Abstract
An employee’s commute to work is not compensable work time. Or is it? This article examines the concept of travel time, focusing on the difficult issues that arise when an employee is using the company’s vehicles to travel. The absence of uniformity in determining compensability in such situations led to an amendment to the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 after 48 years. The amendment exempted from compensable work time travel to work from home and home from work, along with any activities “incidental” to such travel. The article also examines recent cases on the concept of incidental activities.
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References
1.
29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207.
2.
29 C.F.R. 785.7 (citing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946)).
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