International cooperation in the form of aid in return for policy is a prominent feature of international politics. In this paper, I consider whether international commitments impact such cooperation in the context of counterterrorism. Using a game-theoretic model, I argue that counterterrorism conventions operate via an informal enforcement mechanism – foreign aid. I find support for empirical implications of the model. Treaty ratification increases both foreign aid reciepts and efficacy as a counterterrorism tool. This paper contributes to understanding the role of international commitments in fostering aid-based cooperation, as well as the limits of their ability to do so.
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