One of the most controversial subjects among students of international politics is
the role of rational choice in deterrence. Disagreement is especially intense
regarding application to the nuclear setting. Progress in that debate depends on
identifying evidence appropriate for testing a wide range of propositions. The
overall purpose of this review is to assess the record of aggregate evaluation in
order to obtain guidance for further research. This investigation unfolds in several
stages. First, studies appropriate for reassessment are placed in the general
context of deterrence literature. Second, models, data, and testing procedures are
presented and explained. Third, a pair of criteria for evaluation-validity and
reliability-are applied to the above-noted quantitative studies. Fourth, and
finally, new directions for testing are suggested, with emphasis on a more unified
approach.
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