Abstract
This article examines the nature and limits of Russian influence through non-state actors in North Macedonia. To analyze these dynamics, it employs the concept of elite receptivity and introduces a novel analytical distinction between symbolic and institutional influence. It argues that while Russia has built a complex network via ideological proxies—encompassing a range of right-wing and left-wing political parties, civil society organizations, and factions of the Orthodox Church—its ability to secure institutional capture remains severely constrained. This limitation is attributed to the pro-Western orientation of the mainstream political elite, structural coalition dynamics, and particularly the uniformly pro-European stance of the Albanian political parties. By foregrounding elite receptivity as the mediating factor between symbolic resonance and institutional penetration, the article foregrounds how internal political configurations condition and mediate the impact of foreign influence.
Introduction
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine marked a pivotal shift in the European geopolitical landscape, intensifying global scrutiny of the Kremlin’s ambitions. Beyond its military aggression, Russia has long employed soft power tactics, ranging from election interference and media manipulation to the promotion of ideological narratives to extend its influence. 1 In the Western Balkans, such strategies have primarily focused on conservative and anti-Western-oriented political subjects, infiltrating local media landscape, diplomatic and foreign policy structures, while also advancing influence through cultural diplomacy. Countries such as Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (particularly Republika Srpska, one of the two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina), where historical and political ties to Russia remain strong, have proven particularly receptive. 2 Serbia, for instance, has refused to impose sanctions on Moscow following the invasion of Ukraine, positioning itself as an outlier in the European context. In contrast, North Macedonia presents a more constrained case, where Russia has actively engaged civil society, fringe political parties, and religious proxies, yet failed to gain meaningful institutional traction.
This article examines the dynamics of Russian influence in North Macedonia through a dual focus: (1) Why has Russian influence in North Macedonia remained largely symbolic, despite active engagement through non-state actors (NSAs) and cultural diplomacy? (2) How do NSAs facilitate Russian influence, and what mechanisms are employed? To clarify this variation, the article distinguishes between two types of influence, symbolic and institutional, and connects them to the concept of elite receptivity, both points further elaborated in the article. While symbolic influence captures the discursive and ideological resonance of Russia’s narratives among NSAs, institutional influence refers to access to decision-making and formal political alliances among the political elite and government. The framework not only accounts for variation in outcomes but also emphasizes the agency of domestic elites in conditioning the reach and effectiveness of foreign influence.
In line with this cluster’s focus, the article centers on the role of NSAs, such as smaller political parties, civil society organizations, and factions within the Orthodox Church, as key agents for Russian symbolic influence. While these entities often have marginal political power, they operate through individual networks and ideological alignments that allow Russia to maintain a discursive presence. Yet their effectiveness, and the overall impact of Russian influence in North Macedonia, the article argues, is shaped by the domestic political environment, particularly the receptivity or resistance of key political elites.
Methodologically, the article adopts a qualitative and interpretive research paradigm, employing triangulation and comparative analysis to enhance analytical depth and validity. The study covers the post-independence period of North Macedonia, with a primary focus on the years 2015–2025—a timeframe that captures key political turning points, including the domestic political crisis (2015–2017), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accession (2020), and the aftermath of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The analysis concentrates on the ideological, institutional, and societal dimensions of Russian influence, deliberately setting aside economic channels. 3 It draws on content analysis of political discourse, media narratives, and policy publications, supported by comparative regional insights and process tracing of key political junctures. Influence and alignment are measured through observable activities indicating cooperation with Russia, such as meetings with diplomatic representatives and narrative alignment, including support for Russia’s expansionist military campaigns. These include party statements, civil society outputs, and media coverage between 2014 and 2024. Triangulation with investigative journalism ensures analytical depth and reliability of the sources selected. Finally, the article contrasts North Macedonia with other Balkan states—particularly Serbia, and to lesser degree with Montenegro and Republika Srpska—where Russian influence has faced fewer structural constraints, and it is more firmly embedded in the diplomatic and intelligence channels, foreign policy, popular support, and the energy sector.
