Abstract
Scholars of deservingness emphasize the attitudes of host societies toward migrant communities and inter-ethnic stances of migrant groups but not in-group perceptions of deservingness. Based on interviews with Ukrainian citizens who received temporary protection in the Czech Republic and Poland after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, we show that participants classified the fleeing of their fellow citizens from Western Ukraine as non-deserving of temporary protection. Migration from this region, minimally affected by the war, was seen as economic and voluntary not forced. As such, Ukrainians from this part of Ukraine could not vindicate their displacement. By contrast, those fleeing from Eastern Ukraine were perceived as worthy, since their migration was “truly” forced due to the active war, and therefore deserving of temporary protection. However, most Ukrainians displaced in the Czech Republic and Poland are from Western Ukraine and thus, from the perspective of participants, they do not deserve temporary protection. This research suggests that regional aspects are important when studying the “deserving” or “non-deserving” migration aspirations of Ukrainian beneficiaries of the Temporary Protection Directive.
Introduction
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine caused the largest armed conflict in Europe after World War II. This situation led to a significant number of internally displaced persons and migrants moving to the European Union (EU). Poland assisted 1.6 million displaced persons, and the Czech Republic assisted the highest number of Ukrainians per one hundred thousand inhabitants. 1 In these countries, Ukrainians benefited from the Temporary Protection Directive, adopted by the EU in 2001 (Council Directive 2001/55/EC) and launched after 24 February 2022. The Directive provides similar support to the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, the asylum process based on the Convention is individual and the temporary protection is for cases of mass influx. 2
In the host societies, the media generally refer to displaced persons from Ukraine as deserving assistance, while politicians, the public, and many organizations do not differentiate between the specific circumstances of displaced Ukrainians. 3 In comparison, displaced persons living in the Czech Republic and Poland question the value of temporary protection for all Ukrainians. They emphasize significant in-group differences based on regional origins within Ukraine and accuse some migrants of not being “proper” displaced persons. Insight into the social dynamics and interaction of migration aspirations enables us to understand who in the migrant community is seen as more deserving and how migration intentions relate to perceptions of regional differences within the country of origin. 4
The emphasis on regional differences might be problematic especially since Ukrainian political leaders highlight the unity of the country during the war. In Ukraine, the western regions are seen as more “Ukrainized,” agricultural, nationalistic, and “pro-European,” while the east is allegedly more industrialized and “pro-Russian.” 5 This division, underpinned by consumption of specific types of media, might also relate to anti-Soviet and post-Soviet attitudes, urban and rural development, the dominance of Russian-speaking or Ukrainian-speaking people, and “Maidan-Ukraine” or “Anti-Maidan Ukraine” attitudes. 6 Regional differences also are based on differences in historical circumstances. In the past, Western Ukraine was influenced by nationalism and more democratic development within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Eastern Ukraine was affected by the undemocratic tendencies of Tsarist Russia. 7 After World War I, Western Ukraine was part of a more democratic Poland, while Eastern Ukraine was ruled by the Soviet Union. Both regions became reunited after World War II under the control of the Soviet Union. After its dissolution in 1991, several important distinctions emerged in the geopolitical landscape. 8 While the western regions turned toward the EU and more pro-western structures, the eastern regions grew more aligned with Russia. The Russian invasion fueled anti-Russian sentiments even in Eastern Ukraine, but important differences remain. Eastern Ukraine is more urbanized and industrialized, with the Russian language being more popular, while Western Ukraine is more rural and agricultural, with predominantly Ukrainian-speaking inhabitants. 9
Our study explores regional differences because the region of origin increased in importance after displaced persons from Eastern Ukraine fled to the Czech Republic and Poland. There was already an established migration flow from Western Ukraine into these two countries before the Russian invasion of 2022. However, the number of Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine increased when the war began. These displaced individuals began to recognize the differences between themselves and their counterparts from Western Ukraine, based on their distinct experiences with the war and migration aspirations. This led to tensions and complaints about Ukrainians from Western Ukraine, as well as criticisms of the temporary protection process, which does not differentiate between displaced persons.
While migration studies do not associate (non)deserving migration aspirations with the region of origin, scholars studying social policy show that regions are coherently organized social entities consisting of a homogeneous group of people with a shared identity and collective interests. 10 Thus, regional populations are seen as collective social groups with similar intentions, common prosperity, identity, and living standards. 11 The (non)deservingness of the collective regional identity of the displaced persons from Ukraine is also based on discourse and social interactions. 12 This article analyzes perceptions of in-group migration aspirations of fellow citizens who benefited from temporary protection and relates them to “east-west” (non)deservingness. This impacts the effectiveness of the Temporary Protection Directive in meeting its original purpose.
