandise, organizing motorcycle pilgrimages, and defending the Church against protesters. 49 The Russian embassies in Western Balkans actively promote the motorcycle pilgrimages.
Framing Theory and Emotional Mobilization
Framing theory can help us to understand how the NWMC cultivates support by shaping meaning. 50 Snow and Benford define a collective action frame as an interpretive scheme that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” by focusing attention on certain problems and solutions. 51 They identify three core framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Diagnostic framing involves defining a problem and attributing blame or causality. Prognostic framing articulates a proposed solution or strategy for the problem. Motivational framing provides a compelling “call to arms,” a rationale for action, by constructing appropriate “vocabularies of motive” that urge people to engage. Together, these framing processes help movements like the NWMC to define their reality and entice bystanders to become supporters.
A crucial aspect of framing is resonance, meaning that frames must connect with their audience’s values and experiences. Snow and Benford note that motivational frames often emphasize the severity of the problem, the urgency of action, and the moral rightness of the cause. 52 Affective appeals can galvanize collective action. Indeed, emotions play a pivotal role in all three framing tasks. For instance, outrage at a perceived enemy or injustice (a diagnostic frame) can be channeled into patriotic fervor or calls for vengeance (a prognostic frame), accompanied by calls to duty, honor, or salvation that stir pride and hope (motivational frame). Emotions such as anger, fear, shame, or hope are powerful motivators as they foster solidarity and energize activism among would-be participants. 53 Therefore, framing is not a purely cognitive process of slogan-making, it is also about packaging grievances and goals in ways that feel compelling.
The rise of digital media has further accentuated the role of affect in mobilization. Online platforms enable the rapid dissemination of frames infused with emotional appeals, reaching transnational audiences and creating networked public formations that are mobilized through expressions of sentiment. 54 In these networked spaces, such as the NWMC’s Facebook groups, the diagnostic narrative of a righteous Russia versus a corrupt West, the prognostic calls to defend Orthodoxy or “save” Serb brethren, and the motivational exhortations of Slavic brotherhood and sacrifice can spread widely and take hold. Emotional narratives (for example, portraying Russia as a holy savior and the West as an evil threat) are readily amplified by shares and comments, reinforcing a sense of communal purpose. Social media also personalize framing, since messages can be tailored with imagery, symbols, and interactive engagement that heighten emotional impact. 55 This hybrid media environment suits the NWMC’s strategy of mainstreaming its ideology by blending patriotic fervor with the appearance of ordinary community values.
Therefore, framing theory, enriched by insights on emotion, offers a robust conceptual toolkit for analyzing the NWMC’s online mobilization. By examining how the NWMC constructs diagnostic frames (identifying friends and foes), prognostic frames (prescribing solutions and actions), and motivational frames (calling followers to action through emotional and moral appeals), we can better understand how this group seeks to win “hearts and minds” in service of Russia’s goals. Since frames are essential for social mobilization, identifying and analyzing them can enhance our understanding of how the Night Wolves define problems, prescribe solutions, and encourage engagement—ultimately aiming at recruiting supporters and demobilizing opponents. Such insights are particularly important for the EU, especially if it still envisions further enlargement in the Western Balkans.
Methodology and Research Design
This study adopts a qualitative case study approach, focusing on the RS chapter of the NWMC as a prominent example of how Russian-aligned NSAs seek to mobilize ideological support in the Western Balkans. 56 This chapter stands out due to its strong visibility, close ties with local political elites, and alignment with Russian nationalist narratives. Its Facebook presence offers a rich source of material for examining discursive strategies that promote Kremlin-aligned geopolitical goals.
