In this article, I discuss well-known planning modes from the point of view of planner loyalty and argue that advocacy planning is the only mode in which loyalty is a defining feature. Social choice theorists have shown that no attractive social decision procedure satisfies both the Pareto principle and loyalty rights. Observation of individual rights and respect for agreement among parties cannot be guaranteed for all constellations of personal preferences. This theorem is applied here to argue for, and illustrate, the impossibility of Paretian advocacy planning. The Pareto principle can conflict with loyalty claims in other modes of planning too, such as sympathy on ideological grounds for a particular group. Finally, two other paradoxes involving loyalty are presented, and their consequences for advocacy planning are briefly discussed.
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