Can political economists trace secretive processes? Insights from the case of oil politics and policies in Uganda

Abstract

Abstract

Beyond the diversity of research objects, many political economists share the ambition of providing explanations rather than ‘mere’ descriptions of the social facts and phenomena examined. One way to realize this ambition is to identify and conceptualize causal mechanisms through process-tracing analysis. While process-tracing has been applied in many studies, it has been used far less to investigate activities seen as secretive, located in the Global South, and falling within the domain of quiet politics such as the oil sector. This research gap raises a key issue: can political economists trace secretive processes? Drawing on research on oil politics and policies in Uganda, this article shows to what extent political economists can trace secretive processes. Building on a research design with a broad range of empirical fingerprints such as leaks from the Panama Papers and Wikileaks databases and Hansards from the Ugandan Parliament, I first show that political economists can identify and conceptualize one type of causal mechanism linked to these processes, i.e. “relational mechanisms” that “alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks; with words like ally, attack, subordinate, and appease conveying a sense of relational mechanisms” ( Tilly, 2008). Secondly, I shed light on a particular type of causal mechanism that political economists can hardly capture when it comes to tracing secretive processes: “cognitive mechanisms” that “operate through alterations of individual and collective perception, with words like recognize, understand, reinterpret, and classify characterizing such mechanisms” ( Tilly, 2008).