Russian influence in the Western Balkans has attracted growing attention from both scholars and policy analysts. Research has emphasized the symbolic role of Kosovo in shaping regional alignments and has drawn attention to the use of memory diplomacy as a tool through which Russia seeks to assert its presence in Serbia, extending to include visual and performative forms of symbolic communication in public space. 4 The scholarly literature on Russian influence in the Western Balkans has framed Moscow’s engagement as opportunistic, challenging claims that its presence is based on deep-rooted ideological or historical ties. 5
While much of the existing research has concentrated on traditional vectors of influence—such as energy dependence, soft power, and disinformation—little attention has been given to the role of NSAs in these processes. 6 Although some studies acknowledge the limitations and inconsistencies of Russian influence, few have systematically examined how domestic actors outside formal state institutions and key political parties mediate it. This article addresses that gap by focusing on the interaction between Russian-linked networks and NSAs in North Macedonia, offering a more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms and boundaries of Russian engagement in the region. To do so, it engages with a growing body of scholarship that emphasizes the agency of Western Balkan states in shaping their own relationships with external actors. Consistent with this perspective, Cuppuleri and Ashiku argue that countries in the region are not merely passive recipients of Russian influence but actively participate in negotiating and contesting it, an approach that informs the article’s broader analytical framework. 7
In the broader context of Russian influence in the Balkans, North Macedonia may appear to occupy a peripheral position in both Russia’s geopolitical strategy and scholarly interest. While previous research on North Macedonia acknowledges Russia’s limited influence, no study examines comprehensively the rationale behind the limited influence and unique challenges Russia faces in penetrating North Macedonian politics. 8 Much of the existing literature 9 consists of valuable policy papers and publications that often analyze Russia’s influence within the broader context of the Western Balkans and Russia’s strategic interests without more substantially considering the nuances of North Macedonia’s local political landscape and the relevance to broader scholarly debates on external influence, authoritarianism, and hybrid warfare.
Russia’s Geopolitical Strategies in the Balkans
Under Putin’s leadership, Russia’s geopolitical strategy has shifted from the perceived chaos of the Yeltsin era to a more assertive approach, marked by military aggressions and more ideological outreach shaped by the ideas of the “Russkiy Mir” (Russian World) and global multipolarity. 10 Key junctures include the 2008 war in Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has profoundly reshaped European security. Alongside these military interventions, Russia employs soft power strategies such as cultural diplomacy, economic leverage, and the promotion of the “Russkiy Mir” ideology, which combines irredentist claims with efforts to maintain ties with Russian-speaking populations. 11 These strategies are further reinforced by the ideological pursuit of a “multipolar world,” one of the central narratives since the invasion of Ukraine, exemplified by Russia’s key role in expanding BRICS. 12 Russia’s ideological and cultural influence has also resonated globally, including among the far-right and populist-right groups in Western Europe and the United States with some European Union (EU) governments like Slovakia and Hungary, which have adopted pro-Russian stances and resisted offering military aid to Ukraine. 13
Russia has historically been involved in the Balkans. 14 However, compared to other post-Soviet countries, Russia faces unique challenges in Southeastern Europe. The lack of a significant Russian-speaking population and the absence of direct threats of mass violence or occupation limit the applicability of the “Russkiy Mir” project. Instead, Russia leverages historical, cultural, and religious ties, emphasizing Slavic brotherhood and Orthodox identity. Economic investments, particularly in the energy sector, play a significant role, as evidenced by Russia’s status as Montenegro’s largest investor in 2018 and its trade cooperation with Serbia. 15 Cultural and memory diplomacy and historical narratives further bolster its influence with concepts like the “Serbian World” mirroring “Russkiy Mir.” 16
Russia’s current strategies in the Balkans are most visible in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, with Serbia serving as the central hub, where Russia enjoys widespread public support—over 50 percent of the Serbian population views Russia as a key ally. 17 Moscow has cultivated close relationships across Serbia’s political spectrum, including with the current Aleksandar Vučić’s administrations, as well as the Socialist Party of Serbia, one of the key political parties that emerged after the breakup of Yugoslavia. The unresolved Kosovo issue remains a key lever for Russia to shape Serbian foreign policy, as the Serbian leadership finds it hard to make any concessions to Kosovo without Moscow’s approval. 18 President Vučić has maintained a balancing posture between Russia and the West, but his participation in the 2025 Victory Day Parade in Moscow amid the war in Ukraine underscored Serbia’s continued alignment with Moscow. Moreover, the Serbian establishment is sympathetic to the ideas of strong power, attacking civil society and liberal groups, aligning discursively with Putin’s Russia. In Republika Srpska, former President Milorad Dodik—still a dominant political figure—has emerged as one of the Kremlin’s most reliable regional partners, consistently expressing admiration for Vladimir Putin and aligning closely with Moscow’s geopolitical positions. In both cases, Russia legitimizes its role through appeals to shared Slavic and Orthodox identity, with the Serbian Orthodox Church serving as an important cultural and ideological conduit. 19
This hybrid approach, rooted in ideological alignment among the power elite, penetration in the intelligence and foreign policy sectors, strong public support and strategic cooperation, has not been translated to North Macedonia. The country offers a contrasting case that illustrates the limits of Russian influence where elite receptivity of Russian influence is weak, despite the more active attempts of Russia to change the dynamics to its favor in the last decade.