The Directive was created in 2001 as an immediate response to the mass influx of displaced persons because the slow and inefficient asylum system was unable to handle the massive influx of migrants. It provides protection in host countries, including housing, health insurance, labor market access, education, and social welfare. Despite its altruistic aim, the Directive focuses on collective approval of requests without considering individual situations. The asylum system based on the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 thoroughly investigates individual cases, which is a time-consuming process for decisions about asylum applications. In contrast, the Directive expedites processing by not thoroughly examining the circumstances of each request. The Directive and the asylum system have different objectives, but the displaced persons who receive temporary protection enjoy similar rights as those with refugee status. 13 Temporary protection is granted to all Ukrainian nationals who fled to the EU without an investigation into the reasons for their displacement. Individual states may have specific requirements for its implementation. For example, individuals who receive temporary protection in one country cannot re-apply for it in the Czech Republic.
This article explains the situation of Ukrainian holders of temporary protection in the Czech Republic and Poland. The following section focuses on the theoretical interconnection of migration aspirations, the notion of deservingness, and regional origin. The next section presents our methodology and analysis, which examine whether and how participants associate their fellow citizens with specific migration aspirations and perceptions of deservingness. The last section is the discussion and conclusion.
Displaced Ukrainians in the Czech Republic and Poland
Migration from Ukraine to the Czech Republic and Poland was common even before the Russian invasion of 2022. In both countries, many Ukrainians held low-skilled jobs in factories, on construction sites, in medical facilities, hotels, restaurants, or were employed as seasonal workers during harvests. 14 They were predominantly from Western Ukraine and were accustomed to the Czech and Polish environment before the war. 15 These migrants were able to develop social networks in their host countries, something their counterparts from Eastern Ukraine often lacked when they were pushed in after the full-scale Russian invasion.
Both the Czech Republic and Poland accepted large numbers of Ukrainians. In the Czech Republic, the number of individuals registered with temporary protection stood at around 373,000 in December 2023. 16 Most of them live in Prague, the capital, and close surroundings. Displacement is gendered because almost 90 percent of all displaced Ukrainians are women with small children. 17 According to research conducted by the Czech Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in April 2023, 44 percent of displaced persons living in the republic were women and 36 percent were children. 18 In total, 67 percent of economically active Ukrainian holders of temporary protection have full-time employment, albeit primarily in low-skilled or unskilled jobs. 19 Their precarious situation prevents them from fulfilling their potential. Displaced persons assert that the language barrier prevented them from finding better job opportunities. According to PAQ Research, only 44 percent of adult displaced persons could communicate in Czech in daily situations. 20 Ukrainians’ employment in less qualified jobs is financially disadvantageous for the Czech state because they are often highly qualified. Starting mid-2023, Ukrainians were required to pay for rented accommodations and by November 2023, 70 percent of them were renting an apartment. 21 Others lived in hostels and shared accommodations. The proportion of university graduates among Ukrainian holders of temporary protection was twice the Czech population’s rate (36% compared to 17%). 22 Displaced persons receive financial support of US$223 per person for five months, and afterward US$206 is offered to vulnerable groups (such as disabled and retired persons), and US$148 for children. Families receive additional support. 23 Data from the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic show the regions of origin of displaced Ukrainians. In mid-2023, most temporary protection holders were born in Western Ukraine (31%), with Eastern Ukraine accounting for another 16 percent, Northern Ukraine for 9 percent, Southern Ukraine for 7 percent, and Central Ukraine for 5.5 percent. 24 Almost 31 percent of temporary protection holders did not explicitly state their region of birthplace. 25
Poland also houses a high number of displaced Ukrainians due to its border with Ukraine and the possibility of traveling between the two countries. 26 In January 2024, Poland had 955,893 actively registered temporary protection holders. The majority live in the big cities in Mazowieckie, Lower Silesian, and Silesian provinces (voivodeship). In total, 64 percent are women, including youth (nearly 40% are represented by those eighteen to fifty-nine years of age). Displaced persons are mostly employed in low-skilled jobs in hotels, catering industries, services, production and trade, agriculture, and logistics. This leads to precarious positions, insufficient fulfillment of potential, and financial losses for Poland. Some 68 percent of displaced persons live in private accommodation, 12 percent in shared accommodation, 13 percent at hostels, and 7 percent at collective centers. 27 In May 2022, half of all displaced persons had a university degree. 28 There were 691,000 Ukrainians working in Poland in August 2023, the largest foreign labor force in the country. 29 Ukrainians who came to Poland after 24 February 2022 with children and obtained temporary protections are entitled to the most extensive Polish social program 800+. According to the Polish Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy, in December 2023, nearly 210,000 citizens of Ukraine with children received monthly social benefits of US$202 each. 30
Research into the origin of Ukrainian holders of temporary protection, conducted in Poland in May 2023, showed that one-fifth of a sample of 3,658 Ukrainians came from Western Ukraine, 19 percent from the east, 19 percent from the south and 19 percent from Central Ukraine. In addition, 23 percent came from Northern Ukraine. 31 Similar research in the Czech Republic is missing; there are only the data from Ministry of the Interior discussed earlier.
