Abstract
Organizations often set high demands for the release of hostages in civil war. Despite a purported restraint on state concessions to hostage-takers, exchanges between militants and national governments for the release of hostages have reached unprecedented levels in recent years. It is unknown, however, when states concede to insurgents for the release of hostage victims. Given substantial costs associated with granting concessions, I argue that governments only concede for the release of hostages where the victim is likely to attract attention, compelling states to intervene. This occurs when the hostage is a high-profile victim. I test the theory with original and granular data on the Philippines (1975–2018). The data document hostage-takings and concessions between six insurgent groups and the government. The analysis provides robust support for the theory. The findings unveil important insights for policy and research.
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