Contextualizing Russian Engagement in North Macedonia
Although Russia was among the first countries to recognize the newly independent Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name in 1992, this diplomatic recognition did not translate into strong bilateral ties. 20 Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, cooperation remained limited and sporadic. It was not until the major political crisis of 2015–2017, a period marked by rising mass protests known as the Colorful Revolution, a civic protest movement against systemic corruption and rising authoritarianism under Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, that the Macedonian government began to exhibit stronger pro-Russian sentiments. This shift was reflected in Moscow’s support for both Gruevski and former President Gjorge Ivanov, as well as a subtle reorientation in North Macedonia’s geopolitical position. Notably, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Gruevski’s cabinet refrained from joining Western sanctions against Russia. A year later, Ivanov participated in a military parade in Moscow, deviating from the Western consensus. 21 Although these actions might be seen as isolated incidents, they marked a significant shift from North Macedonia’s traditionally Western-oriented geopolitical stance and its EU candidate status.
During that political crisis, Russia echoed the government’s rhetoric, attributing instability to external influences and an ambiguous Albanian conspiracy, as Gruevski’s government clashed with EU expectations. 22 Russia positioned itself as a staunch ally, accusing the West and NATO of exacerbating the crisis through undue interference in North Macedonia. This alignment was unsurprising, given the national-conservative VMRO-DPMNE’s shift toward competitive authoritarianism, marked by the use of both external and internal scapegoats, tactics reminiscent of Putin’s Russia, especially during the political crisis. 23
Following Gruevski’s failure to form a government after the election in 2016 and the electoral defeat of Ivanov in 2019, the government consisting of the Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) prioritized resolving the long-standing name dispute with Greece, perceived as an essential step toward Euro-Atlantic integration. 24 Russia opposed the agreement, viewing it as a threat to its interests and a step toward NATO expansion. Both North Macedonia and Greece accused Moscow of interfering in the process by financially supporting opposition to the name change. 25 An important figure in these efforts was Russian businessman Sergey Samsonenko, who maintained close ties to Macedonian politics, particularly during Gruevski’s tenure. 26
Since the outbreak of the Ukraine war in 2014 and especially after 2022, Russian influence has become more pronounced in the public and online spheres. 27 Through narratives grounded in Slavic brotherhood and infused with anti-Western and anti-Albanian rhetoric, Moscow has attempted to capitalize on internal tensions between Macedonian and Albanian nationalisms, which have historically flared around issues of identity, language rights, and power-sharing in the multiethnic state.
These narratives have found growing resonance among segments of the ethnic Macedonian population. Approximately 25 percent of ethnic Macedonians view Russia as a major ally, particularly supporters of the right-wing VMRO-DPMNE party, which harbors stronger pro-Russian sentiments. 28 Several factors help to explain this growing sympathy toward Russia: frustration over the stalled EU accession process (most recently due to Bulgaria’s veto, and previously Greece’s), Russia’s perceived support for Macedonian interests during the name dispute, and the resonance of conservative Orthodox-rooted narratives. The conservative ideas of order and hard power linked with the contemporary Russia found also its resonance among the right-wing electorate, which traditionally favors strong authority, seeing little value in the ideas of liberal democracy. 29 Despite growing public resonance, Russian influence has struggled to penetrate the mainstream political elite, prompting a pivot toward alternative and non-institutional channels. This highlights the article’s emphasis on elite receptivity, consistent with the view that “norms may first take root among the populace,” but they must then spread to the elite level to affect state behavior. 30
Conceptualizing External Influence: Symbolic versus Institutional Power and Elite Receptivity
Scholarship on authoritarian diffusion suggests that contemporary autocracies such as Russia do not seek to export a specific authoritarian model but rather aim at eroding the global appeal of liberal democracy and fostering permissive conditions for illiberal governance. 31 In contrast to China, which promotes an economic development model attractive for pro-authoritarian governments, Russia lacks comparable strategic leverage. Instead, it relies on hybrid tactics, and ideologically framed messaging, including what scholars have described as strategic narratives: communicative efforts to shape international legitimacy and alliances. 32 Available scholarship is undoubtedly helpful in analyzing Russian influence in the Western Balkans, but offers limited explanatory power for why similar tools produce different outcomes across countries. As noted, Russian influence has achieved stronger overall traction in Serbia and Republika Srpska, penetrating their economic, popular symbolic domains, diplomatic, and elite-level channels, unlike North Macedonia.