Given the centrality of online spaces to modern ideological mobilization, we selected Facebook as the main site of analysis. 57 Facebook remains the dominant social media platform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the chapter uses a closed group on Facebook as its primary channel for communicating with followers. 58 This group had 2,429 members in July 2023 and 2,500 by September 2024. Instagram served as a secondary platform, where most posts simply duplicated Facebook content. At the time of writing, the chapter had no publicly available Telegram, VKontakte, or X (formerly Twitter) accounts (Table 1). Although the NWMC has a broader digital presence (including YouTube and a now-inactive RS chapter website), Facebook offered both accessibility and analytical coherence, making it the most appropriate choice for this case. The study covers the period from 24 February 2022 to 24 February 2024, the first two years of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During this time, we collected a full sample of eighty-six Facebook posts made by the group’s administrator. These posts included photos, videos, banners, and text captions. A Facebook post scraper was used to extract the data.
Night Wolves Motorcycle Club in Republica Srpska on Social Media
We used an inductive, qualitative content analysis based on open “framing-based” coding. First, we read all posts in their original language to identify initial themes and patterns. Based on this exploratory reading, we created an initial coding schema. We then re-read the data, refining categories where needed and adding new codes to ensure thematic completeness. The coding process was guided by framing theory, particularly the tripartite model distinguishing between diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames, as described in the theoretical section. 59 Each post was coded for one or more of these frame types. Table 2 illustrates how these categories were applied.
Types of Framing and Initial Codes
In interpreting motivational frames, we drew on James Jasper’s work on moral emotions and affective framing, particularly his idea of “moral shocks” as triggers for mobilization. 60 We remained attentive to symbolic elements, for example, Orthodox iconography or martyrdom tropes, which convey political meaning beyond literal content.
The methodological choice to focus on social media was reinforced by prior research showing that platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and X are key vectors for propaganda, radicalization, and mobilization, especially when compared to encrypted platforms like Telegram, which serve more for internal communication among ideologically closed communities. 61 Social media also allow actors like the NWMC to bypass traditional media gatekeepers, tailor emotionally resonant frames, and foster personalized engagement with content. The spontaneity of digital trace data also offered the advantage of capturing unguarded self-presentation over time.
In addition to Facebook data, we used open-source secondary material from academic publications, news coverage, and NWMC websites to contextualize findings. These sources helped us to triangulate key events and ideological references. We were aware of the potential for reporting bias and interpretative framing within these sources, especially given the charged geopolitical context of the Ukraine war. Triangulation thus served as a strategy for mitigating, though not eliminating, these biases. We also conducted a semi-structured interview with one prominent NWMC member. While several interviews were promised during our fieldwork, they did not materialize. The group proved extremely closed and hesitant to engage with academic researchers. Interview access was often conditioned on editorial control over results, a condition incompatible with independent scholarship. We learned from the interview that full membership in the NWMC requires a year-long vetting process and unanimous approval by existing members, underscoring the group’s insularity.
The Facebook group is closed, but the NWMC uses it explicitly for public outreach and mobilization. We treated the data as sensitive user content. We engaged only passively in the group (“lurking”), consistent with the suggested practices in digital ethnography. 62 Informed consent from users was not sought due to the nature of the group, but care was taken not to breach privacy or platform terms of service. Reflexivity was maintained throughout, particularly with regard to the researchers’ positionality as external observers potentially sympathetic to democratic values opposed by the NWMC. We remained alert to interpretive bias and the emotional weight of working with war-related content and in a post-war (also online) environment. Thus, the chosen methodology allows for an in-depth and theoretically grounded analysis of how the NWMC RS chapter engages in symbolic and affective mobilization, and how hybrid actors incorporate ideological narratives within locally resonant cultural idioms.
Two Years of Night Wolves in RS on Facebook
There are many Facebook groups titled the “Night Wolves,” including chapters in small cities. The main Facebook group of the NWMC chapter in RS is administered by a moderator, who is the only one permitted to post. Comments are posted by local supporters; those from other Central European chapters are very rare (unlike with the Facebook posts of the Serbian chapter). In the second year of the investigated timeframe, the activity on Facebook profiles decreased, possibly due to transfer to other, more closed or encrypted, social media platforms.
