Abstract
This article examines some unprecedented political events in post-Stalin Europe which have been the subject of much mystery and speculation but no proper scholarly analysis. Based on archive documents, the study explores the purge of several of the highest-ranking political officials in communist Albania from 1981 to 1983, including the ministers of the interior, health, foreign affairs, and defence. Analysing how and under which conditions this happened, the overall aim is to gain a deeper knowledge of the country’s ruler Enver Hoxha and his inner circle. Ultimately, the article contributes to the study of the Stalinist character of Hoxha’s dictatorship during the last years of his life. The analysis shows that, like Stalin, Enver Hoxha was a master of a crisis and a state of emergency. Through a similar rhetoric of alarmism and demolition, he was able to incite his associates to his course of violence while also reducing them to objects of his omnipotence. Under these conditions, cadres were forced to fight for their lives, meetings of leading organs of the communist party resembling battlefields. Ultimately, the bloody purges of 1981 to 1983 represented the final act in Hoxha’s definitive ascent as master over life and death in “his” party.
Introduction
The night before 18 December 1981, Mehmet Shehu, communist Albania’s prime minister since 1954, committed suicide after severe criticism from his politburo comrades and under circumstances that have yet to be fully established. Subsequently, over the course of roughly 10 months, the ministers of the interior, health, foreign affairs and defence and some other high-ranking officials fell from grace. The ruler Enver Hoxha accused them of being traitors and part of a monstrous conspiracy on behalf of hostile foreign powers and under the leadership of Shehu. The main defendants were executed and buried in secret locations in 1983. 1
This last bloody purge by Enver Hoxha, who would die of old age and ill health in 1985, aroused great media interest, but scholarly analyses are still lacking. 2 In surveys of twentieth-century socialism, the events are mentioned only very briefly, if at all, and are interpreted as bizarre and a consequence of power struggles between clans within the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania (PLA). 3 The latter assertion is connected inter alia with false biographical information on the country’s communist leaders, which is also widespread in academic publications, and which at the same time illustrates the extent to which research is still in its infancy. 4 Both the statement that the purged Minister of the Interior Feçor Shehu was a nephew of the prime minister with the same surname, which is widespread in Albania, and the statement that the executed Defence Minister Kadri Hazbiu had married the prime minister’s sister are incorrect. Neither of them were related to Shehu, and the documents consulted contain no indications that they belonged to a clan of the prime minister, as claimed.
The susceptibility to error has to do with the fact that the few researchers and observers in the West who commented on the events of the time were often forced by the country’s isolation to make assumptions and to rely on unverifiable information. 5 Also, after the end of the Cold War, interest on the part of foreign researchers in this very small country, which is often regarded as a strange special case of twentieth-century socialism, remained low. Domestic researchers, on the other hand, lacked, and in many cases still lack, the appropriate framework conditions to conduct thorough archive-based research that is both theoretically informed and methodologically sound. 6
Due to the significant improvement in Albanian archives’ accessibility in recent years, it is now possible to gain insights into the above-mentioned events that were unprecedented for Europe, at least in the post-Stalin era. 7 How and under what circumstances did Enver Hoxha succeed in purging the party leadership on such a large scale? How did he proceed? How did his intended victims react? How did the other members of the leadership circle act?
This article addresses these questions in order to gain knowledge not only about Hoxha’s purging techniques and power strategies, but also about practices, rituals, mind-sets and the atmosphere within the leadership. Overall, the aim is to gain a deeper understanding of the small group of people who determined the fate of the country in an almost totalitarian manner and about whom barely anything is known. Ultimately, the study intends to contribute to the examination of the thesis of the Stalinist character of the Hoxha regime, which has hitherto been based primarily on the analysis of eye-catching characteristics. 8 In doing so, the article approaches issues that have been at the heart of Stalinism studies and, more generally, of research on dictatorships for many decades now: the conditions, mechanisms, nature, scale and processes of personal power and domination and the (il)logic of despotic terror against one’s own entourage. As the numerous interpretative models and scholarly controversies concerning Stalin and his rule demonstrate, these are complex debates on perplexing phenomena. This article adds to them by analysing another case of excessive personal power and repression and, more specifically, the conditions, dynamics and methods that played a central role in this respect. In view of the current state of research and the large amount of relevant sources, the article does not claim to be an exhaustive study. Instead, it regards itself as an initial point of reflection on the purge based on a scholarly analysis of archive documents.