To operationalize this argument and approach, the article adopts a conceptual distinction between symbolic and institutional influence, as two outcomes shaped by the degree of elite receptivity. Symbolic influence is conceptualized here as influence exercised through NSAs that lack formal governmental power but contribute to the legitimization and visibility of Russia’s geopolitical narratives through discursive alignment, acting as ideological allies. Institutional influence, by contrast, involves access to political decision-making such as determining Serbia’s foreign policy through Kosovo, elite cooperation and formal political channels. In North Macedonia, Russian efforts have achieved symbolic resonance through NSAs (and partially and episodically through the VMRO-DPMNE) but remain peripheral in institutional terms.
To better capture this dynamic, the concept of elite receptivity serves as analytical lens, defined as the willingness of political elites to align with external norms and interests. 33 Elite receptivity functions as the gatekeeping variable that determines whether external influence remains symbolic, channeled through discourse and NSAs, or becomes institutional, embedded in formal policy and elite alliances. In a similar tone, Roselle et al. argue that strategic narratives only succeed when they are interpreted and internalized by target audiences. 34 Drawing on Ikenberry and Kupchan’s understanding of socialization in international relations, elite receptivity highlights the role of domestic elites in mediating external influence. 35 Adjusting this theory, this article argues that when elites are ideologically sympathetic or strategically open to an external-power, foreign influence can be institutionalized via mainstream political parties and policy domains. By contrast, when elites are resistant due to divergent values, coalition dynamics (such as in North Macedonia), or competing alignments (such as NATO/EU membership), the article argues that foreign actors are confined to symbolic and informal influence on peripheral actors and segments of civil society. This approach is in a close dialogue with Tolstrup’s conception of elites as “gatekeepers that actively facilitate or constrain ties to external actors,” which challenges portrayals of Balkan states as passive recipients of Russian influence and instead foregrounds the role of domestic agency. 36 While prior studies have explored symbolic influence or elite capture in isolation, this framework bridges the two, positing that elite receptivity functions as the gatekeeping mechanism determining whether external actors achieve mere symbolic alignment or deeper institutional embeddedness. This shall provide a more precise analytical lens for understanding variation not only across countries, but also within them, where different subjects and institutions respond differently to external pressures.
How does this theoretical framework explain the specific dynamics of Russian influence in North Macedonia? In North Macedonia, limited elite receptivity to Russian normative frameworks, though present with some variation across the political spectrum, helps to explain why Russian influence remains largely symbolic and informal, despite active projection. The country’s political landscape is dominated by two major parties: the center-left SDSM and the national-conservative VMRO-DPMNE. Russian influence within either party has been sporadic and episodic, despite divergence in reception. The SDSM, together with DUI, its coalition partner during 2017–2024 and a party representing the Albanian community, has consistently promoted a strong pro-European and pro-NATO orientation. This alignment has been evident in its support for sanctions against Russia following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its active positioning within the Euro-Atlantic alliance.
The national-conservative party VMRO-DPMNE has a record of actively enabling autocratization, particularly under Gruevski’s leadership (2004–2017). Therefore, it might appear to be a more receptive target party, but never fully and strategically aligned with Moscow. Even when rhetorically supported by Russia during the 2015–2017 political crisis, VMRO-DPMNE maintained its formal commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration. Moreover, its dependence on pro-Western Albanian coalition partners has structurally limited its ability to shift toward Moscow. The appointment of a pro-Russian deputy prime minister in 2024 (discussed in detail later in the article) under the VMRO-DPMNE-led government signals rhetorical flexibility, but not necessarily strategic realignment.
The Albanian political establishment, whose parties have consistently participated in government coalitions and often played the role of kingmakers since independence by enabling the formation of ruling majorities, remains uniformly pro-Western and critical of Russian influence across party lines. A key factor behind this stance is Russia’s history of instrumentalizing anti-Albanian narratives as part of broader regional destabilization efforts, which has compelled Albanian parties to align themselves firmly with the anti-Russian camp. Since coalition governments in North Macedonia traditionally require Albanian participation, this bloc serves as a political barrier to Russian access to national institutions and decision-making agenda.
Unlike Serbia and Republika Srpska, where elite receptivity has facilitated a more comprehensive Russian influence, North Macedonia illustrates that domestic alignment with Western institutions and coalition dynamics together can insulate a country from external penetration. This argument supports scholars’ view claiming the linkage with West is pivotal in resisting pressure of autocratization. 37 Even with VMRO-DPMNE’s return to power in 2024, the party’s reliance on Albanian allies, traditionally anti-Russian, makes any dramatic realignment with Russia politically risky and unlikely.
