Empirical research linking violence and ideology—and using discourse theory and analysis—could provide more nuanced insights into political strategies and social contexts associated with the violent imposition of new political orders. This study addresses one such case, that of the communist takeover in Romania between 1944 and 1953, engaging in an analysis of Romanian Communist Party (PCR) discourse. Using concepts from discourse theory as a tool to critically re-examine some of the most influential comparative and Romania-specific scholarship on communist regimes, the article suggests that the PCR's rise to power was underpinned by a coherent ideological strategy. This involved the articulation of violence within a new discursive formation that sought to produce consent for the regime. In Romania's case, these findings call into question the coercion/consent dichotomy that has framed many previous analyses.
Originally the Partidul Comunist din România (PCdR—Communist Party of Romania). Following fusion in February 1948 with the Partidul Social Democrat (PSD) the party changed its name to Partidul Muncitoresc Român (PMR—Romanian Workers' Party). In July 1965 at the 9th Party Congress, Ceauşescu announced the change of name to Partidul Comunist Român (PCR—Romanian Communist Party). See Constantin C.Giurescu, Istoria României în Date (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică Română, 1971), 397. For reasons of clarity, in this article I refer throughout to the Romanian Communist Party (PCR).
2.
See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985), 107.
3.
See Dennis Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State ( New York: St. Martin's, 1999); and Stelian Tănase , Elite sşi Societate: Guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej 1948-1965 (Bucharest: Humanitas , 1998).
4.
See Jacob Torfing, New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999 ), 68.
5.
Keith Hitchins, Rumania, 1866-1947 (Oxford: Clarendon , 1994), 497-500.
6.
I refer to these parties collectively as the `establishment parties' given that they formed part of the inter-war political establishment, while the PCR was illegal between 1924 and 1944.
7.
Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press , 2003), 86.
8.
Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 86.
9.
Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 86-92.
10.
Hitchins, Rumania, 501-47.
11.
Hitchins, Rumania, 533-34.
12.
Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 92.
13.
Hitchins, Rumania, 540-47.
14.
Hitchins, Rumania, 547.
15.
For accounts of these developments, see Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press , 1971), especially for details primarily concerning the Dej period up to 1965. For the Ceauşsescu period from 1965 to 1989, see Trond Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of Ceauşescu's Personal Dictatorship (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990). For an account covering most of the period, see William Crowther, The Political Economy of Romanian Socialism (New York: Praeger, 1988).
16.
See Henry L. Roberts , Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1969); and Hitchins, Rumania, for discussions of politics and development preceding World War II.
17.
SeeŞerban Orescu, “Multilaterally Developed Romania: An Overview,” in Romania, ed. Vlad Georgescu (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University , Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1985), 12-32.
18.
For a discussion of various aspects of Stalinism at its most radical, including the cult of social `transformism' that was part of the driving force behind the construction of Stalinist systems, see Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change ( London: Allen and Unwin, 1972).
19.
Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 107.
20.
Katherine Verdery analyses the suppression of national values in Romania during the `proletcultist period', and the parallel encouragement of Russian and Soviet culture, in National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausşescu's Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Jonathan C.Valdez provides a useful discussion of the development of the theory of People's Democracy after 1948 in the context of Soviet policy on Eastern Europe in Internationalism and the Ideology of Soviet Influence ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 29-34.
21.
See Robert R. King, History of the Romanian Communist Party (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), 135; and William Zimmerman , “Soviet Relations with Yugoslavia and Romania” in Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, ed. Sarah Meiklejohn Terry ( New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), 125-54.
22.
V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution : The Marxist Teaching on the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970), 24-25.
23.
See Leszek Kołakowski , The Breakdown, vol. 3 of The Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origin, Growth, and Dissolution (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), 38.
24.
Referring to the 1930s, Kołakowski in his essay on Stalinism as an ideology points out that `Stalinist propaganda repeated without ceasing that the country was full of wreckers and saboteurs, crypto-kulaks, disloyal intellectuals of the pre-war type, Trotskyists, and agents of the imperialist Powers.' See Kołakowski, The Breakdown, 78.
25.
In V.I. Lenin , `Left-Wing' Communism: An Infantile Disorder (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1934), 9-10, Lenin claimed that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the most determined and the most ruthless war waged by the new class against the more powerful enemy, against the bourgeoisie, whose resistance is increased tenfold by its overthrow. . . . [T]he dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary, and the victory over the bourgeoisie is impossible without a long, stubborn and desperate war of life and death, a war which requires perseverance, discipline, firmness, inflexibility, and a unity of will. (Emphasis in original)
26.
Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since World WarII ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and George Schöpflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
27.
Vlad Georgescu, The Romanians: A History (London: Tauris, 1991), 222-31.
28.
Most commentators concur with this view. For an overview, see Schöpflin's survey in Politics, 62-63.
