In 1970, Congress enacted what some scholars view as the most sweeping criminal statute ever passed at the federal level, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), with the primary objective of prosecuting organized crime. The legislative intent was to destroy criminal organizations by adopting mandatory fines and lengthy sentences. Thirty-two years after its implementation, however, RICO continues to be questionable and polemic. Thus, the primary objective of this study was to obtain a better understanding of RICO by conducting face-to-face interviews with 23 practitioners. The findings suggest that RICO has been extremely successful against traditional organized crime. Although it is not possible to quantify whether the benefits substantially outweigh the negative consequences, both benefits and ramifications appear to be significant and substantial and thus worthy of further analyses.
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