In sum, limited elite receptivity, shaped by pro-European coalitional dynamics, has significantly constrained Russia’s institutional influence in North Macedonia. This reinforces the central argument of the article: where elite receptivity is absent, external influence remains symbolic, pivoting to fringe actors and ideological and non-state channels rather than formal institutional alignment. The article turns now to the role of the NSAs to explain how the Russian influence flows through these channels and networks.
Russia’s Symbolic Influence: Pro-Russian Proxies in North Macedonia
In this study, NSAs are understood as political parties, civil society organizations, and religious networks that operate outside the core executive structures of the state, but possess discursive or mobilizational resources. This section looks specifically at political parties.
Although Russia’s direct institutional influence in North Macedonia remains limited, the 2015–2025 period saw a persistent symbolic engagement through various NSAs. 38 These include political parties across the ideological spectrum, segments of civil society, and factions within the Orthodox Church. 39 Several political groups and individuals seem to strongly resonate with Russian ideological positioning and continue to support President Vladimir Putin, even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia’s approach has relied on cultivating these actors as proxies through explicit political alignment, targeted networking, rhetorical convergence with anti-Western, sovereigntist, and multipolar worldviews, or diffusion, as Ambrosio’s framework on global authoritarian reception suggests. 40 This research conceptualizes pro-Russian networks as openly glorifying the regime, having established channels of communication with it, actively endorsing Russian rhetoric about Western hegemony and the need to establish a multipolar world, or echoing the sovereigntist and anti-liberal/Western positions propagated by Russia.
This section focuses on three parties that serve as vehicles for Russian symbolic influence: the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia (Demokratska Partija na Srbite vo Makedonija), the United Macedonia (Edinstvena Makedonija), and the Left (Levica). Despite their normative ideological differences, these actors share common rhetorical strategies, especially to global politics, criticizing Western liberalism, promoting alignment with Russia, and echoing narratives of national sovereignty, ethnic nationalism, and hostility toward the EU-NATO axis.
The Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia, led by Ivan Stoiljković, represents one of the most explicit pro-Russian voices. Although the party has limited electoral strength, Stoiljković has maintained a parliamentary presence and was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in the VMRO-DPMNE-led government in 2024. 41 His appointment is highly significant, coming at a time when North Macedonia is a NATO member since 2020 and amid the ongoing war in Ukraine and raises questions about the permeability of state institutions to Russian-aligned individuals.
Stoiljković has consistently opposed NATO enlargement and Western sanctions on Russia. In 2016, he joined a group of Balkan politicians in signing a declaration advocating for “military neutrality” in the region, a move clearly aligned with Moscow’s strategic goals. He has maintained close ties to Russian officials, frequently attending high-profile events in Moscow, including the 2023 Security Forum, where Putin addressed the audience. 42 His alignment with Russian narratives includes support for Slavic Orthodox identity, skepticism toward EU membership, and opposition to what he portrays as “Western interference” in domestic affairs. While Stoiljković’s views do not necessarily represent the government, his prominent position in it signals a degree of tolerance or even opportunistic accommodation by ruling elites seeking to appeal to segments of the electorate that harbor pro-Russian sentiments, rather than a coherent foreign policy reorientation. 43 It may signal an openness of the new government toward the Russian Federation, albeit manifested primarily through individual channels rather than as a strategic, institutional, and ideological shift.
United Macedonia, under the leadership of Janko Bacev, is an overtly pro-Russian political entity that operates largely outside the mainstream political arena, but it has received media and public visibility due to its far-right positions and Bacev’s flamboyant public performances. Originally named the People’s Movement for Macedonia (formed in 2002), the party was rebranded in 2018 as United Macedonia, a clear reference to Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, that underscores its loyalties. 44 Bacev and his party have openly advocated for North Macedonia withdrawing from NATO, halting EU accession, and realigning with Russia. Their public discourse blends anti-Westernism, sovereigntist rhetoric, and cultural conservatism. The party has hosted events involving prominent Russian ideologues such as Leonid Savin and Aleksandr Dugin, figures closely tied to the Kremlin’s geopolitical worldview, who disseminate Russian narratives and help cultivate transnational networks within the country. 45 During these events, rhetoric about the decline of the West, echoing the views of leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has resonated strongly, further aligning the party with Russian geopolitical narratives.