As many scholars of Stalinism have warned, recognising the shortcomings and pitfalls of archival documentation is imperative. We can never establish for sure what the true thoughts, intentions and feelings of the actors involved were and, furthermore, we have to take into account the especially secretive and informal environment of the ruler’s “court” in which important decisions were taken. 9 Yet the available documents provide a wealth of insights that allow us to identify prevailing individual and group behaviour and to capture the essence of the atmosphere under which the purges unfolded. This evidence is of crucial importance if we are to grasp the modus operandi of Hoxha’s despotic rule in general and of his last purge in particular. Taking these methodological problems into consideration, the article focuses its main attention on the analysis of practices, behaviours and situations and their dynamics. In this way, it aims to shed light on the conditions that made the purge possible and to gain a better understanding of the “world” of Albanian communist leaders. The approach to examining actual political practices in order to understand the workings of (high) politics has been favoured by numerous scholars of Soviet political history since the opening of the communist-era archives, for instance by Sheila Fitzpatrick and Oleg V. Khlevniuk, to name just two influential ones. 10 How illuminating a focus on individual and collective behaviours can be for understanding purges has been shown for example by William J. Chase’s study of the Comintern from 1934 to 1939. 11 Finally, the present study’s analysis has been inspired by Jörg Baberowski’s situational approach to Stalinist repression and violence. 12 To gain a deeper understanding of these phenomena, he brings into focus pressures to act and further dynamics that develop in the course of a situation. The context is of essential importance too. Baberowski speaks of “spaces of violence” that he defines as not only geographical zones but also invisible spaces created by the idea of a shared world. 13 According to him, they do not prescribe how to act, yet restrain possibilities of action and outline individual and collective behaviours, ultimately enabling and shaping acts of violence. 14 In the present study, the “space of violence” is Enver Hoxha’s circle and the so called bllok (the Albanian short form for “the leaders’ block”). The bllok was not just a neighbourhood in which the communist elite lived, guarded by armed men and enjoying privileges. 15 It was also the space in which power in communist Albania was centralised. 16 It was a way of ruling and a way of living 17 and, as this article shows, in many cases also a way of dying as an enemy.
While the article makes use of results from Stalinism studies throughout the analysis, in order not to risk detracting from the clarity of the examination of the events, systematic comparison between Hoxha’s strategies and practices and those of his political model, Stalin, 18 is made only in closing. Also, of the vast amount of literature on Stalinist purges and show trials, only the works most representative and relevant for the topic under discussion are considered.
The End of Mehmet Shehu as Enver Hoxha’s Demonstration of Power and the Purge’s Starting Point
The fall of the long-time prime minister took its course at the height of his power. In the early 1980s, after numerous party purges had taken place over the years, 19 just as Enver Hoxha was the party’s and the country’s undisputed leader, Shehu was clearly the number two in the power hierarchy. However, in those years, Ramiz Alia, Central Committee (CC) Secretary for Ideology and Propaganda, also appeared to enjoy great and indeed special favour with Hoxha, and his family. While allegations about animosities between the wives of the countries’ two most powerful men need to be treated with caution until verified, there is good reason to assume that Hoxha’s family preferred Alia over Shehu as his successor. Not only had the former been well acquainted with Hoxha’s wife, Nexhmije, since the Second World War, but since 1974 a close important family connection had been established, Alia’s niece having married Hoxha’s son and moved into the ruler’s house. Whereas Shehu had a fearsome reputation as ruthless and had built his own cult as a former military strategist, Alia appeared comparatively moderate, restrained and was completely in the ruler’s shadow. All this made the prospects of him turning against Hoxha’s cult and family once the ruler was gone less likely than in the case of the powerful prime minister. 20 Hoxha’s most important and loyal servants also included Defence Minister Kadri Hazbiu, who had previously headed the ministry of the interior from 1954 to 1980. The other few members of the “old guard” who were still alive and the newcomers of the 1970s 21 clearly ranked behind Hoxha, Shehu, Alia and Hazbiu in the power hierarchy. 22
In the late summer of 1981, one of Mehmet Shehu’s sons got engaged to a young woman from a family with a “bad political biography.” When Hoxha learned of this shortly afterwards, he confronted the prime minister and accused him of neglecting the class struggle. Shehu had the engagement annulled. Hoxha, however, subsequently behaved visibly coolly towards him, and his entourage followed his lead. Shehu became increasingly isolated. 23 In this situation, Hoxha gave him the task of writing a self-criticism. 24 Following his boss’s instructions, Shehu wrote a letter to the Politburo, harshly criticising himself. 25 Taking advantage of this, his “comrades” attacked and humiliated him at the Politburo meeting of 17 December 1981. 26 Hoxha himself sent out many and partially contradictory signals. He acted as an interrogator, but at the same time staged himself as a kind of impartial arbiter. In this latter capacity, he almost always agreed with the “arguments” of Shehu’s critics. Towards the “defendant,” he presented himself as strict but benevolent. At one point, he accused Shehu of having tried to deceive him concerning the engagement. 27 Relatively soon hereafter, however, he appeared conciliatory and addressed Shehu in a companionable manner. 28 In the end, he instructed him to thoroughly revise his self-criticism for the following day’s Politburo meeting. He also ostensibly cleared Shehu of any possible allegation of having acted with hostile intent. 29 However, precisely by explicitly voicing such a suspicion, he in fact fuelled it even more strongly and decisively. Shehu appeared demolished and paralysed. The same night he committed suicide, at least according to official sources. Within a few months and in an almost spectacular manner, Hoxha had managed to bring down the powerful prime minister, who had been much feared for his hardline positions and brutality; 30 he had destroyed him mentally and, ultimately, physically.