Migration Aspirations, Deservingness, and Regional Perceptions
The issue of distributive justice in the EU, “who should get what and why,” is related to the (non)deservingness of displaced persons from Ukraine. 32 Weeks after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Poles, and Czechs were asked by the Czech Institute of Empirical Research and non-governmental organization Globsec to assess the (non)deservingness of displaced persons from various regions of Ukraine. 33 As different regions of Ukraine were affected differently by the war, their inhabitants might also perceive the circumstances for migration differently.
The first research on the topic of deservingness was conducted by Fay Lomax Cook and Abram De Swaan. 34 To assess deservingness, they used five criteria to justify the distribution of social welfare funds among various policy targets: Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity, and Need (jointly known as the “CARIN” criteria). 35 People who cannot “control” their situation are seen as more deserving, as are those with a positive attitude for the help they receive. The reciprocity criterion refers to the extent to which the person who expects support has “earned” it, for example, through activity on the labor market or contribution to the state budget through tax payments. Integration and identification with society are also crucial factors. The more people in need convince their hosts that they are “one of them,” the more help will be provided. The last condition is to meet the needs; those with higher needs are considered as more deserving. 36 The notion of deservingness was further conceptualized by other authors. 37 These criteria were used to assess the refugees’ merit for receiving social assistance, but threats are also associated with attitudes toward refugees. 38 Some authors also challenge the CARIN criteria. 39
This model is often applied to migrants, including refugees from culturally distant countries, such as Syria, Iraq, and Sudan. Several European politicians and media have used the term “economic migrants” to cast doubt on the legitimacy of these migrants’ claims of protection. 40 Symbolic threat refers to the fear that Syrian migrants challenge European religion, values, belief systems, ideology, or worldview. 41 In contrast, geographical, cultural, and historical proximity affects perceptions of Ukrainians who arrive in Poland and the Czech Republic. The difficult Polish-Ukrainian history or the issue of Transcarpathia in the Czech Republic additionally influenced emotions: the CARIN model should account for historical circumstances. Most displaced Ukrainians are close to the ethnicity, culture, religion, values, belief system, and worldview of other Europeans. 42 The numerical predominance of women among them is an advantage, as they are often perceived as mothers with children. In contrast, displaced Muslims arriving at the Polish-Belarus border are viewed in a more negative light, often as single men who are less deserving of assistance. 43 As Ukrainians are seen as more preferred migrants who are not (distant) “others,” it might be problematic to apply the standardized CARIN model. 44
Other political and economic aspects contribute to the closeness of Ukrainians to European societies. The Russian aggression undermined Ukraine’s democratization and desire to join Western institutions, possibly encouraging even more sympathy from the hosts. The “post-Maidan” reforms—the opening of borders to the EU and the increased opportunities to study and work in other European countries—have rapidly “Europeanized” young Ukrainians. Moreover, EU citizens have increasingly chosen Ukraine as a tourist destination. 45
Thus, displaced persons from Ukraine are generally seen as deserving. Scholars of deservingness explain that host European societies perceive forced migrants as deserving and voluntary migrants with alleged economic intentions as non-deserving. 46 Only a few studies of deservingness and inter-ethnic ties between migrant groups show how specific migrant groups see others. 47 Attention is not paid to the in-group migrant community’s awareness of deservingness, the focus of our research. From an in-group perspective, there may be significant differences related to regional aspects tied to a country of origin because displaced persons from different regions may consider their fellow citizens from other regions as non-deserving. This could be linked to the (non)acceptance of fellow citizens based on their region of origin and the perception of “proper” and “improper” displaced persons.
Migration aspirations are affected by push-pull conditions, personal ambitions, objectives, and the capacity to act, which leads most scholars to refer to migration aspiration before the individual has actually migrated. 48 However, in this article, we refer to the migration aspirations of participants who have already migrated to better understand their motivations after the fact. In our research, migration aspiration opens up a bottom-up perspective, orientation toward subjective cognitive perception, and link to self-representation. 49 How individuals perceive the migration incentives of others from the same migrant community remains understudied. Scholars discuss migration ambitions in terms of how individual migration aspirations relate to social affections or the differences in migration objectives of certain groups, but not the migration ambitions within specific groups. 50 Thus, it is valuable to analyze perceptions about the deserving or non-deserving nature of Ukrainian holders of temporary protection from an in-group perspective. This article shows how displaced persons from Ukraine see their fellow citizens and connects these perceptions with migration aspirations, regional origin, and deservingness.
Methodology
The participants were citizens of Ukraine who received temporary protection in the Czech Republic or Poland after 24 February 2022. The selection of participants was based on their holding temporary protection, age (participants had to be above eighteen years of age), and locality (we preferred participants from Prague and Olkusz). Other selective criteria are discussed further below. All participants fled from Ukraine during the first months of the invasion. Research was conducted from June to December 2023. In total, we conducted fifty-seven interviews with seventeen participants in Poland and forty in the Czech Republic. Participants were born in independent Ukraine or the former Soviet Union. One participant was born in Tynda, in the Amur region of Russia, and another in Shymkent, Kazakhstan. All of them have Ukrainian passports and most of them resided outside Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. Two participants born in Crimea resided in the Ukrainian inland before Crimea’s annexation of 2014. One participant fled twice, from Donetsk in 2014 and then from Ukraine in 2022.