During the public protests against the Prespa Agreement in 2018, United Macedonia played a vocal role, framing the agreement as a Western imposition and betrayal of national sovereignty. The Prespa Agreement, signed with Greece in June 2018 and coming into force in February 2019, resolved a long-standing dispute over the country’s name. The country agreed to change its name to North Macedonia, while Greece lifted its veto on the country’s accession to NATO and progress toward EU membership. The Agreement was seen as a diplomatic breakthrough in the Balkans. Bacev waved Russian flags at the demonstration, reinforcing his image as Moscow’s most dedicated advocate in the country. 46 The party also boycotted the 2018 referendum on NATO accession. Despite its lack of parliamentary presence, United Macedonia’s ideological consistency and willingness to act as a public mouthpiece for Russian positions make it an important symbolic player, a discursive and symbolic proxy that amplifies Russia’s geopolitical goals and projects.
In addition to these right-wing political parties, the third significant political organization displaying affinity toward Moscow’s foreign policy is left-wing: Levica. Originally formed by leftist activists from various protest movements, Levica emerged as a radical left-wing alternative grounded in social justice and supra-ethnic solidarity. 47 However, the party has undergone a sharp populist and nationalist turn under the leadership of Dimitar Apasiev since 2019, though signs of this direction were evident earlier within party structures. Following internal splits and the marginalization of its founding progressive wing, Levica rebranded itself as a populist movement centered on anti-Western and anti-Albanian discourse, evolving into a leftist ethno-nationalist party. 48 This repositioning culminated in the party’s boycott campaign of the 2018 Prespa Agreement referendum, during which it aligned itself with far-right organizations.
Unlike the other two parties discussed earlier, Levica has seen a significant rise in influence since 2020, securing six parliamentary seats in the 2024 national elections and showing openness toward Moscow. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Levica’s leaders welcomed the Russian ambassador to the Macedonian Parliament. 49 More intriguing than the meeting itself was the statement released afterward, in which the party referred to a “special military operation” and discussed the “denazification and elimination of the threat from extreme right-wing and radical neo-Nazi movements,” a narrative justifying the invasion of Ukraine. 50 Moreover, the party dismissed the need to impose sanctions on Russia in response to the war in Ukraine. Levica members visited Moscow in 2022, participating in an event organized by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Pioneers. 51 Party leader Apasiev was a guest at the Victory Day in 2025, a key national event in Russia celebrating victory over fascism, staged also as a platform for promoting Russian nationalism and imperialism. 52 Levica officially embraces a leftist ideology, but its discourse resembles the discourse of right-wing parties centered on the decline of the West. 53 While rooted in progressive activism, Levica has become a conduit for illiberal ideas associated with a multipolar, post-liberal international order, increasingly resembling far-right populist rhetoric. The party’s capacity to inject Kremlin-aligned discourse into mainstream debates and its parliamentary representation render it a strategically significant subject in Russia’s broader effort to influence North Macedonia.
The impact of these pro-Russian political parties is still limited and symbolic due to their weak(er) political capital vis-à-vis key political parties. Also, their overtly anti-Western stance has made them vulnerable in a political environment where the mainstream parties maintain a solidly pro-Western orientation. Levica’s ideological realignment illustrates that nominally leftist political parties can adopt symbolic narratives aligned with Russian strategic narratives, particularly the rejection of Euro-Atlantic integration and liberal-democratic norms.
The extent of elite receptivity will continue to shape the future of the relationship between Russia and North Macedonia. As these political parties continue to assert their distinctive positions regarding Russia and the war in Ukraine, and potentially expand their parliamentary representation, their engagement should be closely monitored, particularly in light of VMRO-DPMNE’s stance on geopolitics and the current Vice Prime Minister’s close ties with Moscow.
Russian Influence on Civil Society and Religious Institutions
In this section, the focus turns to civil society groups and pro-Russian factions within the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC). Research on Russia’s engagement with civil organizations and media in North Macedonia indicates that Russia prioritizes cooperation with civil society over the political establishment. 54 This finding aligns with the article’s central observation regarding the limited connection between Russia and the mainstream political environment.
Russia’s engagement with civil society primarily targets organizations and individuals within the “ethnic/Orthodox Macedonian bloc.” 55 Russia avoids ties with Albanian cultural and civil society actors due to its negative perception of the Albanian political establishment as secessionist and Western-aligned. Overseen by the Union of Russian-Macedonian Friendship Association, these civil society groups primarily promote Russian-Macedonian friendship and Russian culture. 56 Officially they focus on strengthening the ties between two nations. According to previous research, Russian engagement in the country is routed through three state organizations: the Gorchakov Fund, a state-backed foundation supporting public diplomacy and promoting Russia’s foreign policy objectives; the Russkiy Mir Foundation, dedicated to spreading the Russian language and cultural heritage abroad; and the Russian Embassy in Skopje. 57 By looking at their activities, they seem are not as politicized as the activities of the political discussed in the previous section.