The very same morning that Shehu was found shot in his bed with a pistol next to him, Hoxha declared him an enemy before the Politburo. A few hours later, at a CC emergency plenum, he spoke of a “masked and dangerous enemy” 31 whose aims and plans had to be revealed. Hoxha claimed that the suicide could only be explained by the fact that Shehu’s conscience must have been burdened by “other mistakes, exceptionally serious ones, and acts still unknown to the party.” 32 Against this background, and especially in view of the “fact that hostile elements have emerged in the party leadership, many times also in its main leadership,” 33 he called for increased vigilance. At the same time, Hoxha urged Shehu’s staff to not fall into a state of fear and shock, but to mobilise even more. In conclusion, he had Shehu posthumously expelled from the party as a “dangerous enemy” along with his wife Fiqrete as his “close collaborator in anti-party and hostile activities.” 34 The Shehu family was immediately placed under house arrest. Its members were only allowed to attend the funeral on 19 December. However, only six people in total dared to do so. Even Shehu’s wife and two of his brothers stayed at home, in the vain hope that this gesture would spare them from repression. 35
All in all, Hoxha used the fall of Mehmet Shehu to demonstrate and strengthen his power. He created an atmosphere of insecurity and mistrust in which only by diligently serving Hoxha could one hope not to be declared a collaborator of Shehu’s. The former powerful prime minister’s shameful end as an enemy, whose funeral was boycotted even by parts of his family, showed everyone how fatal it was to fall out of favour with the party leader. Under these circumstances, Hoxha was to degrade other party leaders to objects of his power and ultimately have them disappear one by one behind bars.
In Search of Conspirators: Uncertainty, Submissiveness and Arrests in the Leadership Circle
On 14 January 1982, Adil Çarçani, on “old guard” member specialised in economy who had served as deputy prime minister under Mehmet Shehu, was given the task of forming a new government. Çarçani essentially confirmed his predecessor’s ministers, with the exception of Minister of the Interior Feçor Shehu, whose fate is not mentioned in the consulted protocols of party meetings of that time. Hekuran Isai, who would soon prove to be a confidant of Ramiz Alias, became the new minister of the interior. Kadri Hazbiu retained the post of minister of defence and, furthermore, was instructed by Hoxha to support Isai in tracking down Mehmet Shehu’s “hostile activities.” 36
While Isai and Hazbiu began to carry out punitive actions such as the dismissal and transfer of cadres, 37 Hoxha ordered the arrest of the removed minister of the interior, Feçor Shehu, for “high treason” by decision of the Politburo. There is almost no information on how this decision came about. It was not discussed in the recorded meetings, but was obviously made in informal talks between Hoxha and his confidants. The Politburo decision document stated that the matter would be discussed at the next CC plenum. 38 However, this was convened only on 24 September, and even then the decision was simply presented to those present for confirmation. Hoxha argued in just two sentences that the Politburo had acted in accordance with the rules laid down in the party statute and that the enemies had been caught red-handed as accomplices of Mehmet Shehu and conspirators. 39 Earlier, in the late April of that year, Hoxha and Interior Minister Isai had only briefly informed the Politburo that the detained wife of Mehmet Shehu had accused Feçor Shehu of having been her husband’s accomplice. 40
In fact, the disaster of the former minister of the interior had already taken its course during the dismantling of Mehmet Shehu. At that time, the latter, after raving accusations from Hoxha and his followers, had to account for why Feçor Shehu had been the first Politburo member he consulted about his son’s engagement. Although the accused had argued that he had asked the minister of the interior for information about the political biography of the fiancée’s family, the suspicion of a conspiratorial relationship between the two could not be dispelled. 41 The name of Feçor Shehu had been “defiled.” Against this background, it can be assumed that his arrest would not have surprised anyone. In any case, the way things were going, the other party leaders hardly had time to deal with his fate.