In the Czech Republic, we conducted interviews with participants from Eastern Ukraine, Central Ukraine, Southern Ukraine, and Western Ukraine to capture the perspectives of interviewees from all regions, acknowledging that they may have had different migration aspirations. However, all participants were still asked about the east and west division. Among them were five participants from Kharkiv (Eastern Ukraine) at the time of flight, seven from Kyiv, and one from near the town of Bucha (Table 1). Five of the 17 interviews conducted in Poland were with participants from Eastern Ukraine, six from Central Ukraine, four from Western Ukraine, and two from Southern Ukraine. A soldier injured in battle and recovering in Poland was the only man in our sample. This gender distribution reflects the high number of women among displaced persons and the reluctance of men to be part of the research (as they might be seen as traitors not fighting for Ukraine). The sample consisted of twenty-seven women who fled with their children, of whom sixteen women reunified with their husbands who were already living in the Czech Republic or Poland. As such, the responses of participants were often focused on family-related issues. Having small children limited their ability to obtain a job, and therefore many interviewed women were financially dependent on their husbands or humanitarian assistance. However, most women had worked before the invasion and were also working in the Czech Republic and Poland when they were interviewed. They worked at least a couple of hours per day to maintain sustainable living conditions. However, living arrangements were particularly problematic for single women with children, and they were dependent on their husbands or humanitarian assistance. The research also included nineteen single women without family obligations or divorced. Women were seen as more deserving of temporary protection in both receiving countries but displaced men were seen as avoiding service in the army. In Poland, the researcher conducted seventeen not twenty interviews due to time constraints.
List of Interviews
Source: Authors.
Note: Table 1 shows the distribution of participants according to their location of birth, location of departure, and location of interview.
Interviews were primarily conducted in Prague and the surrounding areas (Kladno, Tursko, Beroun, Kopidlno, Lány, Kolín, and Milovice). Three interviews were conducted in Hradec Králové thanks to contacts in the local Caritas, and one in Pardubice. In Poland, all interviews were conducted in Olkusz, a small town located 35 km from Cracow. We chose Olkusz to compare a small town with a larger city (Prague). In addition, Olkusz is a significant logistical hub connecting Ukraine to other Polish cities and European countries. Its proximity to Ukraine was also a reason why we selected it. Participants chose the interview place, usually parks, playgrounds, supermarkets, libraries, cafés, or participants’ hostels or apartments. Two interviews were conducted online due to the participants’ strong preference. One participant who returned to Ukraine in July 2022 provided an online interview because she wanted to express her strong gratitude for being accepted in a friendly manner in the Czech Republic.
We shared a post in a Facebook group for Ukrainians living in the Czech Republic. This post offered details about our research, stated our preference for interviews in Prague, and promised anonymity to participants. Participants answered through the author’s Messenger account and then face-to-face meetings were arranged. The post was not sufficient because only two participants from Western Ukraine responded. Therefore, another post searching for participants from that region followed. Only three participants responded via Messenger. Hence, authors contacted five more participants through personal ties with the Ukrainian diaspora living in Prague and with Caritas in Hradec Králové. Ultimately, ten interviews with participants from Western Ukraine were conducted. The unwillingness of displaced persons from Western Ukraine to respond to the Facebook post was perhaps due to their flight from regions less affected by the airstrikes and bombing (thus, they could not justify fleeing from Ukraine). The traditional labor migration from Western Ukraine to the Czech Republic means that even Ukrainians who arrived after February 2022 are viewed (often negatively) as economic migrants.
A certain bias was introduced by the recruitment strategy on Facebook. Participants who responded to us were motivated to provide an interview. Most of them expressed gratitude for being accepted by the Czech Republic and Poland. Others sought to explain their own or Ukraine’s attitude toward Russia, Ukrainian history, and the differences between Ukrainians and Russians, or to describe their living standards and the way they fled from Ukraine. Many participants expressed nationalistic feelings. The responses mostly came from Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine, likely because their position as displaced persons was not questioned. Ukrainians from Western Ukraine may have felt differently.
We used semi-structured interviews. This method is suitable for studying aspirations and deservingness because it can explore values, personal ambitions, identifications, and motivations. The same list of questions was used for all participants. The questions asked about the motives of the participants’ own migration (why participants left Ukraine, what were the main and additional motivations for flight), the migration ambitions of their fellow citizens and differences between the migration aspirations of displaced persons from the western and eastern parts of Ukraine. The last question was sometimes reformulated to capture differences between displaced persons from various regions of Ukraine or shortened to capture regional differences regarding motivations to flee. Some participants began discussing the division between displaced persons from Western and Eastern Ukraine on their own, while others were directly asked about it. Some participants emphasized the unity of Ukraine and the lack of significant differences in the population, but most participants answered the question without any problems.
