Most theories of war and lesser forms of international conflict rest on assumptions
of rational choice. Moreover, many of these explanations explicitly incorporate
decision maker estimates of relative power among competitors. However, a major
theory of great power war-power transition theory-postulates initiation by the
weaker contender. This study demonstrates that among the strongest states an
interactive relationship exists between the static power balance, differential
growth rates in capabilities, and conflict initiation: initiation patterns are
associated with changes in a state's relative military/economic power and
power potential. The findings are consistent with the inherent logic of power
transition theory and are consonant with an assumption of rational calculation in
decisions involving conflict initiation. The results may be interpreted as
reinforcing the realist contention that a shifting power balance is of critical
significance among the causes of war and peace.
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