As the Table 3 shows, the NWMC chapter in RS mostly posted videos on its Facebook. Most of the posts were shared by The Surgeon and referred to the commemoration of war veterans by the NWMC and to the NWMC helping “people in need”: victims of the earthquake in Turkey, veterans from the Bosnian war, or children. For example, a video showed the St. Nicolaus ride, which delivered presents to children on motorbike. The chapter also shared the posts of local newspapers and television stations covering the NWMC in the region, its humanitarian aid abroad and locally, or support for Serbian President Vučić. Quite often, the chapter shared videos from Russian television about the Night Wolves and their charitable activities there. Most reactions (278) were received for a post with a group photo of the RS chapter and for a picture of the NWMC taking an icon of Tsar Lazar to Donskoy Monastery (208). The number of followers and likes significantly increased during the two years under investigation; during the first year, a post on the commemoration of war veterans by the NWMC chapter received the most likes during the first year (192), while another post covering a NWMC member leaving to join a rescue team in Turkey received the most in the second year (180). The letter “Z” appeared twice in comments on the NWMC RS page, but more often in the posts and comments of the NWMC in Serbia.
Types of Posts by the Night Wolves Motorcycle Club in Republika Srpska (February 2022—February 2024)
The framing of Russia and the Russian invasion was mainly found in the posts shared from The Surgeon. Table 4 shows, that diagnostic framing showed Russia as the protector of the weak and oppressed against the evil NATO, or simply the West—a dichotomy of good vs. evil, “the sacred and holy Russia” against “the anti-Christ West.” The NWMC identifies the problem in the West and attributes blame to the evil western organizations, states, and societies. The prognostic framing clearly sets Russia as the solution and outlines the NWMC strategies: the unification of “Little Russia” under the Russian flag and special military operation for the unification of the Russian people. The motivational frame provides reasons for Russian invasion and likens Russia to a holy and divine land, where Russians and Serbs belong to one nation. It also provides reasons for joining the NWMC by resorting to cultural narratives of Serbian–Russian brotherhood, portraying Night Wolves as those on the right side, those who would always fight for the motherland and for its people against the evil outsiders.
Codes for Types of Framing
The tone and frames of the posts remained consistent during the period of analysis. Most posts concerned the NWMC in Russia and echoed their beliefs and worldview. The analyzed posts showed support for Putin, Vučić, or Dodik and love for Russia, framed as a holy and divine Motherland. For example, “Russia is the speed of light. This is a shining celestial motorcycle, on which we, embracing the Savior, fly to new shores, flying over abysses and oceans of darkness” (FB NWMC RS, 12 June 2022). The holy Motherland Russia was also compared to Serbia: “Serbia, like Russia, walking the way of the cross and ascending Golgotha, just like Christ, will inevitably rise again” (FB NWMC RS, 24 March 2022). The message is clear: love your mother country (“never give up anthem or flag,” FB NWMC RS, 21 January 2023), do not let your country be humiliated, and betrayal of the motherland is a great sin. Many posts related Kosovo to Ukraine, as in “Donbass Russia, Kiev Russia, Kosovo Serbia” (FB NWMC RS, 22 February 2023), clearly and openly stating that Ukraine was an indivisible part of Russia (FB NWMC RS, 1 March 2022). The intentional narrative is that the NWMC members are very kind people ready to help not only their country and politicians but also all people in need by providing motorbike rides for children and visiting cemeteries and war memorials to commemorate war veterans. Such a narrative is sometimes disseminated by the NWMC themselves, as in the interview for Novosti news, which stated that “Night Wolves are ready for any kind of help and they are always with their people” (FB NWMC RS, 12 December 2022), and their FB photograph, which argued that “Night Wolves bring us light, good and confidence in a happy tomorrow” (FB NWMC RS, 2 April 2022).