At the meeting of the Politburo on 24 April, Hoxha staged an unprecedented state of emergency. He claimed that for 40 years, Mehmet Shehu had been working with various methods, many accomplices and on behalf of several enemy secret services to destroy socialism in Albania. Now that he had been liquidated, his taskers and accomplices would be enraged. The Politburo had to be prepared for the worst, such as terrorist attacks, Hoxha warned. 42 The “extended arms” of Shehu could be anywhere and would have to be exposed. But he also warned—in fact, Hoxha’s speech reads like a string of warnings—of an espionage mania; distrusting each other would bring about the end of the party. 43 Again, however, they should know that the class struggle continued and was even intensifying. 44 There are many “buts” in Hoxha’s speech. Each of them increased the psychological pressure on those present and compounded the confusion regarding the situation and the “right” way to act. This strategy shows clear parallels to Stalin’s “trick” of exploiting chaos and uncertainty. 45
Hoxha’s speech had begun with a call for strict discretion. Shehu and his accomplices had allegedly long been engaged in a secret fight against socialism. Their “remnants” would continue to operate undercover and could now even get instructions from their foreign masters to hold back for a while in order not to attract attention, and then to strike later. “This will be an insidious fight,” 46 Hoxha warned, demanding maximum vigilance, secrecy and unity. Under these circumstances, and apparently without formal discussion, but rather in a raid, one by one Minister of Health Llambi Ziçishti, his brother Mihallaq, who had previously served as head of the secret police, commonly called the Sigurimi, and Foreign Minister Nesti Nase ended up behind bars. Thus, regardless of whether Hoxha truly believed in the existence of a conspiracy or not, the conspiratorial mindset he disseminated played a central role in enabling and shaping the purge. 47
Nothing is mentioned on the arrest of Llambi Ziçishti in May 1982 in the available documents from the PLA archives. It was only on 24 September that Hoxha gave the absurd explanation before a CC plenum that the accused had accompanied Mehmet Shehu on a trip to the United Nations General Assembly session in New York in September 1960. 48 For the arrest of Mihallaq Ziçishti in August 1982, there is, at least, a decree by the Politburo. However, similar to the case of Feçor Shehu, this contains nothing more than the accusation of “high treason.” 49 The same applies to the arrest of Foreign Minister Nesti Nase in mid-September, 50 after Hoxha had already sent him into early retirement in the June of that year, following Alias’ advice, due to an alleged lack of initiative. 51
Around the same time as Nase’s arrest, accusations were also levelled against Minister of Defence Kadri Hazbiu, who had previously headed the Ministry of the Interior for some 26 years, from 1954 to 1980. Now he was suspected of not having been sufficiently vigilant. On 20 September, the CC Secretariat met to discuss the matter. 52 During this very long meeting, Hoxha and his men used a technique that scholars have observed in other communist party purges in early post-war Eastern Europe too. They “bombarded” the intended victim with endless, repetitive questions about details of matters decades past, striving to make him feel confused, uneasy and guilty. 53 At the same time, they tried to create the impression of a constructive discussion. Hoxha both presented himself as good-natured and exerted great pressure. While ranting against the conspirator Mehmet Shehu, he explicitly denied that Hazbiu had collaborated with him. He did, however, urge him to make a sincere contribution to the clarification of past mistakes “in the interests of the homeland and the party,” and gave him the task of submitting a self-criticism to the Politburo. On the other hand, Hoxha gave the impression that the self-criticism was a formality and talked about returning soon to daily business. 54 Hazbiu declared his willingness to accept any punishment from his master except condemnation as a traitor. 55 Despite the submissive tone, the strikingly clear content of this statement indicates that Hazbiu had learned a lesson from Mehmet Shehu’s fall and could read Hoxha’s face. Nevertheless, as it will be shown, this did not help him. Like the other members of Hoxha’s inner circle, he was completely powerless vis-à-vis the despot.
