Review Essay: Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert,eds. Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative. West Lafayette,IN: Purdue University Press

As a side note: surely the appropriate acronym in the title should have been SFRY and not FRY, which was used for the Serbo-Montenegrin rump Yugoslavia.

The resolution is reproduced in Klaus Peter Zeitler, Deutschlands Rolle bei der volkerrechtlichen Anerkennung der Republik Kroatien unter besonderer Berucksichtigung des deutschen Aussenministers Genscher ( Marburg: Tectum, 2000), 344-45.

The draft is reproduced in B. G. Ramcharan , ed., The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official Papers (The Hague: Kluwer Law International , 1997), 24-27.

The Commission’s opinions and comments are reproduced in International Legal Materials, vol. 31 (1992): 1494-1526.

Ibid., 1505-7. Indeed, the 4 November provisions of the draft Convention did not even delineate the areas that were going to be covered by "special status." Chapter II Article 2(c) stated that "these areas are listed in Annex A," but "Annex A" simply did not exist! See the reproduced draft in Ramcharan, International Conference, 13-23.

The proclamation of the Union of Communes is reproduced in Davor Pauković , ed., Uspon i pad "Republike Srpske Krajine" (Zagreb: Centar za politološka istraživanja, 2005), 68-69.

For the announcement of the Union of Communes and of the boycott of the Croatian Sabor by the SDS deputies, see the interview with the leader of the SDS, Jovan Rašković, in Srđan Radulović, "Zbogom Dalmacijo," Slobodna Dalmacija, 27 May 1991, 12-13.

Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War ( Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).

The choice of this team, as well as of the team working on chapter 3, "Independence and the Fate of Minorities, 1991-1992," not to consult Richard Caplan, Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), for their accounts of the EC’s recognition policy, was very unfortunate. Caplan’s book provides the literature’s best and most detailed treatment of all the issues surrounding the EC’s decision making.

Warren Zimmermann , Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers-America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why ( New York: Random House, 1996), 176; interviews with Hans-Jörg Eiff on 8 June 2005, with Henry Wynaendts on 1 June 2005, with Rusmir Mahmutćehajić on 27 April 2006, and with Haris Silajdžić on 27 April 2006.

The EC’s decisions of 16 December 1991 are reproduced in International Legal Materials 31 (1992): 1485-87.

For the coverage of the CDU congress that took place on 15, 16, and 17 December 1991, and for the confirmation of Kohl’s participation in it on all three days, see the coverage in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, especially pages 1-3 on 16 December, pages 1 and 3 on 17 December, and pages 1 and 2 on 18 December 1991. The telephone contact is confirmed by Genscher in his memoirs Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany’s Reunification (New York: Broadway Books, 1997), 514.

Central Intelligence Agency , Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, vols. I and II (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis , 2002).

See the descriptions of the events in Croatia in the summer of 1991 on pages 83-91 of volume II. To conclude from those that the JNA was acting as a peacekeeper appears to be very naive and extremely generous towards the JNA High Command and its officers on the ground.

See in particular pages 84-85 in volume I and pages 25-27 in volume II.

See the press release from the ECHR regarding its decision in Jorgić vs. Germany at https://wcd. coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1163649&Site=COE.

United Nations Security Council , Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to SCR 780 (1992), S/1994/674, 25, 33.

Statement by Mr. Eric Östberg, Rule 61 Hearing, ICTY Case IT-95-5-R61/IT-95-18-R61 Prosecutor against Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, 27 June 1996, 24-27.

Ivo Goldstein , Croatia: A History (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), 229.

The EC Monitoring Mission clearly laid the blame for the bulk of the committed crimes with the Serbs and the JNA. See the account of its report of 26 November 1991, which was leaked to the press in Tony Barber, "Serbs ‘Bomb Hospitals and Schools,’" Independent, 3 December 1991, 1.

The order of Radovan Karadžić for a "lighting" action of erecting barricades was actually captured on tape and entered as evidence at the ICTY. See the Intercepted communication between Radovan Karadžić and Rajko Dukić, 1 March 1992, OTP no. B9117, BHS transcript, 1-2, available at http://www. domovina.net/tribunal/page_006.php. The premeditation behind the SDS barricade campaign was confirmed by Colonel Colm Doyle, who was a member of the EC Monitoring Mission stationed in Sarajevo at the time in his testimony in the trial of Slobodan Milošević on 26 August 2003, 25265.

For the best descriptions of events in Sarajevo during those days, see CIA , Balkan Battlegrounds, vol. I, 152-54; ibid., vol. II, 345-53; as well as the coverage in Oslobođenje and the journalist account in Tom Gjelten, Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspaper under Siege (New York: HarperCollins , 1995), 19-24.

CIA , Balkan Battlegrounds, vol. II, 304.

See in particular volume I and pages 127-29 on the arming of Bosnian Serbs, and pages 135-38 on the events in Eastern Bosnia in the spring of 1992.