In the Czech Republic, we asked the non-governmental organizations Šatník (which provides clothes) and Potravinová banka (Food Bank, which provides food) for cooperation. These organizations give humanitarian assistance to displaced persons from Ukraine. Our original intention was to search for data about the region of birth of their clients to know the regional origin of Ukrainian holders of temporary protection. In Potravinová banka, a short-term small-scale research asked clients face-to-face about their birth region as the food bank collects no such data. We intended to compare data from both organizations, but were unsure how open Ukrainians in Potravinová banka were about their region of birth. Most of them referred to the region of their departure.
Every participant was informed about the purpose of the research and was asked to sign the informed consent form. This consent secured their approval for being recorded, our promise not to give data to third parties, the retention of data only in our personal archives, the participants’ anonymity, and possibility to withdraw from this research. The ethics committee at the University of Hradec Králové confirmed the integrity of the research (reference number 10/2023). Ethical approvement is necessary due to handling personal and sensitive materials which refer to fleeing from Ukraine and to war circumstances.
We conducted research on migration from Ukraine prior to the 2022 Russian invasion, and two of us undertook fieldwork in Ukraine before the war, where we became familiar with the country and fluent in the Ukrainian language. One author spent nine months in Western Ukraine in 2014– 2017 and remains in frequent contact with Ukrainians there. The second author became employed at Sumy State University before the invasion. Although not of Ukrainian nationality, we were able to conduct interviews in Ukrainian. This was important because participants could not speak Czech or Polish. Participants viewed the authors as members of Czech or Polish society and expressed gratitude during the interviews for being accepted into these countries.
Findings
Migration Aspirations and Deservingness from an In-Group Perspective
Ukraine, especially its western regions, is traditionally a country of emigration, but after 2014, the war in Eastern Ukraine and post-Maidan developments in other regions have been affected by out-migration as well. 51 Before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, most participants, regardless of their region of origin, conducted tourist, work-related or study stays abroad, and four of them had already planned to emigrate permanently for reasons such as family reunification, children’s education, or job searching. Other participants mentioned the possibility of unplanned permanent migration for similar reasons. Although most of the participants strongly denied the possibility of moving abroad permanently before the invasion, the war pushed them to flee.
Participants were asked about their primary reasons for fleeing, and their subsequent aspirations, ranked in order of importance. The war was their primary driver followed by the safety of their children. Few participants referred to family reunification. These motives are interrelated, as one participant states: I fled because I wanted my child to be safe. She should grow up normally, walk calmly in the streets, talk freely with other children of her age and not sit in the shelter and live in fear. I wanted my child to be safe and this was the main reason why we fled. (Participant 16)
Most participants refused to leave Ukraine permanently before the Russian invasion of 2022, but the war drove them out of their homes. Naturally, war conditions and life-threatening situations are reasonable drivers and the self-represented aspirations to flee are related to physical insecurity: Our city was surrounded [by Russian forces]. Like being isolated. Convoys or Russians [soldiers] arrived on tanks in our town. Our men threw Molotov cocktails at them and the Russians left. We all hoped that Ukrainian forces would liberate us, but during one airstrike almost twenty people died. Whole families. The raid fell on houses. I understood that we could die. It was just a matter of time. (Participant 9).
They had agency, even limited, because they discussed fleeing with family members or packing necessary clothes before their departure. Their decision was not made easily, as they took time to think about migration. This is why most participants fled days or weeks after Russia launched the invasion. Scholars suggest that refugees often skip the preparation phase before departure and have limited opportunities to handle situations, but our research suggests that forced migrants do not always depart suddenly nor do they lack an intrinsic ability to impose their agency. 52 Traditional functionalist or structural approaches invoke impersonal factors to explain why forced migrants are pushed out of their country of origin, and often portray refugees as individuals dragged along by fate, but overlook migration as a human-oriented social process. 53 The Temporary Protection Directive also emphasizes that impersonal factors push displaced persons to flee. According to it, participants might be treated as legitimate holders of temporary protection because they fled from armed conflict, were at “serious risk,” or “unable to return in safe and durable conditions because of the situation prevailing in that country.” 54 The Directive includes external factors as also facilitating migration. However, the situation is more complex and our data show the need for a human-oriented perspective to understand the situation of displaced persons.