Even before Hazbiu accounted for himself to the Politburo, on 24 September Hoxha presented to the CC his “synopsis of the secret activity of the enemy Mehmet Shehu,” which was later published and also translated into other languages. 56 In it, he more or less laid down the final version of his story of an existence-threatening conspiracy by a number of foreign secret services under the leadership of Mehmet Shehu that had been going on for decades. Abroad, Hoxha’s conspiracy theory was perceived at most as a further proof of his madness. 57 In Hoxha’s inner circle, however, fear for one’s own life and of a cruel and shameful death may have reached a climax. “The enemies must tremble! The dictatorship of the proletariat will hit harshly and without hesitation all those who threaten the interests of the homeland, socialism and the party,” 58 Hoxha raged. “Mehmet Shehu was buried like a dog,” 59 he humiliated his former close companion in front of the entire plenum. Then, recorded confessions and self-incriminations as traitors by imprisoned family members of the deceased prime minister were played to those present. 60 In the meantime, Shehu’s eldest son and one of his brothers had also committed suicide. 61
Hoxha didn’t give his intended victims time to breathe. The atmosphere of an unprecedented state of emergency was further aggravated. Three days after the speech, the ministry of the interior reported the liquidation of an armed gang of criminal exiled Albanians who had landed on the coast on 25 September. However, this action, which has not been sufficiently clarified to this day, was not discussed in party meetings. As it later transpired, the “gang” consisted of four people, only three of whom had actually landed and one of whom was an undercover Sigurimi agent who later testified against Hazbiu. 62
The “Show Trial” of Kadri Hazbiu before the Leading Party Organs
The defence minister’s fall from disgrace had already been apparent since the CC Secretariat meeting on 20 September at the latest, although the party leader had praised him there as a “loyal comrade.” 63 About three weeks later, Hazbiu ended up behind bars. In contrast to the previous discussed cases, the final phase of Hazbiu’s purging took the form of a kind of show trial before the leadership bodies. It is important to note that the demolition before the Politburo and the CC Plenum was preceded by a period of mental demoralisation of the targeted victim in the summer of 1982 with rumours that he had fallen or would fall from grace. 64
The first part of this “show trial” took place before the Politburo on 8 October. 65 This time, there was no longer any trace of an allegedly constructive and comradely discussion like at the CC Secretariat meeting in September. The meeting bore closer resemblance to a harsh interrogation of a recalcitrant criminal who was to be made aware that he had to surrender unconditionally and immediately. Hazbiu was attacked from all sides with brutal accusations, he was harshly addressed and interrupted, ridiculed and presented as untrustworthy. The most active of all those present was clearly Hoxha. Although his servants were extremely eager, most of the questions put to Hazbiu came from the leader. He hijacked the interrogation from time to time and seemed extremely determined to force Hazbiu to make explicit confessions of guilt. 66 In several ways, Hoxha put immense pressure on the intended victim and played cat and mouse with his fears and hopes, for example by threatening with devastating consequences, 67 leaving open how far these would go, 68 making it clear that Hazbiu’s fate was completely in his hands and that he would accept nothing but capitulation. 69 When all else failed, Hoxha slipped into the role of a fatherly figure or educator who wanted to give the guilty party one last chance to save himself. He instructed him to revise his self-criticism and attempted to lure him into cooperation with the assurance that the comrades only wanted to help him. 70 Despite all Hoxha’s warnings and threats, Hazbiu remained true to his line of argumentation even in his revised self-criticism. He did not confess to treason, but emphasised his loyalty to Hoxha. 71 The result was a storm of indignation on the part of the despot.
The final part of the “show trial,” the CC plenum of 13 October 1982, can be described as the most shocking and bizarre meeting of leading party organs in the period under discussion. 72 It was opened with a speech by Hoxha, in which he heavily accused Hazbiu, while raging against the “terrorist Mehmet Shehu,” 73 whom he also insulted with an obscene gesture with his arm, against his “rats” 74 and against the “shitheads Feçor Shehu and Llambi Peçini.” 75 He then swore pathetically and martially to the invincibility of the party, drawing a parallel that must have terrified those present: “They [the enemies] killed Kirov in the Soviet Union, but they did not [could not] shake the party.” 76 Was the impending purge of Hazbiu not the conclusion to the campaign after Mehmet Shehu’s death, but only the beginning of a wave of terror on an even greater scale, as in Stalin’s Soviet Union after 1934?
In any case, Hoxha’s tendency to imitate to a certain extent the Moscow show trials of 1936–1938 is striking, and examining his actions from this perspective proves fruitful. Confessions of allegedly most disgraceful acts such as participation in conspiracies for the purpose of overthrowing socialism and murdering the nation’s leader belonged to the trademarks of these grotesque spectacles. 77 The “diabolical figure of the traitor” 78 was of essential importance for personalising an abstract political enemy. Labelling comrades enemies was an almost necessary step in the process of depersonalising, dehumanising and, altogether, recategorising them from members of the in-group to members of a supposedly evil out-group posing an existential threat. 79 In this respect, Hazbiu’s denial of treason and his reiteration of his loyalty to Hoxha critically threatened the success of the show trial against him.
Hoxha’s followers pounced on Hazbiu with accusations. They addressed him harshly, mocked him and seemed almost amused at his allegedly obvious dishonesty, complained to Hoxha about the alleged meanness of the victim who was in fact demolished, were dramatically outraged at his “hostile acts,” raged at him with all sorts of accusations, seemingly lost patience with him and then found it again in order to delve into the smallest, specific details that were supposed to reveal traces of monstrous crimes. According to the notes in the minutes, “all comrades” repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction and anger. But there were also several instances of “laughter.” To take passages from this performance full of versatile emotions as an illustration is a challenge, because the entire minutes read like a macabre theatrical contest. Nevertheless, a scene will be given here as example:
I don’t know this, I can’t remember who I notified [about an alleged incident in 1960].
(All comrades express dissatisfaction and anger)
Why didn’t you go directly to Comrade Enver to tell him about it?
I can’t remember who I told about it, I can’t remember.
This is another accusation.
Excuse me?
This is another accusation in continuation of the self-criticism. [. . .] Kadri accuses us, Comrade Enver.
