Social Science and the Two Relativisms

Abstract

Social science has in the past granted much credence to two forms of relativism: cognitive relativism and cultural relativism. These two forms constitute the major components of postmodernism. Why do we believe so easily the arguments put forward by both cognitive and cultural relativism? Suspect arguments are often hyperbolical versions of valid ideas. Cognitive relativism rests on the efforts made, from the work of the Vienna Circle to that of Popper, to identify general criteria by which to differentiate between science and non-science. It also rests on sound studies of the history of science by scholars such as Kuhn. Cognitive relativism is based on hyperbolical conclusions drawn from these two sources; we are not, however, obliged to accept these conclusions. Cultural relativism is legitimated most notably by theories elaborated by certain sociologists and anthropologists on the basis of sound ideas borrowed from Montaigne, Hume and Max Weber. Again, they have drawn hyperbolical conclusions from them that we are not compelled to accept. The influence of the theories that legitimate the two forms of relativism is also due to them having been launched on the ‘market of ideas' at an historical conjuncture when they were perceived by various publics as ‘useful’ (in Pareto's sense of the word).