Politics, society, culture, religion, and promotion were mixed in most of the posts, so it was impossible to divide them according to these themes. The posts showed that to lead a happy and good life, one has to be a good citizen, a patriot of the Orthodox faith, and to promote the glory of one’s country and its comrade Russia. The common themes that emerged from the NWMC profiles were love for Russia, Serbo–Russian brotherhood, patriotism, nationalism, Orthodoxy, historical references to World War II, the Kosovo or Bosnian war, motorcycle culture, brotherhood, masculinity, and solidarity (Figure 1). The administrators from RS seemed to be very close to the Russian leadership, referring to their many trips to Russia to meet the leader, Zaldostanov. The profile emphasized the importance of the NWMC in Russia and its work for Putin that would bring people closer to Russia and potentially fight in Ukraine on the Russian side.
Recurring patterns in the Facebook profiles of the Night Wolves Motorcycle Club in Republika Srpska
The tone of the vast majority of the posts was emotional, passionate, and persuasive, and the communication often incorporated religious symbols, historical references, or references to God and the Holy Motherland Russia to convince readers that Serbia and Russia are interconnected, belong to each other, will always help each other, and their people were, have been, and will be brothers forever (Table 5). Featured videos usually showed beautiful landscapes and the road with groups of NWMC members rallying through Russia with the message: the Night Wolves will always be there to protect our countries, our nations. In most videos, the Night Wolves flew the Serbian and Russian flags together to signify the Serbo–Russian brotherhood.
Framing Examples of Recurring Themes on the Facebook Profiles of the Night Wolves Motorcycle Club Chapter in Republika Srpska
The NWMC is not a mere biker club; it functions as a proxy actor-cum-civil society influencer that advances Moscow’s agenda under the guise of grassroots activism. In conflict zones like Crimea and Donbas, the Night Wolves directly acted as auxiliaries, for instance, by helping screen Russian military movements during the 2014 Crimea annexation. 63 In the more subtle Balkan theater, they carry the banner of Russkiy Mir and Orthodox brotherhood into RS’s towns and events, thus exporting the Kremlin’s preferred historical and cultural narratives to sympathetic communities. 64 Often arriving on Kremlin-sponsored “tours,” the bikers visit Orthodox churches, war memorials, and youth gatherings, disseminating symbolic support for Serb separatism and pan-Slavic unity. 65 They consciously frame Bosnian Serbs as part of the Russian World, as brothers wronged by the same Western “hegemons” that purportedly menace Russia. Local leaders have embraced this messaging. For example, at the 9 January Republika Srpska Day parade, the NWMC members were introduced as honored guests and promoters of Orthodox Christianity, advocating that the Serb entity “be strong and eternal like Mother Russia.” 66 This episode vividly illustrates the fusion of religious nationalism and Occidentalist geopolitics in NWMC’s role. By parading alongside police and officials, imperial Russian and Orthodox symbols, the NWMC legitimized Dodik’s separatist discourse and lent it a quasi-spiritual imprimatur. This imagery projects a narrative of righteous defiance, as Serb Orthodox patriots, with Russia at their back, standing against an encroaching liberal West. Such narratives are potent precisely because they engage the emotional registers of identity, nostalgia, and grievance that are crucial to mobilization. 67
James Jasper’s work on social movements helps to explain why the Night Wolves’ blend of symbolism and action is effective. Jasper argues that emotions are not epiphenomenal but central to collective action; they provide the “energy” and moral direction that drive people to join causes. 68 Feelings of pride, indignation, fear, and solidarity are deliberately cultivated in movement framing. The NWMC’s activities intentionally stoke emotional stimuli: moral outrage at the perceived humiliation of Serbs by the West, collective pride in shared Orthodox heritage and wartime glories, or belonging to a transnational Slavic brotherhood. These affective appeals resonate strongly in post-war RS, where public sentiment is already marked by victimhood narratives and distrust of Western institutions. 69 By inserting themselves into local commemorations and social media discourse, the NWMC members act as “influencers” who reframe grievances into a larger story of civilizational struggle. Their rallies and online posts draw on familiar emotional hooks such as honoring fallen Serb (and Russian) soldiers, venerating saints, or warning of alleged Western plots to destroy Orthodox communities. This convergence of emotional and ideological framing turns the NWMC into an effective proxy actor of mobilization, which extends Russia’s soft power in the Balkans by offering not the usual attractions of culture or prosperity, but identity and catharsis, a sense of being on the righteous side of history, united under the banner of faith and fatherland. Such social mobilization risks reopening old wounds in an unstable region of frozen conflicts that shares a direct border with the EU. In the event of open conflict, Russia needs no new channels for mobilization—these already exist.