29.
Rothschild, Return to Diversity , 76-78.
30.
In talks between Stalin and Tito in 1944 revealed by Milovan Djilas, Stalin said, `This war is not like those in the past: whoever occupies a territory imposes his own social system on it.' See Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1962), 114.
31.
Lenin, State and Revolution , 104.
32.
Lenin, State and Revolution , 105.
33.
Some prominent communists, among them Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, had been busy throughout the inter-war years building Romania-specific socio-political analyses drawing on Marxist historical perspectives. See Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, Sub Trei Dictaturi (1944; reprint, Bucharest : Editura Politică, 1970).
34.
Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs; King, The History of the Romanian Communist Party; and Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania.
35.
Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons; Michael Shafir, Romania, Politics, Economy and Society: Political Stagnation and Simulated Change (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1985); and Ghiţă Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, 1944-1962 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964).
36.
See King, History; Ionescu, Communism in Rumania; Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons; Stephen Fischer-Galaţi, Twentieth Century Romania (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Dennis Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989 ( New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995); Mary-Ellen Fischer, Nicolae Ceauşescu: A Study in Political Leadership ( Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989 ); Georgescu, The Romanians; Roberts, Rumania; Shafir, Romania; Crowther, Political Economy; Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism; Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs; Verdery, National Ideology; and Antoine Roger, Fascistes, communistes, paysans: Sociologie des mobilisations identitaires roumaines (1921- 1989) (Bruxelles: Editions de L'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2002).
37.
Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs, 73-74; and Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 92. Tismaneanu notes that the elections of 1946 were viewed by the communists as an opportunity to step up the process of liquidation of their enemies, on the pretext of punishment of wartime collaborators.
38.
Shafir, Romania, 55-58.
39.
King, History, 99-119; and Verdery , National Ideology, 100-1.
40.
Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs , 73-74.
41.
Kenneth Jowitt, NewWorld Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press , 1992), 51.
42.
See Tănase, Elite Şi Societate, 40. Tănase discusses the relationship of domination between the communist elite and society during the Dej era, emphasising that pure domination was necessary given that the Communist Party was something alien to society.
43.
From Verdery, National Ideology: Romania was unusual within the bloc for its mode of control. In the early days the Romanian regime, like most others, controlled its population chiefly by force, which was later relaxed and briefly supplemented in the 1960s with a few economic incentives. The 1970s ushered in a mode of control that was primarily symbolic-ideological, supplemented and then overtaken by coercive measures in the 1980s. (100) Verdery's account of Romanian socialism and ideology follows that of Jowitt in Revolutionary Breakthroughs and King in History, defining two types of control, ideological-symbolic and coercive. The periodisation adopted by both King and Verdery is similar to Jowitt's division between the breakthrough period involving largely coercion with little interest in mass communication strategies, and later periods when the regime began to attempt mass communication of its ideology.
44.
Cf. Hitchins, Rumania, 545-46. Hitchins cites the speeches of Communist Minister of Justice Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, where class consciousness is invoked in reforms of the justice system, including the appointment of non-professional `people's judges'. Many of Pătrăşcanu's speeches and articles on the necessity of judicial reform are collected in Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, Scrieri, Articole, Cuvîntări 1944-1947 (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1983). Of particular interest is Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, “Principiile Călăuzitoare ale Reformei Justiţiei,” in Scrieri, 211-25, which is a posthumously published extract from a text written while he was minister of justice. Although it is not the main subject of this article, the development by Pătrăşcanu of a Stalinist-populist jurisprudence is fascinating to trace in these writings, and particularly ironic given that several years later he would be condemned to death by the very system that he had had a hand in building. For details on Pătrăş canu's political life, purge, and trial, see Lavinia Betea, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu: Moartea unui lider comunist (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2001).
45.
In 1953 the regime temporarily halted its agricultural collectivisation campaign, a pause that lasted until 1958. In the intervening years the regime continued to pursue the policy tacitly by means of a variety of economic sanctions and incentives. For a discussion of the politics of the first wave of collectivisation, see Robert Levy, “Primul val al colectivizării: politici centrale şi implementare regională 1949-1953,” in Ţărănimea sşi Puterea: Procesul de colectivizare a agriculturii în România ( 1949-1962), ed. Dorin Dobrincu and Constantin Iordachi ( Iaşi, Romania: Polirom, 2005 ), 66-82. For a micro-level analysis of economic sanctions and incentives in the context of state policy, see Călin Goina's fascinating case study of the collective farm at Sântana in Western Romania, “`Ce poţi face azi nu lăsa pe mâine': cazul colhozului-model `Viaţă Nouă,' Sântana” in Dobrincu and Iordachi, Ţărănimea , 368-92.
46.
See Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 110.
47.