The need for a human-centered approach is noticeable when participants assess the aspirations of their fellow citizens to flee. Participants mentioned that others were driven first by war circumstances, and second by economic aspirations, such as getting a job, taking advantage of humanitarian assistance and/or free accommodation, reaching sustainable living conditions, and solving their own unemployment problem in Ukraine. Economic aspirations may be seen as an external, involuntary push influencing the decision to migrate. However, participants perceive these ambitions as voluntary decisions, driven by the desire to seize opportunities abroad. Economic aspirations are associated with one’s own decision to move, not with forced flight from dangerous conflict, as one participant stated, We do not have accommodation for free. I did not even claim it. Since the first day, I have paid a considerable amount of money for one room in the hostel. Some girl from Western Ukraine arrived here to work, she legalized her wage and has free accommodation. This is not right, I should have it as a displaced person from occupied territory. But it is really like that. (Participant 5).
Participants occasionally justified economic incentives with the lack of job opportunities in Ukraine: “There are no jobs. After the invasion, the labor market also suffered and it also affected Western Ukraine” (Participant 21). While many of their fellow citizens obtained temporary protection because they fled war-torn situations, which aligns with the Directive, participants also stated that the economic ambitions of other citizens should not be considered a legitimate reason for receiving temporary protection. However, the Directive states that all nationals who left the country of origin and applied for temporary protection in the country of destination should have equal “deserving” treatment as those who fled from the country due to the war. 55
The Non-Deserving Economic Aspirations of “Westerners”
Participants were further asked about the regional perception of migration aspirations of their fellow citizens. Almost one-third of participants did not differentiate the migration aspirations of Ukrainians by region of origin because war affected or might affect the country’s entire territory: “People from the eastern regions fled because it is dangerous there. People from Western Ukraine fled because they were afraid that war might come to their regions” (Participant 10). Most participants, however, pointed to the economic migration aspirations of their fellow citizens from Western Ukraine. The primary such aspiration was searching for a job abroad: “We had the stereotype that Ukrainians came here to work. They work for money, they are ready (to work) for anything. And displaced persons from the west (Western Ukraine) fulfil it. You know why they fled” (Participant 53). Another frequent answer related to economic aspirations was exploitation of social welfare and humanitarian assistance. Participants refer to the economic aspirations of displaced persons from Western Ukraine in a broader sense, yet they still emphasize the importance of using the opportunity to migrate and exploit the benefits: There were many displaced persons from Western Ukraine, but [Russian soldiers] did not shoot there. They [from Western Ukraine] did not feel the stress and obtained temporary protection. There are organizations offering humanitarian assistance and they go everywhere where they could receive something for free. Their bags [with assistance] are sent to Ukraine. You [wonder] “What is happening?” I see how [Ukrainians from a specific region in Western Ukraine] every day run around many humanitarian centers and say “Give me, give me.” This is ruthless (Participant 11).
Displaced persons from Western Ukraine are “accused” of wanting to settle in the Czech Republic or Poland permanently. People from Western Ukraine “always travelled here to work and they want to settle here. They say that they want to settle here (. . .), build a new life here” (Participant 21).
Participants’ reasoning about the economic aspirations of displaced persons from Western Ukraine is supported by data obtained on 18 January 2024 from the non-governmental organization Šatník in Prague, which records the regions of birth of Ukrainian holders of temporary protection in the Czech Republic. They were born in these regions: Kyiv (738), Zakarpattia (443), Ivano-Frankivsk (422), Odessa (287), Lviv (243), Zaporizhzhia (201), Sumy (145), Mykolaiv (178), Poltava (124), Vinnytsia (123), and Luhansk (112). As many as 1,216 displaced persons come from the western regions, 1,182 from Central Ukraine, 666 from Southern Ukraine, and 112 from Eastern Ukraine. Šatník’s services are mostly used by Ukrainians from Western Ukraine. In Prague, there are generally more Ukrainians from Western Ukraine. 56
This relates to the “character” of fellow citizens from Western Ukraine. Participants described Western Ukraine as calm (without Russian troops, airstrikes, or shooting). Residents might have lived peacefully there because their homes were not bombed, but still decided to migrate: “I do not like it. We arrived here and many displaced persons are from the western part of Ukraine. No one shoots there and it is calm there. They did not feel the stress and still received temporary protection” (Participant 11). Some participants from Western Ukraine challenge these statements. They legitimize their deservingness as holders of temporary protection by their fear of the war (war could extend to Western Ukraine), an unpredictable future (did not know what could happen), or war circumstances (Western Ukraine also exhibits signs of economic depression): I heard the sirens and it was really awful. School did not work so I decided to go after my husband temporarily. If Russians step onto the territory of Western Ukraine, or if the bombs fall, no one knows what could happen (Participant 24).
Participants from Western Ukraine refer to the economic motivations of their regional fellow citizens as non-deserving and not associated with forced migration: everyone should be honest to himself/herself. Because everything that is not on the bright side of honesty, is in front of the eyes. And you cannot cover it. Someone has got a flat in (Western) Ukraine, he rented it, arrived in the Czech Republic, received money and lived for free. And others have nothing. (. . .) This mess is everywhere (Participant 15).
They also stated that “those other” fellow citizens might have intentions contrary to participants from Western Ukraine. Some also mentioned that the primary motivation to flee of “those others” was searching for a job or educating their children abroad.
