The author examines the U.S. Supreme Court's use of post-Chicago economic theory in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services. The author evaluates the impact of the post-Chicago perspective in Kodak on future antitrust litigation and examines the implications of a post-Chicago perspective for marketers.
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