Abstract
In this paper, I attempt to tease out the implications of expected utility models on conflict resolution and peace science. I also consider the trade-conflict model of Polachek (1980) and its extensions, as one example of expected utility in international relations. I raise three questions concerning the impact of expected utility: (1) when does trade mitigate conflict? (2) can trade provoke conflict? (3) can trade induce cooperation? From a review of empirical findings, I consider the political content of the trade-conflict model in particular, and of expected utility models, in general. Subsequently, I discuss two additional questions: (4) how do exchange norms influence trade and conflict? and (5) what incentives exist to foster cooperation from trade under expected utility? I advance the critique that while expected utility underrepresents political actions and motives, the implicit content of politics in the trade-conflict model is predominantly realist. Given this tendency, expected utility in conflict resolution and peace science will invariably be used to model strategic and geostrategic concerns.
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