With reference to the eastern regions, most participants strongly asserted that armed conflict was the most common driver for migration, followed by the impossibility of returning home, and the Russian occupation. These motivations are associated with forced migration and the deservingness of migration, which fits the Temporary Protection Directive. The regional perception, as participants from the in-group perspective reflected, is not in line with the collective approach of the Directive. The Directive refers to “third country,” “country of origin,” and “nationals” without significant in-group divisions or differences in deservingness 57 . Thus, temporary protection was granted to those who were pushed from their country of origin by war, as well as to those motivated by economic incentives for migration. 58 Although the Directive states that the asylum system cannot process the mass influx and therefore protection must be granted more quickly, it overlooks in-group differences between “nationals.” The temporary protection suspended individual investigations. 59 While all Ukrainians are legitimate applicants, participants argued that not all of their fellow citizens should be granted temporary protection.
(Non)deserving Temporary Protection Based on “Proper” Acting, Migration Aspirations, and Region of Origin
Their deservingness is legitimized if displaced persons behave as “good displaced persons” in the receiving Czech and Polish society. Participants who are “good displaced persons” refuse humanitarian assistance, want to hold a job, refuse to be a “burden” on the host country, and legitimize their deserving status by saying that they are hardworking people able to reach sustainable living conditions in host countries by themselves: I met people who said: “You are Ukrainians, you just want to exploit the Czech Republic and you are doing nothing and so on.” But I could not wear a big sign (on my chest) with my story, why I am here, that I do not receive humanitarian assistance, that I work, pay taxes and everything (Participant 14).
This creates boundaries and tensions between hardworking participants and displaced persons from Western Ukraine. “When we arrived here, we immediately felt (from them): ‘They will take our jobs. We are here for ages, we have everything created, agencies, mafia’” 60 “For me it was hard to find work with a normal salary. Everywhere are agencies, everywhere is Western Ukraine, they have money from our jobs (percentage from the salary they took from us) and they do nothing” (Participant 34).
The participants explained that the high number of displaced persons from Western Ukraine was because they worked and lived in the Czech Republic or Poland before the invasion, and they decided to apply for temporary protection instead of returning back to the country of origin: “It is not the reason that the war began and they decided to go to the Czech Republic for work. They were already here” (Participant 2). In mid-2023, people from Western Ukraine made up 31 percent of all displaced persons in the Czech Republic and 20 percent in Poland. 61 This may mean that, also according to participants’ interpretations, the largest group of Ukrainian displaced persons is non-deserving of temporary protection and humanitarian assistance, although the Temporary Protection Directive includes no criteria of deservingness for “subnational” groups.
From their responses, we can conclude that participants are aware of “western non-deservingness” and “eastern deservingness.” The lack of “western“ worthiness of protection is interesting in light of data collected on 7–8 February 2024 in Potravinová banka, which suggest that people purposefully falsified the region from which they fled because of the regional (non)deservingness of temporary protection status. 62 When asked where they came from, 196 clients reported that they fled from Eastern Ukraine, 150 from Central Ukraine, 129 from Southern Ukraine, and only 77 from Western Ukraine. However, workers of Potravinová banka, who know many of their clients personally, asserted that most clients are from Zakarpattia or Ivano-Frankivsk, two western regions. Deliberate concealment was uncovered in an interview we conducted in December 2023, with a participant who explained that she departed from Zakarpattia (Western Ukraine), but in Potravinová banka, she strongly insisted she departed from Zhytomyr (Central Ukraine). The purpose was, probably, to legitimize her position as a displaced person deserving of the services of the non-governmental organization. Our sample is too small to allow generalization.
Our findings show that participants view the economic aspirations of displaced persons as non-deserving of temporary protection and associate these aspirations with their fellow citizens from Western Ukraine. Participants consider the fear of war experienced by displaced persons as deserving of temporary protection, associating this fear with their fellow citizens from Eastern Ukraine. Almost all participants—including those from Western Ukraine—self-represented their own aspirations as associated with war. They consider themselves as deserving temporary protection. Deservingness and non-deservingness also relate to “proper” (participating in the labor market, refusing humanitarian assistance) or “improper” (relying on humanitarian assistance) behavior. Note, however, that one-third of participants did not support this regional division.