However, a revealing case of indirect institutional linkage involves the Gorchakov Fund. In July 2024, the Macedonian media reported that Sandra Stoiljkovik, identified in the report as the daughter of Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Stoiljković, served as a program coordinator at the Gorchakov Fund in North Macedonia and has participated in high-level events such as the Balkan Dialogue, a regional forum supported by the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russian Embassy in Skopje in 2023. 58 Sandra Stoiljkovik’s repeated public appearances at these events, including as a speaker in 2023, suggest an effort to foster a new generation of ideologically aligned elites in the Balkans.
Moreover, research conducted by several civil society organizations and journalists in the country highlights a highly politicized civil society sector related to Russia. According to the extensive research, based on North Macedonia’s intelligence documents, Russia is involved in financing over thirty civil society groups with over five thousand members. 59 Russian consulates in the towns of Bitola and Ohrid function as “intelligence bases.” 60 The recently opened Russian Centre in Skopje, allegedly overseen by the Russian Embassy in Skopje, sponsored Orthodox crosses and Russian-style churches across the country. 61
The Orthodox Church has become an additional channel for Russia to extend its influence, especially as other official avenues lack the capacity to do so. Russia integrates religion and intelligence to manipulate the geopolitical landscape through ecclesiastical ties. 62 Part of the MOC structure increasingly aligns with Moscow against the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, primarily due to the complexities surrounding the MOC’s quest for full recognition as autocephalous. While the MOC received recognition of its autocephaly from the Serbian Orthodox Church in 2022, formal granting of the Tomos of Autocephaly by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople remains pending. 63 The conditions set by Constantinople, such as avoiding the term “Macedonian” in the church’s official name and recognizing the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine, have been met with resistance from the MOC. In contrast, Moscow, alongside Belgrade, has no objection for the local church to use the name “Macedonian.” This unresolved situation creates an opportunity for Russia to maintain and even expand its influence in North Macedonia’s ecclesiastical affairs, though its influence is not absolute and unchallenged within the MOC. 64
Several developments suggest that certain factions within the MOC maintain pro-Moscow sympathies. A particularly telling case is the banning of Vasili Zmeev, a prominent representative of the Russian ecclesiastical mission (podvorje) in Bulgaria. Former Macedonian President Stevo Pendarovski claimed that Zmeev coordinated the MOC’s decisions, reflecting Russia’s broader strategy to maintain influence. 65 These activities align with Moscow’s ambition to counterbalance Constantinople’s influence and strengthen ties with sympathetic factions within the MOC. 66
In contrast to the more ambiguous and informally conditioned ties of cultural centers and civil society groups, the relationship between Moscow and the MOC is more evident and direct among certain structures with the MOC. Russia’s influence within the MOC, and on other Orthodox Churches in the Western Balkans, is likely to persist due to its political and ideological capital, as well as the institutional networks it has built around the Church. This influence is further reinforced by the status of the Russian Orthodox Church as one of the largest and most influential Orthodox institutions, recognized by all sister churches. In contrast, the MOC lacks this recognition. As Russia seeks to deepen its penetration, it will likely rely on these channels to expand its leverage, potentially complicating the internal dynamics and increasing Moscow’s influence within the Orthodox Churches in the region.
