Cet article propose un ensemble de cas, destinés à décrire une série de problèmes auxquels doit faire face la force de vente, et offre des solutions fondées sur la littérature théorique récente. Les dernières tendances dans l'analyse de la rémunération de la force de vente, basées sur les théories de l'agence et du coût de transaction sont également présentées. Finalement, les résultats empiriques, infirmant ou confirmant chacun de ces cadres conceptuels, sont exposés, permettant aux gestionnaires d'élaborer ou de modifier les plans de rémunération de leur force de vente.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
AndersonE.OliverR. L. (1987). «Perspectives on Behavior-Based Versus Outcome-Based Salesforce Control Systems», Journal of Marketing, 51, 4, 76–88.
2.
BasuA. K.GurumurthyK. (1992). «On the Relative Performance of Linear Versus Nonlinear Compensation Plans», International Journal of Research in Marketing, 7, 2, 171–178.
CoughlanA. T.NarasimhanC. (1992). An Empirical Analysis of Salesforce Compensation Plans», Journal of Business, 65(January), 93–121.
5.
DarmonRené Y. (1979), «Setting Sales Quotas with Conjoint analysis», Journal of Marketing Research, 16, 1, 133–140.
6.
DeardenJ. A.LilienG. L. (1990). «On Optimal Salesforce Compensation in the Presence of Production Learning Effects», International Journal of Research in Marketing, 7, 4, 179–188.
7.
GonikJ. (1978). «Tie the Salesman's Bonuses to Their Forecasts», Harvard Business Review, 56, (May-June), 116–123.
8.
JohnG.WeitzB. A. (1988). «Explaining Variations in Sales Compensation Plans: Empirical Evidence for the Basu et al. Model», Working Paper, College of Business Administration, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.
9.
JohnG.WeitzB. A. (1989). «Salesforce Compensation: An Empirical Investigation of Factors Related to Use of Salary Versus Incentive Compensation», Journal of Marketing Research, 26, 1, 1–14.
10.
LalR. (1982). «A Theory of salesforce Compensation Plans», unpublished doctoral dissertation, Pittsburgh, PA: Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University.
11.
LalR. (1986). «Delegating Pricing Responsibility to the Salesforce», Marketing Science, 5, 2, 159–168.
12.
LalR.StaelinR. (1986). «Salesforce Compensation Plans in Environments with Asymmetric Information», Marketing Science, 5, 3, 179–198.
13.
LalR.SrinivasanV. (1993). «Compensation Plans for Single and Multi-product Salesforces: An Application of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Model», Management Science, 39, 7, 777–793.
14.
LalR.OutlandD.StaelinR. (1993). «Salesforce Compensation plans: An Individual Level Analysis», Working Paper, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
15.
PeckC. A. (1982). «Compensating Field Sales Representatives», Report 828. New York: The Conference Board.
16.
RaoR. C. (1990). «Compensating Heterogeneous Salesforces: Some Explicit Solutions», Marketing Science, 9, 4, 319–341.
17.
RossWilliam T. (1991), «Performance Against Quota and the Call Selection Decision», Journal of Marketing Research, 28, 3, 296–306.
18.
SmythRichard C. (1968). «Financial Incentives for Sales», Harvard Business Review, 46(Jan-Feb), 109–117.
19.
SteinbrinkJ. P.FriedmanW. B. (1986). Sales Force Compensation: Dartnell's 23rd Biennal Survey. Chicago, Illinois: The Dartnell Corporation.