Who, us?
He says he sent word, but he is lying.
(Comrades: This is a lie.) [. . .]
Hey, Comrade Hekuran, hey, Comrade Hekuran.
He [Hazbiu] will have told Mehmet Shehu and he [Shehu] will have told [responded to] him: Shut up . . . (Laughter)
This way we can speculate [about everything], Comrade Pilo.
But [these are] not speculations, these are not speculations. 80
After the meeting, which ended with Hazbiu’s expulsion from the party and the decision to prosecute him, Hoxha played the role of a loving, fatherly, almost chummy character. He went to some of the plenum members in the hall and had a cordial conversation with them while he scolded and mocked Hazbiu. “All comrades” laughed. But they also rushed to show their loyalty. “Very well done, Comrade Enver,” ‘that’s the way he wanted [deserved] it “the party strengthens itself when it cleanses itself of such anti-party and enemy elements,” they cheered. 81 While allegedly joking, Hoxha indicated the “advantages” of the purge for incoming officials. The “comrades” laughed again and declared their full readiness to serve the party leader. Then they said goodbye to him in the coffee break attended only by the Politburo members, laughing and cheering, according to the protocol. 82 One wonders whether they could have such a good-humoured conversation with someone who had just cruelly humiliated and sent to death one of his most loyal men for decades and had demonstrated his power to do the same with anyone else anytime.
Further Purges in the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies
Research into Stalinist show trials has shown that they “needed a complex story line, a conspiracy involving many actors.” 83 Demonstrating the existence of great danger and unmasking double-dealers were some of their main purposes. 84 In doing so, show trials had both a frightening and mobilising effect on their audience. 85 The pressures to conform and to defend one’s membership of the in-group were immense. The latter required active participation in the hunt for double-dealers. In the course of the Moscow show trials, “as political anxieties deepened, ‘vigilance’ became synonymous with ‘mistrust.’ 86 Denouncing comrades and recategorising them as the “demonic Other” became “acts of personal and group defence.” 87 The resemblances with the Albanian case under scrutiny are conspicuous and help make sense of the dynamics and individual and group behaviour presented below.
Interrogations of other attendees had already flared up during the “show trial” of Hazbiu before the assembled CC plenum. Rexhep Kolli, who had held various high Sigurimi positions for many years, including that of the head, was the first to be interrogated. Ramiz Alia called him as a witness when it was alleged that Hazbiu had possibly been involved in crimes in the early days of communist rule. Kolli first announced that he himself bore an extraordinarily heavy responsibility and had therefore prepared self-criticism, but then tore into Hazbiu with hysterical accusations. Hazbiu’s self-criticism, he said, was an intrigue, a fraud. Hazbiu had been involved in the crimes of Koçi Xoxe, the minister of the interior executed in 1948 and Enver Hoxha’s former arch-enemy, and subsequently in Mehmet Shehu’s conspiracy plans. Kolli also railed against the imprisoned Feçor Shehu and the former Sigurimi head Mihallaq Ziçishti, himself now arrested. 88 Hoxha was satisfied for the time being and ordered that Kolli should now sit down while Hazbiu continued to account for himself. In the course of the debate about Hazbiu, however, Kolli again became involved and showed himself to be particularly aggressive. 89 Among other things, he accused Hazbiu of not having carried out comprehensive purges of ‘Feçor Shehu’s main brood’ in the Ministry of the Interior and in the judicial organs. 90 In this way, at a stroke he massively expanded the circle of suspects. It is not possible to find out whether Kolli’s “testimony” had been coordinated with Alia and Hoxha beforehand or whether he had thought it up on his own in fear for his life. In any case, his hysterical accusations must have put many of those present in fear of death.
