Competition centered strategies in the form of predatory pricing directed toward weakening or destroying a competitor are receiving increasing emphasis in the Courts and among antitrust theorists and policymakers. Recently, the Supreme Court found little evidence of antitrust injury extending from price predation in the case of Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation (1993). The author examines the current legal standard for predatory pricing and juxtaposes it against emerging insights on this competitive practice.
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