See John Hoffman , “The Coercion/Consent Analysis of the State under Socialism” in The State in Socialist Society, ed. Neil Harding ( Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 129-49.
48.
S. Cohen, “ Bolshevism and Stalinism” in Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation, ed. RobertTucker (New York: Norton, 1977), 27, cited in Hoffman, “The Coercion/Consent Analysis,”137.
49.
Goran Therborn , The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology (London: Verso, 1980), 108, cited in Hoffman, “The Coercion/Consent Analysis,”140.
50.
Victor Frunză , Istoria Comunismului în România ( Bucharest: EVF, 1999), 357-61.
51.
For a general overview, see Rothschild , Return to Diversity, 125-46. For the specifics of the Romanian case, see Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons; and Robert Levy, Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
52.
Frunză, Istoria, 365-68.
53.
See Levy, Ana Pauker, 218-19; and Frunză , Istoria, 357-61.
54.
A political frontier is a constitutive part of a political discourse. All political discourses constitute `subject positions' with which social agents can identify. Thus a discursive field, such as Romanian communism, is filled by subject positions, such as `peasant', `worker', `kulak', and `landowner'. The discourses that create these subject positions are at the same time discourses that unite groups of subject positions together in alliance, and divide them in conflict. In this sense we can see the ideological and discursive nature of social divisions if we imagine a discursive field criss-crossed by political frontiers that serve to divide (and unite) social agents. For an extensive discussion of the concept of political frontiers, see Aletta J. Norval, “ Trajectories of Future Research in Discourse Theory,” in Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change, ed. David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000), 219-22.
55.
Lenin, State and Revolution , 20, 24-25.
56.
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej , “Raportul Politic al Comitetului Central la Conferinţa Naţională a Partidului Comunist Român,” Scânteia, 20 October 1945.
57.
See Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, “Pentru Puritatea Rândurilor Partidului,” Pentru Pace Trainică, Pentru Democraţie Populară25 (23 June 1950 ).
58.
Roger, Fascistes , 169-70. Roger also points out how this tension was used in defining conflict between leadership factions within the party.
59.
Verdery, National Ideology , 198.
60.
Verdery, National Ideology , 110-11.
61.
Gheorghiu-Dej, “ Raportul Politic al Comitetului Central.”
62.
Gheorghiu-Dej, “ Raportul Politic al Comitetului Central,” 8.
63.
Roger, Fascistes, 169-70.
64.
This is discussed at greater length in Levy, Ana Pauker, 90-133.
65.
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Raportul Politic General făcut de tov. Gh. Gheorghiu Dej la Congresul Partidului Muncitoresc Român (Bucharest: Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Român, 1948), 30.
66.
For an account, see Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 85-106.
67.
See Rezoluţia Biroului Politic al CC al PMR în Chestiunea Naţională (Bucharest: Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Român, 1948), 21.
68.
Gheorghiu-Dej, Raportul Politic General făcut de tov, 4.
69.
Gheorghiu-Dej, Raportul Politic General făcut de tov, 19.
70.
Gheorghiu-Dej, “ Raport asupra proiectului de constituţie” in Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole şi Cuvântări (Bucharest: Editura pentru literatura politică, 1952), 183.
71.
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, `Cuvântare rostită în faţă alegătorilor din Bucureşti in zuia de 26 martie 1948', in his Articole şi Cuvântări, 171.
72.
Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej, Lupta de clasă în etapa actuală (Bucharest : Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Român, 1951), 8-10.
73.
Gheorghiu-Dej, Lupta de clasă, 8.
74.
See Ruxandra Cesereanu, Imaginarul Violent al Românilor (Bucharest: Editura Humanitas, 2003), 79. Cesereanu quotes from Scânteia, 30 October 1948.
75.
Cesereanu, Imaginarul, 79.
76.
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej , “Expunere de motive la proiectul de lege pentru naţionalizarea întreprinderilor industriale, miniere, bancare, de asigurări, şi de transport,” Scânteia , 13 June 1948.
77.
Gheorghiu-Dej, “ Cuvântare rostită în faţă alegătorilor,” 177.
78.
Gheorghiu-Dej, Lupta de clasă, 10.
79.
Gheorghiu-Dej, Lupta de clasă, 13-14.
80.
Gheorghiu-Dej, speaking in 1948 at the National Assembly during the debate on the constitution of the Romanian People's Republic. See Gheorghiu-Dej, “ Raport asupra proiectului de constituţie,” 183.
81.
Gheorghiu-Dej, Raportul Politic General făcut de tov., 20; see also Gheorghiu-Dej, “ Partidul Comunist Român în lupta pentru democratizarea t şării: Raport informativ făcut la consfătuirea reprezentanţilor unor partide comuniste care a avut loc în Polonia la sfârşitul lunii septembrie 1947,” in Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole şi Cuvântări, 101.