Next, still during the “trial” against Hazbiu, the two Deputy Defence Ministers Veli Llakaj and Nazar Berberi had to explain themselves. The accusations against them were monstrous and had been made by Hoxha himself. In his opening speech he had stated it was proven that Llakaj and Berberi had visited Mehmet Shehu at his home a few days before his death. Hoxha then expressed the suspicion that Shehu had planned a military coup with them, and hysterically conjured that in such a case the army would have immediately torn the plotters to pieces. 91 Llakaj and Berberi were apparently in a state of shock, for they did not react for a very long time. Only at an advanced stage of the discussion did Llakaj take the floor and attack Hazbiu and Berberi. A debate broke out among the three accused, while Hoxha and his men also chimed in with shots at them. 92
It was not until after the “trial” of Hazbiu that the interrogations really began. No sooner had he left the hall than many of Kolli’s, Llakaj’s and Berberi’s subordinates spoke out and attacked them harshly. Their situation looked hopeless. As in the case of Hazbiu, it was now completely in Hoxha’s hands to show mercy or to send the accused to a shameful death as traitors. Unlike Hazbiu, who had “dared” to make it a condition he would not be declared a traitor, Kolli hurried to affirm that he would conscientiously accept any punishment. 93 Hoxha ultimately showed mercy, but before that he played a macabre game with the anxious accused. He left it up to him to make a proposal as to what punishment the party should give him. Kolli proposed they exclude him from the CC, but allow him to remain in the party. Hoxha extended the game. Now the CC participants had to vote whether this was the just punishment for Kolli. This they affirmed. Hoxha approved their “decision,” 94 but in fact his omnipotence as the master over life and death had become more visible than ever. After markedly brusque interrogations of Llakaj and Berberi, Hoxha also showed them mercy. Although they were completely excluded from the party and relieved of their leading positions in the ministry of defence, they still escaped imprisonment. 95
Finally, the purge also reached the PLA Institute for Marxist-Leninist Studies. It was not its director, Hoxha’s wife, but the deputy director Ndreçi Plasari who was held accountable for the praise of Mehmet Shehu in the institute’s publications. He was also accused of having concealed a document of the British secret service concerning the then prime minister, which he had found in the London archives. Plasari began to read out a prepared self-criticism. He heavily accused himself for having served, albeit unconsciously, the “hostile views” and “diabolical intentions” of Mehmet Shehu. 96 But the “comrades” indignantly interrupted him and asked him to reveal the reasons for his misdeeds. The accused broke out in hysterical self-reproach. He had been an opportunist, a coward and politically short-sighted. He had never suspected that Shehu was a traitor. Now he was greatly angry at himself. 97 The plenum members became increasingly enraged. They did not accept Plasari’s arguments, but clearly steered towards making him out to be a liar and possibly a collaborator of Shehu’s. After intervention from Ramiz Alia, however, it was finally decided to “only” exclude Plasari from the CC for the time being and to leave further punitive measures open. 98
The CC plenum continued its work with a long afternoon session on the problems of transport. Now the “comrades” acted as if nothing had happened. The CC plenum even ended solemnly. Three of those present received decorations, bestowed by Hoxha in person. Among them were two Politburo members who had been particularly aggressive in the purges, Pali Miska and Simon Stefani. “Long live the party, long live you, Comrade Enver, as long as our mountains,” cheered Miska and embraced the party leader while everyone applauded. 99 To sustained applause from the whole assembly, Hoxha said goodbye to the participants. 100
‘A Great Lesson for All’: Court Sentences and Executions
In connection with the alleged conspiracy under the leadership of Mehmet Shehu, two prominent court proceedings, one civil and one military, took place almost parallel to each other. In the first, the defendants were Mehmet Shehu’s wife Fiqrete, his son Skënder, former Foreign Minister Nesti Nase and former Health Minister Llambi Ziçishti. The second trial was directed against Kadri Hazbiu, who was arrested two days after the CC plenum, the former Minister of the Interior Feçor Shehu, three Sigurimi officials, Mehmet Shehu’s head bodyguard and a hairdresser also accused of collaboration in conspiracy. The accused in the first trial also appeared as witnesses in the second. 101
Dramatic scenes unfolded in the courtroom as the defendants accused and insulted each other. They were also under fire from numerous witnesses, including former subordinates and acquaintances. In vain, Hazbiu appealed to the judge that the witnesses should only testify and not insult him. 102 Only Kadri Hazbiu, Feçor Shehu and Sigurimi official Llambi Peqini refused to accept the charge that they had been members of a counterrevolutionary organisation. All three were sentenced to death. They were shot on the night of 9 to 10 September 1983. The same fate befell the former Minister of Health, Ziçishti. The rest of the accused received long prison sentences. 103
When Enver Hoxha was informed of the court sentences by his confidant Ramiz Alia at a meeting of the CC Secretariat, he expressed nothing but hatred and contempt for the “dog” Hazbiu and the other “dung heaps and vile traitors.” 104 At the CC plenum of 20-21 September, he then presented the “uncovering” and “destruction” of the “conspiracy” as “a great lesson for all” which needed to be reflected upon in depth. 105 In a manner typical of him, Hoxha painted a picture of a state of emergency in which everyone was to be maximally vigilant and mobilised on all fronts. He also praised the “deadly fists” and the “sword of the party” that had destroyed all enemies and would continue to do so. 106 He ended his speech by proclaiming “Long live the party.” According to the minutes, the assembled responded with “thunderous applause” and cheers of “Party of Labour—Enver Hoxha.” 107 Indeed, the party had become Hoxha’s “possession” and its members, including the entire leadership, his hostages.