In addition to engaging with civil society and the MOC, the Russian influence also extends into North Macedonia’s media landscape, where campaigns further amplify anti-Western sentiments. The proliferation of anti-Western and anti-Albanian narratives in pro-Russian media outlets aligns with hybrid warfare tactics, where information operations serve to undermine democratic institutions, manipulate the facts by relying on disinformation, and aim at creating collective divisions. 67
Recent research offers clear evidence of Russian media presence in North Macedonia. 68 Five Russian state-owned outlets—Russia 24, Sputnik, RTR-Planeta, Channel One, and Russia Today (RT)—maintain a direct footprint in the country. Although none of them rank among the top five most-consumed channels, their consistent availability provides Moscow with direct platforms for dissemination. No major media outlet in North Macedonia is directly owned or operated by Russian entities and owners. This helps explain why Russia’s media influence remains limited in terms of institutional reach—understood here not just as ownership or editorial control, but also as structural integration into major national media outlets. However, unlike restrictions in the EU, where Russian state-affiliated media Sputnik and RT have been banned due to disinformation concerns following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, North Macedonia continues to permit access to these channels via certain cable providers. 69 This relatively permissive media environment, combined with the country’s openness to foreign media ownership and hidden stakes from Hungary, Kosovo, Greece, and Serbia, creates potential entry points for Kremlin-backed narratives, even in the absence of formal ownership. 70
The intention to exert ethnic tensions and fuel anti-Western sentiments has been central to the media coverage of Russian media channels. 71 Between 2015 and 2017, amid a severe political crisis and leading up to Macedonia’s NATO accession in 2020, Russian outlets amplified divisive and destabilizing rhetoric. Anti-Western and anti-Albanian narratives gained traction, with NATO membership portrayed as a historical mistake. Russian media coverage at the time frequently aimed at provoking ethnic tensions, criticizing pro-Western political parties, and suggesting that the West supported an alleged Albanian conspiracy to destabilize the region. 72 Russian actions were most active during the referendum for the name change in 2018, when Russia relied on disinformation tactics to delegitimize the process and oppose the resolution of the name issue, which eventually led to North Macedonia’s NATO membership. 73 Other studies on Russian media influence and disinformation tactics confirm efforts to divide the society and erode trust in institutions and the media. 74
The informal relying on NSAs to disperse its influence characterizes Russia’s use of local socio-political networks through a variety of ways, individuals, and channels. In the absence of a clear pro-Russian policy embraced by the political establishment, Russia attempts to fill the gap by investing in media narratives, Orthodox Church structures, and NSAs. In addition, intelligence seemingly plays an important role in penetrating wider social sectors. Further research focused on particular segments can reveal the full extent of these activities and their impact on North Macedonia’s political and cultural landscapes.
Conclusion
The North Macedonian case demonstrates that smaller states exercise agency in resisting external-power influence. Elite receptivity of foreign interests and norms shapes whether foreign influence remains symbolic or evolves into institutional capture. In North Macedonia, the absence of elite alignment among the core political establishment has relegated Russian influence to the margins, channeled through ideological proxies and non-state networks. While there is tolerance for Russian positions and media in the country, we have not seen deep institutional capture of domestic and foreign policy.
Furthermore, the study offers a more differentiated understanding of Russian influence, calling for future scholarship to unpack the intersection of ideology, agency, and informal power and non-state structures. It demonstrates that Russian influence is not uniform across the region, showcasing instead how local political structures and elite coalitions mediate and diffuse external strategies. Compared to Russia’s strategic assertiveness in the post-Soviet republics, its influence in the Western Balkans is more fragmented. While other states and entities in the region, notably Serbia and Republika Srpska, show deeper Russian penetration through formal channels, North Macedonia presents a more constrained environment marked by limited elite receptivity and fragmented symbolic influence.
The study’s main empirical contribution is to show that the NSAs—such as fringe political parties, civil society organizations, and segments of the Orthodox Church—serve as alternative vehicles for Russian influence. Since access to elite structures has been restricted to less influential political parties and NSAs, Moscow has concentrated its efforts on marginal parties and ideological proxies that remain outside the core executive structures but possess the ability to shape public discourse, deepen social cleavages, and provide platforms for the circulation of Russian-aligned ideas. These organizations promote Kremlin-aligned narratives, but their limited institutional standing constrains their capacity to effect meaningful policy change.
These dynamics carry important analytical and practical implications. The appointment of a pro-Russian deputy prime minister in the 2024 government does not signal a strategic realignment, but may encourage potential pro-Russian structures, particularly within VMRO-DPMNE, to provide more room for Russian external politics. This could normalize illiberal narratives, amplify existing grievances, and erode democratic norms through incremental shifts rather than overt policy reversals. Given its unresolved issues around autocephaly and recognition, the Orthodox Church may continue to serve as an entry point for Russian influence, with religious diplomacy and intelligence-linked networks playing a quiet but persistent role.
Future research could further test this symbolic–institutional typology in other contexts, using elite receptivity as the explanatory variable for variation in foreign influence outcomes. The key is to gain better understand the role of the Orthodox Church in North Macedonia, intelligence networks, and evolving state–NSA relations. Greater attention should be paid to informal political dynamics, which may offer deeper insights into the connections between Russia and both state actors and NSAs. Monitoring pro-Russian individuals and organizations, and their potential institutional advancements, remains essential, especially as political alignments continue to shift and the broader geopolitical environment remains volatile, particularly in light of evolving U.S. policy toward Europe under the Trump administration.