To conclude, participants do not view all displaced persons from Ukraine as deserving of temporary protection based on their region of origin and economic intentions for migration. The research also reveals that migration from Western Ukraine is perceived as non-deserving of protection, while participants from the same region consider their own migration aspirations as deserving. This viewpoint goes against the collective rationale of the Temporary Protection Directive which omits the in-group awareness of deservingness and emphasizes mass protection based on nationality. Studies of deservingness emphasize the ethnic group perspective (scholars debate how host societies perceive certain groups of migrants or discuss inter-ethnic ties between migrant groups) and refugee studies address the ethnic background, but our data suggest that the in-group perspective is equally important. 63
Discussion
Participants in this research distinguish deserving and non-deserving migration aspirations of their fellow citizens and associate the non-deservingness of migration aspirations with the economic ambitions of displaced persons from Western Ukraine. These economic motivations include searching for a job, exploiting humanitarian assistance, or—more widely—using the opportunities offered by the temporary protection status in the Czech Republic and Poland. Being pro-European, Western Ukrainians adapted more easily than their counterparts fleeing Eastern Ukraine to life abroad. 64 Participants consider that fellow citizens from Western Ukraine, because to their non-deservingness, are fallible because their relocation is not related to forced migration but to voluntary mobility. Participants from Western Ukraine insisted on the non-deservingness of granting temporary protection to their fellow citizens for the same reasons. At the same time, the same participants legitimized their own temporary protection by the decision to flee from the war and keep their children safe (a reason for being eligible for temporary protection). Contrary to displaced persons from Western Ukraine, displaced persons from Eastern Ukraine are seen as fleeing from life-threatening situations and facing the impossibility of return. They are thus seen by participants as deserving temporary protection.
These findings support the recognition of (non)deserving migration aspirations among displaced persons from Ukraine. Scholars of migration aspirations provide a bottom-up perspective focused on self-representation but overlook the interaction of migration aspirations with the aspirations of others from the same community. 65 The concept of deservingness allows us to elaborate on which aspirations within the community are seen as deserving and which are not. Scholars of deservingness show how host societies perceive certain minorities/migrant communities and suggest that majorities in host countries view migrant groups as economic migrants, generally seen as non-deserving. In contrast, refugees are typically perceived as deserving. 66 Few studies explore the inter-ethnic ties between migrant groups, but overlook the in-group perspective which, nevertheless, can reveal significant differences in deservingness, as participants from the same group have a better understanding of their fellow migrants’ experiences and aspirations. 67 The present study shows the divide between the Western and Eastern Ukraine perceived by the migrant community.
Conclusion
This article focuses on the interconnection of migration aspirations, deservingness, and the regional origin of displaced persons from Ukraine. Participants explained that their fellow nationals from Western Ukraine have economic aspirations which, from their perspective, are non-deserving of temporary protection. In contrast, fellow nationals from Eastern Ukraine are seen as forced migrants deserving of temporary protection. The Temporary Protection Directive provides collective safety to all Ukrainian citizens.
Our findings have practical implications. Temporary protection and refugee status are different in their nature and should not be equated although the rights provided to temporary protected persons are similar to the protection of refugees. 68 The temporary protection is immediate in the case of a massive influx of migrants, when third-country nationals are treated collectively because of the risk that the asylum system will fail to efficiently process applications. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 elaborates on personal fear but requires time for processing applications (usually six months or more). In contrast, temporary protection can overlook significant individual disparities due to its simplified and rapid procedures. This is why temporary protection might not address the influx of migrants adequately. 69
For our participants, the Directive recognizes that all nationals from Ukraine can be considered as temporary protection holders despite the significant in-group differences in perceived migration aspirations and deservingness. Granting temporary protection in the Czech Republic and Poland overlooked key distinctions among displaced persons from Ukraine because the Directive does not provide for individualized procedures. The Directive is a useful tool when the asylum system cannot handle a large number of individual assessments, but our study shows that Ukrainians evaluate temporary protection deservingness based on the region of origin.
This research has some limitations. First, participants mentioned that displaced Ukrainians should behave “appropriately” in countries of destination, but the societal norms were not analyzed. Second, the terms deserving and undeserving are methodologically based on polarization and future research should overcome this logic. Third, a high number of women was interviewed, while men were not part of the research. The reason for this was that men were unwilling to provide interviews, whereas women agreed to participate as they were perceived as more deserving of protection. The situation for men is generally problematic, as they are often perceived as traitors unwilling to defend their country. This leads to the focus of this article only on women’s perspectives. Including only women as participants reflects one key factor—that the women in the Czech Republic and Poland, including the participants, are often the recipients of humanitarian assistance, which influences their understanding of who deserves to receive assistance and who does not. In addition, a significant portion of the participants were single women, either due to their age or lack of family commitments, and their drivers for fleeing may differ from other participants with families. However, the article did not focus on this distinction. Fourth, the number of participants from Western Ukraine was lower, but we aimed to maintain a balanced ratio of participants from all regions of Ukraine. Last, but not least, while some participants themselves initiated talking about the regional division, others were prompted to do so. This suggests that results of this article may be influenced by the fact that some participants were prompted to offer their views on regional division.
Future research exploring the implications of the Temporary Protection Directive is promising. It is important to debate how the Directive accomplishes its purpose, especially after it was firstly launched on the territory of EU in 2022. European countries did not have experience with it before the Russian invasion, so it is critical to elaborate on the successes, indispositions, or insufficiencies of the Directive.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and editors for their helpful comments and feedback.
