In this paper, the author examines competitive interaction in the form of predatory conduct and presents an overview of alternative strategies and current U.S. antitrust policy. Marketing has traditionally emphasized issues related to the reaction of consumers to marketing strategies. In contrast, the reactions and strategies of competitors toward one another have received less attention. A climate of mounting competitive intensity and an increasingly aggressive stance for marketing theory indicate that marketers should be aware of the nature and legal implications of these strategies.
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