This study examines the role of status differential between the involved parties and amici curiae participation in explaining variation in U.S. Supreme Court criminal justice decisions that favor the government interest over the interest of the other party (1994-2012 terms). The study finds status differential between the involved parties to be a significant predictor of outcome. Repeat player effects were found for special interests that file in support of the government entity (U.S. Solicitor General and Criminal Justice Legal Foundation), but not for special interests who file for the other party (the American Civil Liberties Union and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). The study found that greater levels of aggregate amici curiae participation (all interest group activity) in the direction of the other party significantly reduce the likelihood of a case outcome that favors the government. Implications are discussed.
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