Famous Marks Now Federally Protected against Dilution

AHP Subsidiary Holding Company v. Stuart Hale Company (1993), 1 F.3d 611 (7th Cir.).

American Express Company v. Vibra Approved Laboratories Corporation (1989), 10 USPQ2d 2006 (S.D.N.Y 1989).

Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc. (1983), 718 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir.).

Blue Ribbon Feed Company, Inc. v. Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc. (1984), 731 F.2d 415, (7th Cir.).

Coca-Cola Company v. Gemini Rising (1972), 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y.).

Congressional Record, (1995), 104 Cong. 1st sess. Vol. 141, pt. 211 (December 29), S19310).

Eastman Kodak Company v. Rakow (1989), 739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y.).

Gilson Jerome (1996), “Trademark Dilution Now a Federal Wrong: An Analysis of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995,” Trademark Protection and Practice and World Trademar Law and Practice, (Special Pamphlet). New York: Matthew Bender.

Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1989), 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir.).

Port Kenneth L. (1994), “The ‘Unnatural’ Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?” Seton Hall Legislative Journal, 18(2), 433–88.

Schechter Frank I. (1927), “The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,” Harvard Law Review, 40, 813–33.

U.S. House of Representatives (1995), Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Report 104–374, 104 Cong. 1st sess. 8.

United States Trademark Association (1964), Model State Trademark Bill. New York: United States Trademark Association.

Wedgewood Homes, Inc. v. Lund (1983), 659 P.2d 377, 222 U.S.P.Q. 446 (Or).

Yale Electric Corporation v. Robertson (1928), 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.).