Conclusion
Like Stalin, Enver Hoxha was a master of a crisis and a state of emergency. 108 He fabulated a monstrous conspiracy, staged a situation of unprecedented danger, put the party leadership on red alert and created an overall atmosphere comparable to that during Stalin’s Great Terror. 109 As Hoxha’s reference to the events in the Soviet Union after Sergei Kirov’s death shows, he admired Stalin’s great purges. Through a similar rhetoric of alarmism and demolition, he was able to incite his associates to his course of violence. In contrast, however, Hoxha’s last purge was mainly limited to his prominent comrades. In this respect he even went further than his role model. Stalin too, especially in the last years of his life, had internally attacked and humiliated his most important and loyal companions. 110 But Hoxha destroyed them and hatefully denigrated them publicly. The explanation could lie in the fact that in the last years of his life, Hoxha, unlike the Soviet despot, had apparently determined a successor. The killing of prominent party leaders clearly elevated and consolidated the position of his trustee, Ramiz Alia, as his successor. Otherwise, what has been noted for Stalin’s behaviour in his last years also applies to Hoxha’s last purge. The dictator might have appeared capricious and highly unstable, yet his actions followed a clear logic: to preserve and even boost his power in and despite old age and illness. 111 Under such conditions, although no one dared oppose him, apparently Hoxha too still “felt compelled to launch on-going struggles to maintain his personal hegemony in a precarious environment.” 112
The state of emergency provided an ideal breeding ground for Hoxha’s games with suspicion and rumours, which, like Stalin, he wielded as an important weapon in his arsenal of power and subjugation techniques. 113 Furthermore, the state of emergency offered him the greatest possible freedom of action. No measure could be questioned under such circumstances, no punishment could be considered too harsh. With the argument that it was essential to fight deceitful conspirators lurking everywhere, Hoxha was able to issue arrest decrees without prior formal consultations and did not even have to formally justify them afterwards. The decision-making centre shifted to his “court,” while meetings of the party’s governing bodies were mainly transformed into stages for ritual homage to the ruler and the demolition of those who fell from grace. 114
In turn, the other members of the ruling circle had their hands tied. The more dramatically Hoxha staged the state of emergency, the crueller the punishments his followers had to fear. The more party leaders were actually declared enemies, the higher they stood in the power hierarchy and the more dramatic their end was, the greater and more terrifying the avalanche of terror appeared. Under the condition of the state of emergency, Hoxha’s followers were degraded to objects of his omnipotence. They lived in an atmosphere of total arbitrariness and permanent fear of death. Who could feel safe when the ruler declared his closest long-time comrades to be his worst enemies from one day to the next, cruelly humiliating and destroying them?! How terribly would the despot punish others if he did not even show mercy to his most valuable and loyal servants, but instead had even their wives and children arrested, interned or killed?! What intrigues took place behind one’s back in the course of the “discreet fight” against the allegedly covert traitors? Whose turn was it next to suddenly disappear behind bars? What shameful end as a traitor then awaited and what unimaginable suffering would family members have to endure? Hoxha’s ruling circle, like Stalin’s, was an assembly of terrified people with whose fears and hopes the despot played cat and mouse. 115
Escalating the dimensions of the conspiracy and threats also had a strong mobilising effect. 116 As in Stalin’s circle, in Hoxha’s too, one had to become a perpetrator in order to avoid ending up as a victim. In the atmosphere of distrust and the frenzy of violence, nobody could prove his innocence, but had to show his zeal and spirit. Fights for life and death broke out among the “comrades.” Meetings of leading party organs resembled battlefields. As soon as somebody was suspected, all those present pounced on him with such brutality that only his ruthless destruction could be the goal. Companions attacked and humiliated each other, subordinates stabbed their bosses in the back, the accused practised self-deprecating self-criticism and hysterically hurled accusations at other people. A signal from the ruler was enough for grotesque rituals of criticism and self-criticism of Stalinist character to be set in motion. 117
The purges turned perpetrators into victims, but they also produced new perpetrators and winners. These included in particular Hoxha’s later successor Ramiz Alia and a number of party leaders who had started rising to power in the course of the 1970s. With striking aggression and cynicism, they helped Hoxha push his old and much-feared guard into the abyss. Their role in the informal, confidential meetings at the despot’s court remains to be clarified. Independently of this, however, the bloody purges of 1981 to 1983 represented the final act in Hoxha’s definitive ascent to the position of a master over life and death in “his” party.
To conclude, Enver Hoxha’s purge methods and rhetoric and his subordinates’ actions and reactions reveal the essentially Stalinist character of the prevailing practices and mindsets within the elite of a country on the outer edge of the Eastern bloc roughly two and a half decades after Nikita Khrushchev had initiated de-Stalinization. Whereas much research still needs to be done on why Stalinism appealed so much to the Albanian leadership and especially on the implications of historical and cultural similarities, the documents analysed demonstrate, above all, the powerful role of enemy and conspiracy thinking in enabling and perpetuating despotic power.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The publication of this article was funded by the University of Vienna.
