Three models of reciprocity–simple, trend, and comparative–are
applied to events data which describe interaction between the United States and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War. The comparative reciprocity model–which
predicts that change in each actor's behavior will be based on prior
differences in the rivals' actions–received the greatest,
although limited, support. There was little agreement in the results of the three
reciprocity models for specific years. Overall, while there is some evidence of
reciprocity when using either the simple reciprocity or the comparative reciprocity
model, reciprocity does not appear to have been a robust process in U.S.-Soviet
interaction. It tended to occur most often at times of high tension and conflict.
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