Conclusion
This article analyses the RS chapter of the NWMC as a proxy actor of Russian influence in the Western Balkans, focusing on the first two years following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Through a close reading of eighty-six Facebook posts, investigated through framing theory, the study shows that the NWMC constructs a persuasive ideological narrative that aligns with Kremlin foreign policy goals while remaining tailored to the RS’s sociopolitical context.
By using diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames, we find that the group articulated a binary worldview: a sacred, defensive, and victimized Russia set against a morally corrupt, aggressive, and anti-Christian West. Diagnostic frames frequently portrayed Ukraine as a Nazi-infested puppet of NATO, while prognostic frames legitimized Russian intervention as both a defensive and a redemptive act. Motivational frames drew heavily on shared Slavic kinship, Orthodox Christianity, and emotional appeals to honor, sacrifice, and civilizational survival. Through these layered frames, the NWMC simultaneously exacerbated everyday grievances and rendered them spiritually meaningful, blurring the line between ideology and identity. Its Facebook posts do not solely promote war narratives; they also present the group as a community actor engaged in charity, child outreach, and cultural celebration. Such banal nationalism and moral posturing make the group more palatable to wider audiences, enabling its soft entry into harder ideological commitments. Groups like the NWMC form part of the “militant infrastructure” of the Russky Mir, capable not only of symbolic projection but of preparing the terrain for harder influence, potentially even kinetic operations. The RS chapter exemplifies how NSAs operating under the sign of patriotism, faith, and cultural affinity can function as intermediaries in broader hybrid warfare strategies. Unlike overt Russian media platforms, this NWMC chapter benefits from domestic legitimacy: its messaging is amplified by its alignment with RS’s political elite and the SOC. Thus, rather than functioning as a foreign body, the NWMC acts as a locally rooted but transnationally oriented actor, a soft agent of geopolitical socialization in an already favorable political environment.
This case study contributes to the literature on authoritarian soft power and hybrid threats by demonstrating that actors below the state level of analysis, particularly culturally embedded proxies, can perform ideational work that bolsters strategic objectives. While much of the academic focus has explored digital disinformation campaigns or state-backed media, this analysis foregrounds a different mechanism: affective mobilization through community-based, semi-paramilitary actors who build legitimacy through appeals to memory, religion, and identity. In this sense, the NWMC in RS is not an aberration, but a model for understanding how ideological infrastructures operate in gray zones between civic activism, cultural diplomacy, and violent subversion. The case raises important questions about the nature of hybrid threats in fragmented societies. It is not radical speech or fake news that destabilize democratic processes, it is the normalization of revisionist and illiberal worldviews through organizations that operate with cultural fluency and tactical ambiguity. Monitoring actors like the NWMC, especially when embedded in routine public life, require not only technical capabilities but also cultural literacy and long-term engagement with the local civil society.
Future research could deepen this line of inquiry by conducting comparative studies across a number of NWMC chapters in Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, or by tracing how narratives circulate across other platforms such as Telegram or VKontakte. Another direction lies in studying audience reception. While this article focused on the producers of frames, future work may analyze how users interpret or resist these narratives in digital environments. Understanding the interaction between ideological supply and affective demand will be key to anticipating the next phase of Russian influence operations, not just in the Western Balkans, but in the “West” in general.
Footnotes
Funding
The research was supported by the Czech Science Foundation (grant number 23-04955S) (Russian influence operations in the Western Balkans and their impact on the Western Balkan Security Complex), which is conducted at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Jostova 10, Brno.